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Summa Theologica641 passages

Summa Theologica, PART HI SUPPL, Q 92, A i, ANS and REP 9-10 1025c-1032b✓ correct

Article 1. Whether the human intellect can attain to the vision of God in His essence? Objection 1. It would seem that the human intellect cannot attain to the vision of God in His essence. For it is written (John 1:18): "No man hath seen God at any time"; and Chrysostom in his commentary says (Hom. xiv in Joan.) that "not even the heavenly essences, namely the Cherubim and Seraphim, have ever… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, :✓ correct

Article 1. Whether contrition is an assumed sorrow for sins, together with the purpose of confessing them and of making satisfaction for them? Objection 1. It would seem that contrition is not "an assumed sorrow for sins, together with the purpose of confessing them and of making satisfaction for them," as some define it. For, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6), "sorrow is for those things… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 45, Q 91, A 2, REP 10 1017c-1020c✓ correct

Whether to Create Is to Make Something from Nothing? Objection 1: It would seem that to create is not to make anything from nothing. For Augustine says (Contra Adv. Leg. et Proph. i): "To make concerns what did not exist at all; but to create is to make something by bringing forth something from what was already." Obj. 2: Further, the nobility of action and of motion is considered from their… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 50, A 2, ANS 270a-272a; Q 84, A 7, REP 3 449b- 450b; Q 88, AA 1-2 469a-472c; Q 94, A 2 503a- 504a; Q in, A i, REP 3 568c-569b; PART i-n, Q 3, A 6, ANS 627b-628a; A 7 628a-d✓ correct

Whether an Angel Is Composed of Matter and Form? Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is composed of matter and form. For everything which is contained under any genus is composed of the genus, and of the difference which added to the genus makes the species. But the genus comes from the matter, and the difference from the form (Metaph. xiii, text 6). Therefore everything which is in a genus… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, QQ 50-64 269a-338d✓ correct

Whether an Angel Is Altogether Incorporeal? Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not entirely incorporeal. For what is incorporeal only as regards ourselves, and not in relation to God, is not absolutely incorporeal. But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "an angel is said to be incorporeal and immaterial as regards us; but compared to God it is corporeal and material. Therefore he is… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, QQ 50- 53 269a-284d; Q 79, A i, REP 3 414a-d; Q 87, A i, ANS and REP 2-3 465a-466c✓ correct

Whether the Intellect Is a Power of the Soul? Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect is not a power of the soul, but the essence of the soul. For the intellect seems to be the same as the mind. Now the mind is not a power of the soul, but the essence; for Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 2): "Mind and spirit are not relative things, but denominate the essence." Therefore the intellect is the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 10, A 3, ANS and REP i 42c-43b; AA 5-6 44b-46d; Q 50, A 5 274b-275a; Q 61, A 2 315c-316a; Q 97, A i, ANS 513c-514c, Q 104, A i, ANS and REP i,3534c~536c✓ correct

Whether to Be Eternal Belongs to God Alone? Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to God alone to be eternal. For it is written that "those who instruct many to justice," shall be "as stars unto perpetual eternities [*Douay: 'for all eternity']" (Dan. 12:3). Now if God alone were eternal, there could not be many eternities. Therefore God alone is not the only eternal. Obj. 2: Further,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART Q 7, A 2, i, ANS and REP 2 31d-32c; Q 12, A 4, REP 2 53b-54c; QQ 54-58 284d-306b; Q 64, A i 334a- 335c; Q 75, A 7, REP 3 384d-385c; Q 79, A i, REP 3 414a-d; A 2, ANS 414d-416a; A 8, ANS and REP 3 421c-422b; A 10, ANS 423d-424d; Q 84, A 2, ANS 442b-443c; A 3, REP i 443d- 444d; A 7, ANS 449b-450b; Q 85, A i, ANS 451c-453c; A 5, ANS 457d-458d; Q 87, A i, ANS and REP 2 465a-466c; A 3, ANS 467b- 468a; Q 89, A 3, ANS 475d-476c; A 4, ANS 476c-477a, Q 117, A 2 597c-598c; PART i-n, Q 3, A 8, REP 2 628d-629c✓ correct

Whether Theologians Should Take Note of the Circumstances of Human Acts? Objection 1: It would seem that theologians should not take note of the circumstances of human acts. Because theologians do not consider human acts otherwise than according to their quality of good or evil. But it seems that circumstances cannot give quality to human acts; for a thing is never qualified, formally speaking,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 50, A 6 lla-12a; Q 51, A i, ANS and REP 2 12b-13c; PART H-II, Q 5, AA 1-2 410a-412a✓ correct

Whether There Are Habits in the Angels? Objection 1: It would seem that there are no habits in the angels. For Maximus, commentator of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), says: "It is not proper to suppose that there are intellectual (i.e. spiritual) powers in the divine intelligences (i.e. in the angels) after the manner of accidents, as in us: as though one were in the other as in a subject: for… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 47, A 2, ANS 257b-258c; Q 50, AA 3-4 272a-274b; Q 63, A 7 331c-332b; A 9, REP 3 333b-d; QQ 106-109 545c-564b; PART i-n, Q 4, A 5, REP 6 632c-634b✓ correct

Whether the Inequality of Things Is from God? Objection 1: It would seem that the inequality of things is not from God. For it belongs to the best to produce the best. But among things that are best, one is not greater than another. Therefore, it belongs to God, Who is the Best, to make all things equal. Obj. 2: Further, equality is the effect of unity (Metaph. v, text 20). But God is one.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 8, A 4 759b-d

Whether the Will Is Moved by the Same Act to the End and to the Means? Objection 1: It would seem that the will is moved by the same act, to the end and to the means. Because according to the Philosopher (Topic. iii, 2) "where one thing is on account of another there is only one." But the will does not will the means save on account of the end. Therefore it is moved to both by the same…

Summa Theologica, PART i, QQ 59-✓ correct

Whether There Is Will in the Angels? Objection 1: It would seem that there is no will in the angels. For as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42), "The will is in the reason." But there is no reason in the angels, but something higher than reason. Therefore there is no will in the angels, but something higher than the will. Obj. 2: Further, the will is comprised under the appetite, as… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 45, A 5, ANS and REP i 245c-247a; QQ 51-53 275a- 284d; Q 91, A 2, REP i 485b-486b; A 4, REP 2 487d-488c; QQ 106-107 545c-552b; QQ iio-in 564c-571d✓ correct

Whether It Belongs to God Alone to Create? Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to God alone to create, because, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text 34), what is perfect can make its own likeness. But immaterial creatures are more perfect than material creatures, which nevertheless can make their own likeness, for fire generates fire, and man begets man. Therefore an… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 7, A 2, REP 2 31d-32c; Q 23, A i, REP 3 132c-133b; Q 47, A 2, ANS 257b-258c; Q 51, A i, ANS and REP 2-3 275b-276b …✓ correct

Whether Anything but God Can Be Essentially Infinite? Objection 1: It seems that something else besides God can be essentially infinite. For the power of anything is proportioned to its essence. Now if the essence of God is infinite, His power must also be infinite. Therefore He can produce an infinite effect, since the extent of a power is known by its effect. Obj. 2: Further, whatever has… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 63, AA 8-9 332c-333d; Q 109 562a-564b✓ correct

Whether the Sin of the Highest Angel Was the Cause of the Others Sinning? Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of the highest angel was not the cause of the others sinning. For the cause precedes the effect. But, as Damascene observes (De Fide Orth. ii), they all sinned at one time. Therefore the sin of one was not the cause of the others' sinning. Obj. 2: Further, an angel's first sin can… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 64, A 4, ANS 337d-338d; Q 66, A 3, REP 2 347b< 348d, Q 86, A 4, REP 2 463d-464d; Q 89, A 8, REP 2 479c-480c; o 91, A 2, REP 1,3 485b-486b; QQ 111-113 568b-581d; PART i-n, Q 3, A 7, RLP 2 628a-d; Q 5, A 6 641a 642a✓ correct

Whether Our Atmosphere Is the Demons' Place of Punishment? Objection 1: It would seem that this atmosphere is not the demons' place of punishment. For a demon is a spiritual nature. But a spiritual nature is not affected by place. Therefore there is no place of punishment for demons. Obj. 2: Further, man's sin is not graver than the demons'. But man's place of punishment is hell. Much more,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 98, A 3 241c-242b; PART in SUPPL, Q 76, A 3 942b-d; Q 89, A 3 1007d-1008b✓ correct

Whether the Old Law Was Given Through the Angels? Objection 1: It seems that the Old Law was not given through the angels, but immediately by God. For an angel means a "messenger"; so that the word "angel" denotes ministry, not lordship, according to Ps. 102:20, 21: "Bless the Lord, all ye His Angels . . . you ministers of His." But the Old Law is related to have been given by the Lord: for it… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 63, A 9, RLP 3 333b-d, Q 64, A 4, ANS 337d-338d; Q 86, A 4, REP 2 463d-464d; Q 89, A 8, REP 2 479c-480c; Q 114 581d-585c✓ correct

Whether Those Who Sinned Were As Many As Those Who Remained Firm? Objection 1: It would seem that more angels sinned than stood firm. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6): "Evil is in many, but good is in few." Obj. 2: Further, justice and sin are to be found in the same way in men and in angels. But there are more wicked men to be found than good; according to Eccles. 1:15: "The number… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-ii, Q 80 159d-162d, P\RT in, Q 8, AA 7-8 761d-763b✓ correct

Whether the Devil Is Directly the Cause of Man's Sinning? Objection 1: It would seem that the devil is directly the cause of man's sinning. For sin consists directly in an act of the appetite. Now Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 12) that "the devil inspires his friends with evil desires"; and Bede, commenting on Acts 5:3, says that the devil "draws the mind to evil desires"; and Isidore says (De… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theohgica, PART i, Q 63 325b-333d✓ correct

Whether the Evil of Fault Can Be in the Angels? Objection 1: It would seem that there can be no evil of fault in the angels. For there can be no evil except in things which are in potentiality, as is said by the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, text. 19), because the subject of privation is a being in potentiality. But the angels have not being in potentiality, since they are subsisting forms. Therefore… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 8, A i, REP 4 34d-35c; A 3, ANS 36b-37c; Q 49, A 3 266d-268a,c; Q 63, A 2, ANS 326c-327b✓ correct

Whether God Is Everywhere by Essence, Presence and Power? Objection 1: It seems that the mode of God's existence in all things is not properly described by way of essence, presence and power. For what is by essence in anything, is in it essentially. But God is not essentially in things; for He does not belong to the essence of anything. Therefore it ought not to be said that God is in things by… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART HI SUPPL, : Q 74, A i, REP i 925c-926c✓ correct

Article 1. Whether the world is to be cleansed? Objection 1. It would seem that there is not to be any cleansing of the world. For only that which is unclean needs cleansing. Now God's creatures are not unclean, wherefore it is written (Acts 10:15): "That which God hath cleansed, do not thou call common," i.e. unclean. Therefore the creatures of the world shall not be cleansed. Objection 2.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, Q 89, A 4 10Q8b-1009b✓ correct

Article 4. Whether the demons will carry out the sentence of the Judge on the damned? Objection 1. It would seem that the demons will not carry out the sentence of the Judge on the damned after the day of judgment. For, according to the Apostle (1 Corinthians 15:24): "He will then bring to naught [Vulgate: 'When He shall have brought to naught', etc.] all principality, and power, and virtue."… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theohgica, PART i, Q 18, A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 75, A 3, ANS and REP 2 380c-381b; Q 78, AA 3-4 410a-413d; Q 91, A 3, RBP 1,3 486b-487d✓ correct

Whether Life Is Properly Attributed to God? Objection 1: It seems that life is not properly attributed to God. For things are said to live inasmuch as they move themselves, as previously stated (A. 2). But movement does not belong to God. Neither therefore does life. Obj. 2: Further, in all living things we must needs suppose some principle of life. Hence it is said by the Philosopher (De… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 6, A i, REP 2 28b-d; QQ 80-8 1 427a-431d; PART i-n, Q 6, A 2 646a-c; Q n, A 2 667b-d; Q 12, A 5 672a-c; Q 13, A 2 673c-674c; Q 15, A 2 682a-c; Q 16, A 2 684d-685b; Q 17, A 2 687d-688b; Q 40, A 3 794c-795a; Q 46, A 4, ANS and REP 2 Animals, CH n [703 8-i5] 239b / Generation b 815bd✓ correct

Whether God is good? Objection 1: It seems that to be good does not belong to God. For goodness consists in mode, species and order. But these do not seem to belong to God; since God is immense and is not ordered to anything else. Therefore to be good does not belong to God. Obj. 2: Further, the good is what all things desire. But all things do not desire God, because all things do not know… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theohgica, PART i, Q 78, A 4, ANS and REP 3,5-6 411d-413d; PART i-ii, Q 13, A 2, REP 3 673c-674c✓ correct

Whether the Interior Senses Are Suitably Distinguished? Objection 1: It would seem that the interior senses are not suitably distinguished. For the common is not divided against the proper. Therefore the common sense should not be numbered among the interior sensitive powers, in addition to the proper exterior senses. Obj. 2: Further, there is no need to assign an interior power of apprehension… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologies PART i, Q 18, A i, REP 2 104c-105c; A 2, REP i 105c-106b; A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 69, A 2, REP 1 361c-362c; Q 72, A i, REP i 368b-369d; Q 78, A i, ANS 407b-409a✓ correct

Whether Life Is an Operation? Objection 1: It seems that life is an operation. For nothing is divided except into parts of the same genus. But life is divided by certain operations, as is clear from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 13), who distinguishes four kinds of life, namely, nourishment, sensation, local movement and understanding. Therefore life is an operation. Obj. 2: Further, the active… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3, A i, REP 2 14b-15b; A 4, REP i 16d-17c; Q 18, A 2, REP i 105c-106b; A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 19, A 10, ANS 117d-118b; Q 30, A 2, REP 3 168a- 169b; Q 59, A 3, ANS 308b-309a; Q 72, A i, REP 1,3 368b-369d; Q 75, AA 2-3 379c-381b; A 6, REP i 383c-384c; Q 76, A 5, REP 4 394c- 396a; Q 78, A i, ANS 407b-409a; A 4, ANS 411d-413d; Q 79, A 8, REP 3 421c-422b; Q Si, A 3, ANS and REP 2 430c-431d; Q 83, A i, ANS 436d-438a; Q 91, A 3, REP 1-3 486b-487d; A 2, ANS and REP 1,3 610b-611b; Q 2, A 5, CONTRARY 618d-619c; Q 6, A 2 646a-c; Q 10, A 3, ANS 664d-665c; Q n, A 2 667b-d; Q 12, A 5 672a-c; Q 13, A 2 673c-674c; Q 15, A 2 682a-c; Q 16, A 2 684d-685b; Q 17, A 2 687d- 688b✓ correct

Whether Essence and Existence Are the Same in God? Objection 1: It seems that essence and existence are not the same in God. For if it be so, then the divine being has nothing added to it. Now being to which no addition is made is universal being which is predicated of all things. Therefore it follows that God is being in general which can be predicated of everything. But this is false: "For men… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 50, A 3, REP 2 8b-9a; Q no, A 4, REP 3 350d-351d; PART III, Q 2, A 2, REP 2 711d-712dj Q 7, A 9, ANS 751d-752c; PART in SUPPL, Q 79, A i, ANS 951b-953b✓ correct

Whether There Can Be Any Habits in the Powers of the Sensitive Part? Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be any habits in the powers of the sensitive part. For as the nutritive power is an irrational part, so is the sensitive power. But there can be no habits in the powers of the nutritive part. Therefore we ought not to put any habit in the powers of the sensitive part. Obj. 2:… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 75, A 6, REP i 383c-384c; Q 76, A 5, ANS and REP 3-4 394c-396a; Q 78, A 4, ANS 411d-413d, QQ 80-81 427a-431d; Q 91, A 3, REP 1-3 486b- 487d; Q 98, A 2, ANS and REP 3 517d-519a; Q 99, A i, ANS and REP 2 519b-520a; PART i-n, Q 2, A 5, CONTRARY 618d-619c; A 6, CONTRARY 619d-620d✓ correct

Whether the Human Soul Is Incorruptible? Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul is corruptible. For those things that have a like beginning and process seemingly have a like end. But the beginning, by generation, of men is like that of animals, for they are made from the earth. And the process of life is alike in both; because "all things breathe alike, and man hath nothing more than the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 2, A 2, REP 2 711d-712d✓ correct

Whether Man's Happiness Consists in Honors? Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in honors. For happiness or bliss is "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). But honor more than anything else seems to be that by which virtue is rewarded, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore happiness consists especially in honor. Obj. 2: Further, that… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 19, A 10, ANS 117d-118b; Q 59, A 3, ANS 308b-309a; Q 78, A 4, ANS 411d-413d; Q 81, A 3, ANS and REP 2 430c-431d …✓ correct

Whether God Has Free-Will? Objection 1: It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146, ad Damas.]; "God alone is He who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having free-will, can be inclined to either side." Obj. 2: Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 59, A 3, ANS 308b-309a; Q 76, A 5, REP 4 394c- 396a; Q 79, A 8, REP 3 421c-422b; Q 83, A i, ANS 436d-438a; Q 96, A i, ANS and REP 4 510b-511b, PART I-H, Q 12, A 5 672a-c; Q 17, A 2 687d-688b✓ correct

Whether There Is Free-Will in the Angels? Objection 1: It would seem that there is no free-will in the angels. For the act of free-will is to choose. But there can be no choice with the angels, because choice is "the desire of something after taking counsel," while counsel is "a kind of inquiry," as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. But the angels' knowledge is not the result of inquiring, for this… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART HI SUPPL, Q 79, A i, ANS 951b-953b✓ correct

Article 1. Whether in the resurrection the soul will be reunited to the same identical body? Objection 1. It would seem that the soul will not be reunited to the same identical body at the resurrection, for "thou sowest not the body that shall be, but bare grain" (1 Corinthians 15:37). Now the Apostle is there comparing death to sowing and resurrection to fructifying. Therefore the same body… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 18, A i 104c-105c; Q 72, A i, REP i 368b-369d, Q 75, A 3 380c-381b; A 6, REP i 383c-384c; Q 78, A i 407b-409a; Q 118, A i 600a-601c; PART i-n, Q 17, A 2, REP 2 687d-688b✓ correct

Whether to Live Belongs to All Natural Things? Objection 1: It seems that to live belongs to all natural things. For the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 1) that "Movement is like a kind of life possessed by all things existing in nature." But all natural things participate in movement. Therefore all natural things partake of life. Obj. 2: Further, plants are said to live, inasmuch as they have in… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART HI SUPPL, Q 79, A 3, ANS and REP i 955c-956b✓ correct

Article 3. Whether the ashes of the human body must needs, by the resurrection, return to the same parts of the body that were dissolved into them? Objection 1. It would seem necessary for the ashes of the human body to return, by the resurrection, to the same parts that were dissolved into them. For, according to the Philosopher, "as the whole soul is to the whole body, so is a part of the soul… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 91, A 3 486b-487d✓ correct

Whether the Body of Man Was Given an Apt Disposition? Objection 1: It would seem that the body of man was not given an apt disposition. For since man is the noblest of animals, his body ought to be the best disposed in what is proper to an animal, that is, in sense and movement. But some animals have sharper senses and quicker movement than man; thus dogs have a keener smell, and birds a swifter… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 71, A i, REP 2 367a-368b; Q 99, A i, ANS 519b- 520a✓ correct

ON THE WORK OF THE FIFTH DAY (In One Article) We must next consider the work of the fifth day. Objection 1: It would seem that this work is not fittingly described. For the waters produce that which the power of water suffices to produce. But the power of water does not suffice for the production of every kind of fishes and birds since we find that many of them are generated from seed.…

Summa Theologica, PART HI SUPPL, Q 84, A i, REP 4 983c-984c✓ correct

Article 1. Whether the glorified bodies will be agile? Objection 1. It would seem that the glorified bodies will not be agile. For that which is agile by itself needs not to be carried in order to move. But the glorified bodies will, after the resurrection, be taken up by the angels (according to a gloss) in the clouds "to meet Christ, into the air" (1 Thessalonians 4:16). Therefore the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-ii, Q 17, A 9, REP 2 692d-693d✓ correct

Whether the Acts of the External Members Are Commanded? Objection 1: It would seem that the members of the body do not obey reason as to their acts. For it is evident that the members of the body are more distant from the reason, than the powers of the vegetal soul. But the powers of the vegetal soul do not obey reason, as stated above (A. 8). Therefore much less do the members of the body… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART HI SUPPL, Q 80, A 2, REP i 957c-958b; A 3, ANS and REP 2 958b-959c✓ correct

Article 2. Whether the hair and nails will rise again in the human body? Objection 1. It would seem that the hair and nails will not rise again in the human body. For just as hair and nails result from the surplus of food, so do urine, sweat and other superfluities or dregs. But these will not rise again with the body. Neither therefore will hair and nails. Objection 2. Further, of all the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, : 9,19-23 Q 80, A 3, ANS 958b-959c; A 4 959c-963a✓ correct

Article 3. Whether the humors will rise again in the body? Objection 1. It would seem that the humors will not rise again in the body. For it is written (1 Corinthians 15:50): "Flesh and blood cannot possess the kingdom of God." Now blood is the chief humor. Therefore it will not rise again in the blessed, who will possess the kingdom of God, and much less in others. Objection 2. Further,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 97, A 4 515d-516d; Q 99, A i 519b-520a; Q 119, A i, ANS and REP 4 604c-607b✓ correct

Whether in the State of Innocence Man Would Have Acquired Immortality by the Tree of Life? Objection 1: It would seem that the tree of life could not be the cause of immortality. For nothing can act beyond its own species; as an effect does not exceed its cause. But the tree of life was corruptible, otherwise it could not be taken as food; since food is changed into the substance of the thing… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Tbeologica, PART in SUPPL, : Q 80, A 4, ANS 959c-963a; A 5, REP i 963a-964b✓ correct

Article 4. Whether whatever in the body belonged to the truth of human nature will rise again in it? Objection 1. It would seem that what was in the body, belonging to the truth of human nature, will not all rise again in it. For food is changed into the truth of human nature. Now sometimes the flesh of the ox or of other animals is taken as food. Therefore if whatever belonged to the truth of… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 25, A 2, REP 2 144c-145b; Q 45, A 8, REP 3 249b- 250a; Q 71, A i, REP i 367a-368b; Q 72, A i, REP 5 368b-369d; Q 92, A r, ANS ana REP i 488d-489d; Q 118, AA 1-2 600a-603b; Q 119, A 2 607b-608d✓ correct

Whether the Power of God Is Infinite? Objection 1: It seems that the power of God is not infinite. For everything that is infinite is imperfect according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 6). But the power of God is far from imperfect. Therefore it is not infinite. Obj. 2: Further, every power is made known by its effect; otherwise it would be ineffectual. If, then, the power of God were infinite,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART MI, Q 60, A i, ANS 49d-50c BK iv, CH 1-2 304b,d-308d✓ correct

Whether There Is Only One Moral Virtue? Objection 1: It would seem that there is only one moral virtue. Because just as the direction of moral actions belongs to reason which is the subject of the intellectual virtues; so does their inclination belong to the appetite which is the subject of moral virtues. But there is only one intellectual virtue to direct all moral acts, viz. prudence.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 119, ences in different classes of animals A 2, ANS 607b-608d

Whether Prodigality Is a Sin? Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is not a sin. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:10): "Covetousness [Douay: 'desire of money'] is the root of all evils." But it is not the root of prodigality, since this is opposed to it. Therefore prodigality is not a sin. Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:17, 18): "Charge the rich of this world . . . to give easily,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 92, A 3, REP 2 490c-491b; Q 97, A 2, REP 3 514c- 515a;Q98, A 2 517d-519a✓ correct

Whether the Woman Was Fittingly Made from the Rib of Man? Objection 1: It would seem that the woman should not have been formed from the rib of man. For the rib was much smaller than the woman's body. Now from a smaller thing a larger thing can be made only—either by addition (and then the woman ought to have been described as made out of that which was added, rather than out of the rib… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theohgica, PART i, Q 75, AO\REP i383c-384c;Q92,A i, ANs488d-489d; Q 98, A 2, ANS and REP 1,3 517d-519a; Q 118, AA 1-2 600a-603b✓ correct

Whether the Soul Is a Body? Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is a body. For the soul is the moving principle of the body. Nor does it move unless moved. First, because seemingly nothing can move unless it is itself moved, since nothing gives what it has not; for instance, what is not hot does not give heat. Secondly, because if there be anything that moves and is not moved, it must be… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 92, A i, ANS and REP i 488d-489d; Q 98, A 2, ANS 517d-519a; Q 99, A 2 520a-d; Q 115, A 3, REP 4 588c-589c; Q 118, A i, REP 4 600a-601c✓ correct

Whether the Woman Should Have Been Made in the First Production of Things? Objection 1: It would seem that the woman should not have been made in the first production of things. For the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 3), that "the female is a misbegotten male." But nothing misbegotten or defective should have been in the first production of things. Therefore woman should not have been made at… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologtca, PART in SUPPL, Q 81, A 3 966a-c; A 4, REP 2 966d-967d 401b; 402c-d; 454a-b, 462b; 481c✓ correct

Article 3. Whether all will rise again of the male sex? Objection 1. It would seem that all will rise again of the male sex. For it is written (Ephesians 4:13) that we shall all meet "unto a perfect man," etc. Therefore there will be none but the male sex. Objection 2. Further, in the world to come all pre-eminence will cease, as a gloss observes on 1 Corinthians 15:24. Now woman is subject to… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theohgica, PART i, Q 118, A i, REP 4 600a-601c

Whether Covetousness Is a Sin? Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a sin. For covetousness (avaritia) denotes a certain greed for gold (aeris aviditas),* because, to wit, it consists in a desire for money, under which all external goods may be comprised. [*The Latin for covetousness avaritia is derived from aveo to desire; but the Greek philargyria signifies literally "love of money":… Read the rest of this passage →

Swnma Theologica, PART i, Q 96, A i, : REP 2 510b-511b✓ correct

Whether Adam in the State of Innocence Had Mastership Over the Animals? Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence Adam had no mastership over the animals. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14), that the animals were brought to Adam, under the direction of the angels, to receive their names from him. But the angels need not have intervened thus, if man himself were master over… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 95, A 4, ANS 229b-230c; Q 105, A i, ANS 307d- 309d✓ correct

Whether Isidore's Division of Human Laws Is Appropriate? Objection 1: It would seem that Isidore wrongly divided human statutes or human law (Etym. v, 4, seqq.). For under this law he includes the "law of nations," so called, because, as he says, "nearly all nations use it." But as he says, "natural law is that which is common to all nations." Therefore the law of nations is not contained under… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologtca, PART i-n, Q 92, : A i, REP 3 213c-214c; Q 105, A i, ANS and REP 1-2 307d-309d✓ correct

Whether an Effect of Law Is to Make Men Good? Objection 1: It seems that it is not an effect of law to make men good. For men are good through virtue, since virtue, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6 is "that which makes its subject good." But virtue is in man from God alone, because He it is Who "works it in us without us," as we stated above (Q. 55, A. 4) in giving the definition of virtue. Therefore… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Tkeologica, PART i-n, Q 57, AA 3-4 37b-39a; Q 58, A 2, REP i 42a-43a; A 5, REP 2 44d-45c; Q 65, A i, REP 4 70b-72a✓ correct

Whether the Intellectual Habit, Art, Is a Virtue? Objection 1: It would seem that art is not an intellectual virtue. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18, 19) that "no one makes bad use of virtue." But one may make bad use of art: for a craftsman can work badly according to the knowledge of his art. Therefore art is not a virtue. Obj. 2: Further, there is no virtue of a virtue. But "there is… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART HI SUPPL, Q 80, AA 1-2 956c-958b✓ correct

Article 1. Whether all the members of the human body will rise again? Objection 1. It would seem that not all the members of the human body will rise again. For if the end be done away it is useless to repair the means. Now the end of each member is its act. Since then nothing useless is done in the Divine works, and since the use of certain members is not fitting to man after the resurrection,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 41, A 3, ANS 219d-221c; Q 45, A 2, ANS 242d-244a; Q 47, A i, REP i 256a-257b; Q 91, A 3, ANS 486b-487d; Q 104, A i, ANS 534c-536c; Q 105, A 5, ANS 542a-543b✓ correct

Whether the Notional Acts Proceed from Something? Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts do not proceed from anything. For if the Father begets the Son from something, this will be either from Himself or from something else. If from something else, since that whence a thing is generated exists in what is generated, it follows that something different from the Father exists in the Son,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 2, A i, ANS 710a-711c; PART in SUPPL, Q 79, A 2, REP 4 953b-955c; Q 80, AA 1-2 956c-958b✓ correct

Whether Man's Happiness Consists in Wealth? Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in wealth. For since happiness is man's last end, it must consist in that which has the greatest hold on man's affections. Now this is wealth: for it is written (Eccles. 10:19): "All things obey money." Therefore man's happiness consists in wealth. Obj. 2: Further, according to Boethius (De… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 2, A 3, ANS and REP 2 12c-14a; Q 14, A 8 82c-83b; A n, ANS 84c-85c; Q 15 91b-94a; Q 16, A i 94b-95c; Q 17, A i lOOd-lOld …✓ correct

Whether God Exists? Objection 1: It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the word "God" means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist. Obj. 2: Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART HI, Q 3, A 8, ANS 729b-730b; PART in SUPPL, Q 75, A 3, REP 4 938a-939d

Whether Man's Happiness Consists in the Vision of the Divine Essence? Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness does not consist in the vision of the Divine Essence. For Dionysius says (Myst. Theol. i) that by that which is highest in his intellect, man is united to God as to something altogether unknown. But that which is seen in its essence is not altogether unknown. Therefore the final… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 16, A i, ANS 94b-95c 309c-310c; 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 57 A 3 ANS an(^ REP J 3 37b-38a; A 4, ANS and REP 2 38a-39a; Q 95, A 2, ANS 227c- 228c✓ correct

Whether Truth Resides Only in the Intellect? Objection 1: It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5) condemns this definition of truth, "That is true which is seen"; since it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth would not be true stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following, "That is true… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 68, : [io25 i8-28] 547d; BK xi, CH 7 [1064*10-18] A 4, REP i 91b-92c✓ correct

Whether the Seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost Are Suitably Enumerated? Objection 1: It would seem that seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably enumerated. For in that enumeration four are set down corresponding to the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel, which corresponds to prudence; whereas nothing is set down corresponding to art, which is the fifth… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q i, A 9, REP i 8d-9c; Q 93, A 2, REP 4 493a-d; Q 117, A i, ANS 595d-597c✓ correct

Whether the Image of God Is to Be Found in Irrational Creatures? Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "Effects are contingent images of their causes." But God is the cause not only of rational, but also of irrational creatures. Therefore the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures. Obj. 2:… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 117, A i 595d-597c

Whether Liberality Is a Virtue? Objection 1: It seems that liberality is not a virtue. For no virtue is contrary to a natural inclination. Now it is a natural inclination for one to provide for oneself more than for others: and yet it pertains to the liberal man to do the contrary, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1), "it is the mark of a liberal man not to look to himself, so… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 14, A 8 82c-83b; Q 17, A i, ANS lOOd-lOld; Q 19, A 4, REP 4 lllC-112c; PART I-II, Q 14, A 4, ANS 679b-d✓ correct

Whether the Knowledge of God Is the Cause of Things? Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is not the cause of things. For Origen says, on Rom. 8:30, "Whom He called, them He also justified," etc.: "A thing will happen not because God knows it as future; but because it is future, it is on that account known by God, before it exists." Obj. 2: Further, given the cause, the effect… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I I CH 19 [i4i9b io-27] 674c-d A 2, ANS 125c-d [1449^3-28] 684a;✓ correct

Whether, besides Philosophy, any Further Doctrine Is Required? Objection 1: It seems that, besides philosophical science, we have no need of any further knowledge. For man should not seek to know what is above reason: "Seek not the things that are too high for thee" (Ecclus. 3:22). But whatever is not above reason is fully treated of in philosophical science. Therefore any other knowledge…

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q no, A 2, REP 3 565d-566d, Q 117, A i 595d-597c 20 AQUINAS* Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 51, A i, ANS 12b-13c✓ correct

Whether One Man Can Teach Another? Objection 1: It would seem that one man cannot teach another. For the Lord says (Matt. 22:8): "Be not you called Rabbi": on which the gloss of Jerome says, "Lest you give to men the honor due to God." Therefore to be a master is properly an honor due to God. But it belongs to a master to teach. Therefore man cannot teach, and this is proper to God. Obj. 2:… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 57, A 4, REP 3 38a-39a; PART n-n, Q 40, A 3 580d-581b✓ correct

Whether Prudence Is a Distinct Virtue from Art? Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a distinct virtue from art. For art is the right reason about certain works. But diversity of works does not make a habit cease to be an art; since there are various arts about works widely different. Since therefore prudence is also right reason about works, it seems that it too should be reckoned a… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 104, A 4, ANS 306d-307c✓ correct

Whether It Is Possible to Assign a Distinct Division of the Judicial Precepts? Objection 1: It would seem that it is impossible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts. Because the judicial precepts direct men in their relations to one another. But those things which need to be directed, as pertaining to the relationship between man and man, and which are made use of by men, are… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 14,✓ correct

Whether There Is Knowledge [*Scientia] in God? Objection 1: It seems that in God there is not knowledge. For knowledge is a habit; and habit does not belong to God, since it is the mean between potentiality and act. Therefore knowledge is not in God. Obj. 2: Further, since science is about conclusions, it is a kind of knowledge caused by something else which is the knowledge of principles. But… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 32, A i, REP 2 175d-178a✓ correct

Whether the Trinity of the Divine Persons Can Be Known by Natural Reason? Objection 1: It would seem that the trinity of the divine persons can be known by natural reason. For philosophers came to the knowledge of God not otherwise than by natural reason. Now we find that they said many things about the trinity of persons, for Aristotle says (De Coelo et Mundo i, 2): "Through this… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART IX-H* Q 9, A 2, REP 3 424b-425a✓ correct

Whether the Will Is Moved by the Sensitive Appetite? Objection 1: It would seem that the will cannot be moved by the sensitive appetite. For "to move and to act is more excellent than to be passive," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). But the sensitive appetite is less excellent than the will which is the intellectual appetite; just as sense is less excellent than intellect. Therefore the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 23, A 7, ANS and REP 2 138d-140a; Q 50, A 3, ANS and REP 3 272a-273b; Q 58, A i 300c-301a; Q 63, A i, REP 2 325c-326c; A 7, ANS 331c-332b; QQ 66-68 343d-359b; Q 70 362c-367a; Q 102, A 2, REP i 525a-526a; Q no, A i, REP 2-3 564c-565d; Q 115, AA 3-6 588c-592d✓ correct

Whether the Number of the Predestined Is Certain? Objection 1: It seems that the number of the predestined is not certain. For a number to which an addition can be made is not certain. But there can be an addition to the number of the predestined as it seems; for it is written (Deut. 1:11): "The Lord God adds to this number many thousands," and a gloss adds, "fixed by God, who knows those who… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART HI, Q 5, A 2 736d-737c; PART in SUPPL, Q 77, AA 1-3 943a-947a; Q 91, AA 2-3 1017c-1022c

Whether One Man Can Be Happier Than Another? Objection 1: It would seem that one man cannot be happier than another. For Happiness is "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). But equal reward is given for all the works of virtue; because it is written (Matt. 20:10) that all who labor in the vineyard "received every man a penny"; for, as Gregory says (Hom. xix in Evang.),… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 10, A 6, ANS 45c-46d; Q 67, A 4, ANS and REP 2-3 352a-354a; Q 70, A 2, ANS and REP 3,5 364b- 365a✓ correct

The Difference of Aeviternity and Time Objection 1: It seems that aeviternity is the same as time. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20, 22, 23), that "God moves the spiritual through time." But aeviternity is said to be the measure of spiritual substances. Therefore time is the same as aeviternity. Consequently, by such knowledge as the angels have of things through the Word, they know all…

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, : Q 77, A 2, ANS 945a-946b; Q 91, A 2, REP 1-3, 5,8 1017c-1020c✓ correct

Article 2. Whether the time of our resurrection is hidden? Objection 1. It would seem that this time is not hidden. Because when we know exactly the beginning of a thing, we can know its end exactly, since "all things are measured by a certain period" (De Generat. ii). Now the beginning of the world is known exactly. Therefore its end can also be known exactly. But this will be the time of the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-ii, Q 49, A 4, ANS 5a-6a; PART in, Q 5, A 2, ANS and REP 3 736d-737c; PART in SUPPL, Q 91, A 3, REP 3 1020d-1022c✓ correct

Whether Habits Are Necessary? Objection 1: It would seem that habits are not necessary. For by habits we are well or ill disposed in respect of something, as stated above. But a thing is well or ill disposed by its form: for in respect of its form a thing is good, even as it is a being. Therefore there is no necessity for habits. Obj. 2: Further, habit implies relation to an act. But power… Read the rest of this passage →

Sumtna Theologica, PART r, Q 18, A i, REP 1 104c-105c, Q 47, A i, ANS 256a-257b; Q 50, A 3 272a-273b; Q 51, A 3, REP 3 277a- 278c; Q 52, A 2 279b-280a; Q 66, A 2, ANS 345d-347b; Q 70, A 3 365b-367a; Q no, A i, REP 2-3 564c-565d; A 3, ANS 566d-567b; Q 115, A 4, REP i 589d-590c; Q 117, A 4, REP i 599b-d; PART i-n, Q 6, A 5, REP 2 648b-649a b b✓ correct

Whether Every Human Action Is Good, or Are There Evil Actions? Objection 1: It would seem that every human action is good, and that none is evil. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil acts not, save in virtue of the good. But no evil is done in virtue of the good. Therefore no action is evil. Obj. 2: Further, nothing acts except in so far as it is in act. Now a thing is evil, not… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART n-n, Q 2, A 3, ANS 392d-393c✓ correct

Whether Man's Happiness Consists in Fame or Glory? Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in glory. For happiness seems to consist in that which is paid to the saints for the trials they have undergone in the world. But this is glory: for the Apostle says (Rom. 8:18): "The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 66, A 2, ANS 345d-347b✓ correct

Whether the Formless Matter of All Corporeal Things Is the Same? Objection 1: It would seem that the formless matter of all corporeal things is the same. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): "I find two things Thou hast made, one formed, the other formless," and he says that the latter was the earth invisible and shapeless, whereby, he says, the matter of all corporeal things is designated.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 46, A i, REP 2-3,5 250a-252d; A 3, ANS and REP i 255a-d; Q 66, A i, ANS and REP to CONTRARY 343d-345c; A 3 347b-348d; A 4, ANS and REP 5 348d-349d; Q 67, A 4 352a-354a; Q 68, A i 354a-355c; Q 70, A A 1-2 362c-365a✓ correct

Whether the Creation of Things Was in the Beginning of Time? Objection 1: It would seem that the creation of things was not in the beginning of time. For whatever is not in time, is not of any part of time. But the creation of things was not in time; for by the creation the substance of things was brought into being; and time does not measure the substance of things, and especially of… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 70, A i, REP 5 362c-364b✓ correct

Whether the Lights Ought to Have Been Produced on the Fourth Day? Objection 1: It would seem that the lights ought not to have been produced on the fourth day. For the heavenly luminaries are by nature incorruptible bodies: wherefore their matter cannot exist without their form. But as their matter was produced in the work of creation, before there was any day, so therefore were their forms. It… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART HI SXTPPL, Q 91, A i, REP i 1016b-1017c; A 2 1017c-1020c✓ correct

Whether There Is in Us a Natural Law? Objection 1: It would seem that there is no natural law in us. Because man is governed sufficiently by the eternal law: for Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i) that "the eternal law is that by which it is right that all things should be most orderly." But nature does not abound in superfluities as neither does she fail in necessaries. Therefore no law is natural… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 105, A 6, REP i 543b-544a; Q no, A 3, REP i 566d- 567b✓ correct

Whether God Can Do Anything Outside the Established Order of Nature? Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot do anything outside the established order of nature. For Augustine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3) says: "God the Maker and Creator of each nature, does nothing against nature." But that which is outside the natural order seems to be against nature. Therefore God can do nothing outside the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART ii-n, Q 2, A 3, ANS 392d-393c✓ correct

Whether It Is Necessary for Salvation to Believe Anything Above the Natural Reason? Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary for salvation to believe anything above the natural reason. For the salvation and perfection of a thing seem to be sufficiently insured by its natural endowments. Now matters of faith, surpass man's natural reason, since they are things unseen as stated above (Q. 1, A. 4).… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 70, A 2, REP i 364b-365a; Q 86, A 4, REP 2-3 463d- 464d; Q 96, A 3, ANS 512a-c; Q 115, A 4 589d- 590c; A 5, REP i 590d-591c; Q 116, A i, ANS 592d-593d; PART i-n, Q 9, A 5 660d-662a✓ correct

Whether the Cause Assigned for the Production of the Lights Is Reasonable? Objection 1: It would seem that the cause assigned for the production of the lights is not reasonable. For it is said (Jer. 10:2): "Be not afraid of the signs of heaven, which the heathens fear." Therefore the heavenly lights were not made to be signs. Obj. 2: Further, sign is contradistinguished from cause. But the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART HI SUPPL, Q 76, A i, REP 2 939d-941a; Q 77, A i, ANS 943a-944d; Q 86, A 2, ANS and REP 1-2 993c- 994d; Q 91, A i, REP i 1016b-1017c✓ correct

Article 1. Whether the resurrection of Christ is the cause of our resurrection? Objection 1. It would seem that the resurrection of Christ is not the cause of our resurrection. For, given the cause, the effect follows. Yet given the resurrection of Christ the resurrection of the other dead did not follow at once. Therefore His resurrection is not the cause of ours. Objection 2. Further, an… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART ii-n, Q 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH 5 [645*4-^6] 168d-169a / Ethics, BK iv, CH 2 [1122*34-1123*33] 369a-370b passim …

Whether Knowledge Is a Gift? Objection 1: It would seem that knowledge is not a gift. For the gifts of the Holy Ghost surpass the natural faculty. But knowledge implies an effect of natural reason: for the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that a "demonstration is a syllogism which produces knowledge." Therefore knowledge is not a gift of the Holy Ghost. Obj. 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 5, A 4, REP i 25d-26c; Q 91, A 3 486b-487d; Q 96, A 3, REP 3 512a-c; PART i-n, Q 27, A i, REP 3 737b-d✓ correct

Whether Goodness Has the Aspect of a Final Cause? Objection 1: It seems that goodness has not the aspect of a final cause, but rather of the other causes. For, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "Goodness is praised as beauty." But beauty has the aspect of a formal cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect of a formal cause. Obj. 2: Further, goodness is self-diffusive; for Dionysius says (Div.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q a b 502d; BK xin, CH 3 [io78 ^9~ 5] 610a 49, A 2, ANS and REP i 2b-4a; A 4, ANS 5a-6a; y 50, A 3, REP 2 8b-9a …✓ correct

Whether It Belongs to Man to Act for an End? Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to man to act for an end. For a cause is naturally first. But an end, in its very name, implies something that is last. Therefore an end is not a cause. But that for which a man acts, is the cause of his action; since this preposition "for" indicates a relation of causality. Therefore it does not…

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 39, A 8, ANS 210a-213a; P*RT i-n, Q 3, AA 4-5 625a-627a, A 8 628d-629c; Q 4, A i✓ correct

Whether the Essential Attributes Are Appropriated to the Persons in a Fitting Manner by the Holy Doctors? Objection 1: It would seem that the essential attributes are appropriated to the persons unfittingly by the holy doctors. For Hilary says (De Trin. ii): "Eternity is in the Father, the species in the Image; and use is in the Gift." In which words he designates three names proper to the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 49, A 2, REP i 2b-4a; Q 54, A i, ANS 22d-23d; PART II-II, Q l8o, A 2, REP 3 608c-609c 29 CERVANTES* Don Quixote, PART i, 184b✓ correct

Whether Habit Is a Distinct Species of Quality? Objection 1: It would seem that habit is not a distinct species of quality. Because, as we have said (A. 1), habit, in so far as it is a quality, is "a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill." But this happens in regard to any quality: for a thing happens to be well or ill disposed in regard also to shape, and in like… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART n-ii, Q 180, A 2, REP 3 608c-609c; PART in, Q 6, A i, REP 3 740b-741b✓ correct

Whether the Moral Virtues Pertain to the Contemplative Life? Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the contemplative life is to cling to the love of God and our neighbor with the whole mind." Now all the moral virtues, since their acts are prescribed by the precepts of the Law, are reducible to the love of… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 19, A 9, REP 2 116d-117d; Q 23, A 8, REP 2 140a- (D) 141a, Q 66, A i 343d-345c; Q 74, A 3, REP 3 375a-377a,c✓ correct

Whether the Will of God Imposes Necessity on the Things Willed? Objection 1: It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved, except whom God has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to will it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be." Obj. 2: Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its…

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, Q 91 1016a-1025b✓ correct

Article 1. Whether the world will be renewed? Objection 1. It would seem that the world will never be renewed. For nothing will be but what was at some time as to its species: "What is it that hath been? the same thing that shall be" (Ecclesiastes 1:9). Now the world never had any disposition other than it has now as to essential parts, both genera and species. Therefore it will never be… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologtca, PART i, Q 93,✓ correct

Whether the Image of God Is in Man? Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not in man. For it is written (Isa. 40:18): "To whom have you likened God? or what image will you make for Him?" Obj. 2: Further, to be the image of God is the property of the First-Begotten, of Whom the Apostle says (Col. 1:15): "Who is the image of the invisible God, the First-Born of every… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 5,✓ correct

Whether Goodness Differs Really from Being? Objection 1: It seems that goodness differs really from being. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "I perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing: that they are is another." Therefore goodness and being really differ. Obj. 2: Further, nothing can be its own form. "But that is called good which has the form of being," according to… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologtca, PART i-n, Q 49,✓ correct

Whether Habit Is a Quality? Objection 1: It would seem that habit is not a quality. For Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 73): "this word 'habit' is derived from the verb 'to have.'" But "to have" belongs not only to quality, but also to the other categories: for we speak of ourselves as "having" quantity and money and other like things. Therefore habit is not a quality. Obj. 2: Further, habit… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, QQ 2-13 10c-75b passim✓ correct

Whether the Existence of God Is Self-Evident? Objection 1: It seems that the existence of God is self-evident. Now those things are said to be self-evident to us the knowledge of which is naturally implanted in us, as we can see in regard to first principles. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 1,3), "the knowledge of God is naturally implanted in all." Therefore the existence of God is… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 61, A i, REP i 54d-55c✓ correct

Whether the Moral Virtues Should Be Called Cardinal or Principal Virtues? Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtues should not be called cardinal or principal virtues. For "the opposite members of a division are by nature simultaneous" (Categor. x), so that one is not principal rather than another. Now all the virtues are opposite members of the division of the genus "virtue." Therefore… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3, A 3, ANS 16a-d; A 7, REP 2 19a-c; QQ 7-8 31a-38c; Q n, AA 3-4 49a-50b; Q 13, A n 73c-74b; QQ 44-45 238a-250a; Q 47 256a-259a; Q 50, A i, ANS and REP 3 269b-270a; Q 90, A i 480d- 481d; QQ 103-105 528a-545b✓ correct

Whether God is the Same as His Essence or Nature? Objection 1: It seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature. For nothing can be in itself. But the substance or nature of God—i.e. the Godhead—is said to be in God. Therefore it seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature. Obj. 2: Further, the effect is assimilated to its cause; for every agent produces its like. But… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 54, A 3, REP 2 24c-25b; Q 55, A 4, REP 1-2 28c-29d✓ correct

Whether Habits Are Divided into Good and Bad? Objection 1: It would seem that habits are not divided into good and bad. For good and bad are contraries. Now the same habit regards contraries, as was stated above (A. 2, Obj. 1). Therefore habits are not divided into good and bad. Obj. 2: Further, good is convertible with being; so that, since it is common to all, it cannot be accounted a… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3, A 2,✓ correct

Whether God Is Composed of Matter and Form? Objection 1: It seems that God is composed of matter and form. For whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form; since the soul is the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for it is mentioned in Hebrews (Heb. 10:38), where God says: "But My just man liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My soul."… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART HI, Q 2, A i, ANS and REP 2 710a-711c; A 9 719d- 720c; Q 17 806d-809d; Q 19, A i, REP 4 816a- 818b; PART in SUPPL, Q 83, A 3, REP 4 978c- 980d

Whether Any Created Good Constitutes Man's Happiness? Objection 1: It would seem that some created good constitutes man's happiness. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that Divine wisdom "unites the ends of first things to the beginnings of second things," from which we may gather that the summit of a lower nature touches the base of the higher nature. But man's highest good is happiness. Since…

Swnma Theologica, PART i-n, Q 52,✓ correct

Whether Habits Increase? Objection 1: It would seem that habits cannot increase. For increase concerns quantity (Phys. v, text. 18). But habits are not in the genus [of] quantity, but in that of quality. Therefore there can be no increase of habits. Obj. 2: Further, habit is a perfection (Phys. vii, text. 17, 18). But since perfection conveys a notion of end and term, it seems that it cannot be… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3,✓ correct

Whether God Is a Body? Objection 1: It seems that God is a body. For a body is that which has the three dimensions. But Holy Scripture attributes the three dimensions to God, for it is written: "He is higher than Heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt thou know? The measure of Him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea" (Job 11:8, 9). Therefore God is a… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 94, A 2, ANS 221d-223a✓ correct

Whether the Natural Law Contains Several Precepts, or Only One? Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law contains, not several precepts, but one only. For law is a kind of precept, as stated above (Q. 92, A. 2). If therefore there were many precepts of the natural law, it would follow that there are also many natural laws. Obj. 2: Further, the natural law is consequent to human nature.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3, A 5, REP 1-2 17c-18b; A 6 18c-19a; Q u, A 3, ANS 49a-c; Q 13, A 9, ANS 71b-72c; QQ 29-43 161d-237a,c passim✓ correct

Whether God Is Contained in a Genus? Objection 1: It seems that God is contained in a genus. For a substance is a being that subsists of itself. But this is especially true of God. Therefore God is in a genus of substance. Obj. 2: Further, nothing can be measured save by something of its own genus; as length is measured by length and numbers by number. But God is the measure of all… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologtca, PART n-ii, Q 4, A i, ANS and REP i 402a-403d; PART in, QQ 1-3 701b,d-730b; Q 17 806d-809d passim; PART in SUPPL, Q 83 974d-983b passim✓ correct

Whether Delight Is Required for Happiness? Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not required for happiness. For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "vision is the entire reward of faith." But the prize or reward of virtue is happiness, as the Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. i, 9). Therefore nothing besides vision is required for happiness. Obj. 2: Further, happiness is "the most… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3, A 6, ANS 18c-19a; Q 9, A 2 39c-40d; Q 41, A 3 219d-221c; A 5 222b-223b; Q 44, A 2 239b- 240a; Q 4$, AA 1-5 242a-247a passim …✓ correct

Whether in God There Are Any Accidents? Objection 1: It seems that there are accidents in God. For substance cannot be an accident, as Aristotle says (Phys. i). Therefore that which is an accident in one, cannot, in another, be a substance. Thus it is proved that heat cannot be the substantial form of fire, because it is an accident in other things. But wisdom, virtue, and the like, which are… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 51, A 2, ANS and REP 1-2 13c-14b; Q 52, AA 1-2 15d-19a; Q 53, A i, REP 1 19d-21a; A 2, REP 1-3 21a-d; Q no, A 2, REP 3 349a-d; PART in SUPPL, Q 75, A 3, ANS 938a-939d; Q 80, A 4 959c-963a; Q 82, AA 1-2 968a-971a; Q 83, A i 974d-976b; A 5, ANS 981b-982c; Q 84 983c- 989b; Q 86, A A 2-3 993c-996a,c✓ correct

Whether Any Habit Is Caused by Acts? Objection 1: It would seem that no habit is caused by acts. For habit is a quality, as we have said above (Q. 49, A. 1). Now every quality is caused in a subject, according to the latter's receptivity. Since then the agent, inasmuch as it acts, does not receive but rather gives: it seems impossible for a habit to be caused in an agent by its own acts. Obj.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 50, A 2, REP 3 7c-8a; Q 71, A 3 107c-108b; PART in, Q 10, A 3, ANS 769d-771b✓ correct

Whether the Soul Is the Subject of Habit in Respect of Its Essence or in Respect of Its Power? Objection 1: It would seem that habit is in the soul in respect of its essence rather than in respect of its powers. For we speak of dispositions and habits in relation to nature, as stated above (Q. 49, A. 2). But nature regards the essence of the soul rather than the powers; because it is in respect… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 4, A 2, ANS 21b-22b; Q 5, A i, REP i 23c-24a; Q 14, A 2, ANS and REP 2-3 76d-77d; Q 18, A 3, ANS and REP i 106b-107c; Q 25 143c-150a; Q 48, A 4, ANS 262a-263a; Q 50, A 2 270a-272a; Q 52, AA 1-2 278d-280a; Q 58, A i 300c-301a; Q 63, A i, REP i 325c-326c; Q 66, A 2 345d-347b; Q 75, A 5 382a-383b; A 6, REP 2 383c-384c; Q 77, A i 399c-401b; A 3 401d-403a; A 6 404c- 405c; Q 79, A 2 414d-416a; A 10 423d-424d; Q 87, A 2, ANS 466c-467b; Q 92, A 4, REP 3 491 b-d; Q 104, A 4, REP 2 538a-c; Q 105, A 5, ANS 542a-543b; PART i-n, Q 3, A 2, ANS and REP i 623a 624b; Q 10, A i, REP 2 662d-663d; Q 22, A i 720d-721c✓ correct

Whether the Perfections of All Things Are in God? Objection 1: It seems that the perfections of all things are not in God. For God is simple, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 7); whereas the perfections of things are many and diverse. Therefore the perfections of all things are not in God. Obj. 2: Further, opposites cannot coexist. Now the perfections of things are opposed to each other, for each thing… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 49, A 3 4b-5a; Q 50, A 2 7c-8a; A 6 lla-12a; Q 51, 7< The distinction between teal and ideal being, or between natural being and being in mind✓ correct

Whether Habit Implies Order to an Act? Objection 1: It would seem that habit does not imply order to an act. For everything acts according as it is in act. But the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text 8), that "when one is become knowing by habit, one is still in a state of potentiality, but otherwise than before learning." Therefore habit does not imply the relation of a principle to an… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART m, Q 2, A 5, REP 2 715a-716b; PART in SUPPL, Q 82, A 3 % ANS and REP 2 971a-972d✓ correct

Whether Man's Happiness Consists in Any Bodily Good? Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in bodily goods. For it is written (Ecclus. 30:16): "There is no riches above the riches of the health of the body." But happiness consists in that which is best. Therefore it consists in the health of the body. Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v), that "to be" is better than… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 8, A 4, REP i 37c-38c; Q 14, PREAMBLE 75c-d; Q 15 91b-94a; Q 16, A 7, REP 2 99a-d; Q 18, A 4 107d-108c; Q 29, A 2, REP 4 163b-164b; Q 44, A 3 240b-241a; Q 47, A i, REP 2 256a- 257b; Q 55 288d-291d; Q 57, AA 1-2 295a- 297a; Q 65, A 4 342b-343c; Q 76, A 2, REP 4 388c-391a; Q 79, A 3, ANS 416a-417a; Q 84, AA 1-7 440d-450b; Q 85, A i, ANS and REP 1-2 451c-453c; A 2, ANS and REP 2 453d-455b; A 3, REP 1,4 455b-457a; A 8, ANS 460b-461b; Q 86, A 4, REP 2 463d-464d; Q 87, A i, ANS 465a-466c; Q 88, A i, ANS 469a-471c; A 2, ANS 47lc-472c; Q 105, A 3, ANS 540c-541b; Q no, A i REP 3 564c-565d; A 2, ANS 565d 566d; Q 115, A i, ANS 585d-587c; A 3, REP 2 588c-589c; PART I-H, Q 29, A 6, ANS 748b- 749a✓ correct

Whether to Be Everywhere Belongs to God Alone? Objection 1: It seems that to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. For the universal, according to the Philosopher (Poster. i), is everywhere, and always; primary matter also, since it is in all bodies, is everywhere. But neither of these is God, as appears from what is said above (Q. 3). Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, Q 83, A 2, ANS 976c-978c; A 3, REP 2 978c-980d✓ correct

Article 2. Whether by reason of this subtlety a glorified body is able to be in the same place with another body not glorified? Objection 1. It would seem that by reason of this subtlety a body is able to be in the same place with another body not glorified. For according to Philippians 3:21, "He will reform the body of our lowness made like to the body of His glory." Now the body of Christ was… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 13, A 7, ANS and REP 2,4-5 68d-70d; Q 28, AA 1-2 157c- A 2, REP 4 214b-215b; Q 45, A 3, REP 1-3 244a-d✓ correct

Whether Names Which Imply Relation to Creatures Are Predicated of God Temporally? Objection 1: It seems that names which imply relation to creatures are not predicated of God temporally. For all such names signify the divine substance, as is universally held. Hence also Ambrose says (De Fide i) that this name "Lord" is the name of power, which is the divine substance; and "Creator" signifies… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 2, A 7, REP 2 718b-d

Whether Some Good of the Soul Constitutes Man's Happiness? Objection 1: It would seem that some good of the soul constitutes man's happiness. For happiness is man's good. Now this is threefold: external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But happiness does not consist in external goods, nor in goods of the body, as shown above (AA. 4, 5). Therefore it consists in goods of the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologtca, PART i, Q 9, A 2 39c-40d; Q 10, A 2, REP 1-2 41d-42c; A 3, ANS and REP i 42c-43b; AA 5-6 44b-46d; Q 18, A 3, REP 3 106b-107c; Q 22, A 2, ANS 128d-130d; Q 46, A i, REP 2-3 250a-252d; Q 48, A 2, ANS and REP 3 260c-261b; Q 50, A 5 274b-275a; Q 63, A i, REP 2 325c-326c; Q 66, A 2 345d- 347b; Q 68, A i, ANS 354a-355c; Q 75, A 6 383c-384c; Q 76, A 3, REP 1-2 391a-393a, Q 97, A i 513c-514c; A 4 515d-516d; Q 104, A i, REP 1,3 534c-536c; Q 113, A 2, ANS 576d-577d; PART I-II, Q 22, A I, REP 3 720d-721C✓ correct

Whether God is altogether immutable? Objection 1: It seems that God is not altogether immutable. For whatever moves itself is in some way mutable. But, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit, viii, 20), "The Creator Spirit moves Himself neither by time, nor by place." Therefore God is in some way mutable. Obj. 2: Further, it is said of Wisdom, that "it is more mobile than all things active [Vulg.…

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 67, A 3, ANS 3Slb-352a; Q 78, A 3, ANS 410a-411d; Q 86, A 3 463b-d✓ correct

Whether Light Is a Quality? Objection 1: It would seem that light is not a quality. For every quality remains in its subject, though the active cause of the quality be removed, as heat remains in water removed from the fire. But light does not remain in the air when the source of light is withdrawn. Therefore light is not a quality. Obj. 2: Further, every sensible quality has its opposite, as… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 2, A 2,✓ correct

Whether It Can Be Demonstrated That God Exists? Objection 1: It seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated. For it is an article of faith that God exists. But what is of faith cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration produces scientific knowledge; whereas faith is of the unseen (Heb. 11:1). Therefore it cannot be demonstrated that God exists. Obj. 2: Further, the essence is… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica JPWT i-n, Q 60, A i, ANS 49d-50c; Q 72, A 3 113b-114a; Q 75, A i, ANS and REP 2 137d-138c; Q 76, A i, ANS and REP i 141a-c; Q 85, A i, REP 4 178b-179b; A 5, ANS and REP i 181d-182d; PART in, Q 62,✓ correct

Whether There Are Any Theological Virtues? Objection 1: It would seem that there are not any theological virtues. For according to Phys. vii, text. 17, "virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best: and by perfect, I mean that which is disposed according to nature." But that which is Divine is above man's nature. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of a… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 66, A 6, REP 3 80c-81b; Q 75, A 4 140a-d; Q 112, AA 1-3 356c-358d; Q 113, A 8 367d-368c; PART II-H, Q i, A 7, REP 3 385c-387a …✓ correct

Whether Charity Is the Greatest of the Theological Virtues? Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the greatest of the theological virtues. Because, since faith is in the intellect, while hope and charity are in the appetitive power, it seems that faith is compared to hope and charity, as intellectual to moral virtue. Now intellectual virtue is greater than moral virtue, as was made… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 8, A i, REP 3 34d-35c; Q 14, A 8, ANS 82c-83b; Q 18, A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 22, A 2, ANS 128d- 130d; Q 70, A 3 365b-367a; Q 98, A i, ANS 516d-517c; PART i-n, Q i, A 2 610b-611b✓ correct

Whether God Is in All Things? Objection 1: It seems that God is not in all things. For what is above all things is not in all things. But God is above all, according to the Psalm (Ps. 112:4), "The Lord is high above all nations," etc. Therefore God is not in all things. Obj. 2: Further, what is in anything is thereby contained. Now God is not contained by things, but rather does He contain… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, Q 75, A 3, REP 4 938a-939d✓ correct

Article 3. Whether the resurrection is natural? Objection 1. It would seem that the resurrection is natural. For, as the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14), "that which is commonly observed in all, marks the nature of the individuals contained under it." Now resurrection applies commonly to all. Therefore it is natural. Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral. xiv, 55): "Those who do not… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 19, AA 3-10 110b-118b passim; Q 41, A 2 218c-219d; Q46, A i, REP 9-10 250a-252d; Q 47, A i, REP i 256a-257b; Q 59, A 3 308b-309a …✓ correct

Whether Whatever God Wills He Wills Necessarily? Objection 1: It seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily. For everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills from eternity, for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily. Obj. 2: Further, God wills things apart from Himself, inasmuch as He wills His own goodness. Now God… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 71, A 4, ANS and REP 3 108b-109a✓ correct

Whether Sin Is Compatible with Virtue? Objection 1: It would seem that a vicious act, i.e. sin, is incompatible with virtue. For contraries cannot be together in the same subject. Now sin is, in some way, contrary to virtue, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore sin is incompatible with virtue. Obj. 2: Further, sin is worse than vice, i.e. evil act than evil habit. But vice cannot be in the same… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologtca, PART i, Q 19, A 5, REP 2 112d-113c; Q 85, A 7, CONTRARY 459c-460b; PART i-n, Q 3, A 8, ANS 628d- 629c 20 AQUINAS iiSbntma Theolagica, 0,9, ^ ,i2 LUCRETIUS Nattitv of Things* BX v {5^6-533] :✓ correct

Whether Any Cause Can Be Assigned to the Divine Will? Objection 1: It seems that some cause can be assigned to the divine will. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46): "Who would venture to say that God made all things irrationally?" But to a voluntary agent, what is the reason of operating, is the cause of willing. Therefore the will of God has some cause. Obj. 2: Further, in things made by one… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 54, A 2, REP 3 23d-24c; Q 57, A 5, ANS 39a-40a; a b Q 94, A 2, ANS 221d-223a; A 4, ANS 223d-224d; [765 35- 6] 306c; BK v, CH i b Q 95, A 3 228c-229b; Q 107, A i, ANS 325c-327b; b 114, A 4, REP i 373a-d; PART n-n, Q 27, A 6, ANS 524c-525c✓ correct

Whether Habits Are Distinguished by Their Objects? Objection 1: It would seem that habits are not distinguished by their objects. For contraries differ in species. Now the same habit of science regards contraries: thus medicine regards the healthy and the unhealthy. Therefore habits are not distinguished by objects specifically distinct. Obj. 2: Further, different sciences are different habits.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 55, 425a✓ correct

Whether Human Virtue Is a Habit? Objection 1: It would seem that human virtue is not a habit: For virtue is "the limit of power" (De Coelo i, text. 116). But the limit of anything is reducible to the genus of that of which it is the limit; as a point is reducible to the genus of line. Therefore virtue is reducible to the genus of power, and not to the genus of habit. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 13, A 5, ANS 66b-67d; Q 14, A 8, REP i 82c-83b; Q 19, A 5, ANS 112d-113c; Q 57, A 2, ANS 295d- 297a✓ correct

Whether What Is Said of God and of Creatures Is Univocally Predicated of Them? Objection 1: It seems that the things attributed to God and creatures are univocal. For every equivocal term is reduced to the univocal, as many are reduced to one; for if the name "dog" be said equivocally of the barking dog, and of the dogfish, it must be said of some univocally—viz. of all barking dogs; otherwise… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 12, A 8, ANS 57b-58b; Q 19, A 5, REP 2 112d-113c; Q 57, A 3, ANS 297b-298a✓ correct

Whether Those Who See the Essence of God See All in God? Objection 1: It seems that those who see the essence of God see all things in God. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv): "What do they not see, who see Him Who sees all things?" But God sees all things. Therefore those who see God see all things. Obj. 2: Further, whoever sees a mirror, sees what is reflected in the mirror. But all actual or… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 8, A i b 34d-35c; A 2, ANS 35c-36b; A 3, ANS and REP i 36b-37c; Q 9, A 2, ANS 39c-40d; Q 21, A 4, REP 4 126c-127c …✓ correct

Whether God Is Everywhere? Objection 1: It seems that God is not everywhere. For to be everywhere means to be in every place. But to be in every place does not belong to God, to Whom it does not belong to be in place at all; for "incorporeal things," as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), "are not in a place." Therefore God is not everywhere. Obj. 2: Further, the relation of time to succession is the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 79, A 2, ANS 157b-158a; Q 85, A 6 182d-184a; Q 109, A i, ANS 338b-339c; Q no, A i, REP 2 347d-349a; PART II-H, Q 9, A 2, ANS 424b- 425a; Q 18, A 4, ANS 464c-465a; PART in, y 6, A i, REP i 740b-741b; Q 13, A3, CONTRARY 782b-783b; PART m SUPPL, Q 74, A 2, RLP 3 926c-927c✓ correct

Whether the Act of Sin Is from God? Objection 1: It would seem that the act of sin is not from God. For Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that "the act of sin is not a thing." Now whatever is from God is a thing. Therefore the act of sin is not from God. Obj. 2: Further, man is not said to be the cause of sin, except because he is the cause of the sinful act: for "no one works, intending… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theohgica, PART i, Q 22, A 2, REP i 128d-130d; Q 47, A i, ANS 256a- 257b; Q 57, A 3, ANS 297b-298a; Q 103, A 5,✓ correct

Whether Everything Is Subject to the Providence of God? Objection 1: It seems that everything is not subject to divine providence. For nothing foreseen can happen by chance. If then everything was foreseen by God, nothing would happen by chance. And thus hazard and luck would disappear; which is against common opinion. Obj. 2: Further, a wise provider excludes any defect or evil, as far as he… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Thcologica, PART i, Q 14, A 13, REP i 86d-88c; Q 19, A 8 116a-d; Q 22, A 2, REP i 128d-130d; A 4 131c-132b; Q 103, A 5, REP i 531b-532b; A 7, REP 2 533b-d; Q 115, A 6 591d-592d; Q 116, A i 592d-593d; A 3 594c-595a✓ correct

Whether the Knowledge of God Is of Future Contingent Things? Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future contingent things. For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary effect. But the knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as said above (A. 8). Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowledge of God is not… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 15, A i, ANS 91b-92a; Q 19, A 4, ANS lllc-112c; Q 22, A 2, ANS and REP 3 128d-130d; A 4 131c- 132b; Q 47, A i, ANS 256a-257b; Q 103, A i 528b-529a; A 7, REP 2 533 bd✓ correct

Whether There Are Ideas? Objection 1: It seems that there are no ideas. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), that God does not know things by ideas. But ideas are for nothing else except that things may be known through them. Therefore there are no ideas. Obj. 2: Further, God knows all things in Himself, as has been already said (Q. 14, A. 5). But He does not know Himself through an idea;… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 57, A 3, ANS 297b-298a; PART I-H, Q 14, A 4, ANS 679b-d✓ correct

Whether Angels Know the Future? Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know future events. For angels are mightier in knowledge than men. But some men know many future events. Therefore much more do the angels. Obj. 2: Further, the present and the future are differences of time. But the angel's intellect is above time; because, as is said in De Causis, "an intelligence keeps pace with… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 19, A i, ANS 108d-109c; Q 84, A i, REP 3 440d- 442a; Q 86, A 3 463b-d; Q 113, A i, ANS 576a-d; Q 115, A3, ANS and REP 2 588c-589c✓ correct

Whether There Is Will in God? Objection 1: It seems that there is not will in God. For the object of will is the end and the good. But we cannot assign to God any end. Therefore there is not will in God. Obj. 2: Further, will is a kind of appetite. But appetite, as it is directed to things not possessed, implies imperfection, which cannot be imputed to God. Therefore there is not will in… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 15, b A 10, REP i 795b-796a; Q 62, A 4 861a-862a; PART III SUPPL, Q 91, A 3, REP 2 1020d-1022c

Whether Consent to the Act Belongs Only to the Higher Part of the Soul? Objection 1: It would seem that consent to the act does not always belong to the higher reason. For "delight follows action, and perfects it, just as beauty perfects youth" [*oion tois akmaiois he hora—as youthful vigor perfects a man in his prime] (Ethic. x, 4). But consent to delight belongs to the lower reason, as…

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 113, A 8 367d-368c✓ correct

Whether the Infusion of Grace Is Naturally the First of the Things Required for the Justification of the Ungodly? Objection 1: It would seem that the infusion of grace is not what is naturally required first for the justification of the ungodly. For we withdraw from evil before drawing near to good, according to Ps. 33:15: "Turn away from evil, and do good." Now the remission of sins regards… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 7, A 3, REP 4 32c-33c; Q 10, A i, ANS 40d-41d; AA 4-6 43b-46d; Q 53, A 3 283b-284d; Q 57, A 3, REP 2 297b-298a; Q 63, A 5, ANS 329a-330c; A 6, REP 4 330c-331c; Q 66, A 4, REP 4 348d- 349d; PART i-n, Q 31, A 2, ANS and REP i✓ correct

Whether an Actually Infinite Magnitude Can Exist? Objection 1: It seems that there can be something actually infinite in magnitude. For in mathematics there is no error, since "there is no lie in things abstract," as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii). But mathematics uses the infinite in magnitude; thus, the geometrician in his demonstrations says, "Let this line be infinite." Therefore it is not… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 113, A 7, REP 5 366a-367c; PART in SUPPL, Q 84, A 3 985d-989b Divine Comedy, PARADISE, xxvn [106-120] 148b-c 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY, 201a-202a✓ correct

Whether the Justification of the Ungodly Takes Place in an Instant or Successively? Objection 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly does not take place in an instant, but successively, since, as already stated (A. 3), for the justification of the ungodly, there is required a movement of free-will. Now the act of the free-will is choice, which requires the deliberation of… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theohgica, PART i, Q 44, A 2, AN!> 239b-240a; Q 45, A i, REP 2 242a-d; Q 66, A i, ANS 343d-345c; Q 118, A 2, REP 2 601c-603b; PART I-H, Q i, A 3, ANS 611b-612a; Q 23, A 2, ANS 724c-725c✓ correct

Whether Primary Matter Is Created by God? Objection 1: It would seem that primary matter is not created by God. For whatever is made is composed of a subject and of something else (Phys. i, text 62). But primary matter has no subject. Therefore primary matter cannot have been made by God. Obj. 2: Further, action and passion are opposite members of a division. But as the first active… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theohgica, PART I-H, Q 107, A i, ANS 325c-327b; PART HI SUPPL, Q 84, A 2, REP 1,4 984c-985d; A 3, ANS 985d-989b✓ correct

Whether the New Law Is Distinct from the Old Law? Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law is not distinct from the Old. Because both these laws were given to those who believe in God: since "without faith it is impossible to please God," according to Heb. 11:6. But the faith of olden times and of nowadays is the same, as the gloss says on Matt. 21:9. Therefore the law is the same also. Obj.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theohgica, PART i, Q 67, A 2, REP 3 350b-351a; Q 78, A 3, ANS 410a- 411d; Q 1 10, A 3, ANS 566d-567b✓ correct

Whether Light Is a Body? Objection 1: It would seem that light is a body. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 5) that "light takes the first place among bodies."Therefore light is a body. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. v, 2) that "light is a species of fire." But fire is a body, and therefore so is light. Obj. 3: Further, the powers of movement, intersection, reflection,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theohgica, PART HI SUPPL, : Q 84, A 2, RBP 1,4 984c-985d✓ correct

Article 2. Whether the saints will never use their agility for the purpose of movement? Objection 1. It would seem that the saints will never use their agility for the purpose of movement. For, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 2), "movement is the act of the imperfect." But there will be no imperfection in glorified bodies. Neither therefore will there be any movement. Objection 2.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, : Q 83, AA 2-5 976c-982c; Q 84, A 2, REP i 984c- 985d; A 3 985d-989b✓ correct

Article 1. Whether subtlety is a property of the glorified body? Objection 1. It would seem that subtlety is not a property of the glorified body. For the properties of glory surpass the properties of nature, even as the clarity of glory surpasses the clarity of the sun, which is the greatest in nature. Accordingly if subtlety be a property of the glorified body, it would seem that the glorified… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 119, [989*18-29 A i, ANS 604c-607b b

Whether Prodigality Is Opposite to Covetousness? Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is not opposite to covetousness. For opposites cannot be together in the same subject. But some are at the same time prodigal and covetous. Therefore prodigality is not opposite to covetousness. Obj. 2: Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But covetousness, as opposed to liberality, relates to… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 48 A 4, ANS and REP 3 262a-263a✓ correct

Whether Evil Corrupts the Whole Good? Objection 1: It would seem that evil corrupts the whole good. For one contrary is wholly corrupted by another. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore evil corrupts the whole good. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that "evil hurts inasmuch as it takes away good." But good is all of a piece and uniform. Therefore it is wholly taken away… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-ii, Q 50, A i, REP 3 6a-7b; PART in, Q 2, A r, ANS 710a- 711c; PART in SUPPL, Q 74, A i, REP 3 925c- 926c, A 5 929d-931b; Q 80, A 3, REP 3 958b- 959c; Q 82, A i, ANS 968a-970c✓ correct

Whether There Is a Habit in the Body? Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a habit in the body. For, as the Commentator says (De Anima iii), "a habit is that whereby we act when we will." But bodily actions are not subject to the will, since they are natural. Therefore there can be no habit in the body. Obj. 2: Further, all bodily dispositions are easy to change. But habit is a quality,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, Q 74, A i, ANS and REP 3 925c-926c; A 5, ANS✓ correct

Article 5. Whether that fire will consume the other elements? Objection 1. It would seem that the fire in question will consume the other elements. For a gloss of Bede on 2 Peter 3:12 says: "This exceeding great fire will engulf the four elements whereof the world consists: yet it will not so engulf all things that they will cease to be, but it will consume two of them entirely, and will restore… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 14, A 15, REP 2 89b-90b; Q 78, A 3, REP 2 410a- 411d; Q 84, A i✓ correct

Whether the Knowledge of God Is Variable? Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is variable. For knowledge is related to what is knowable. But whatever imports relation to the creature is applied to God from time, and varies according to the variation of creatures. Therefore the knowledge of God is variable according to the variation of creatures. Obj. 2: Further, whatever God can… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 10, A 2, REP 2 41d-42c; A 4, ANS 43b-44b; Q 14, A 12, ANS 85d-86d; Q 46, AA 1-2 250a-255a; Q 75, A i, REP i 378b-379c✓ correct

Whether God is Eternal? Objection 1: It seems that God is not eternal. For nothing made can be predicated of God; for Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "The now that flows away makes time, the now that stands still makes eternity;" and Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 28) "that God is the author of eternity." Therefore God is not eternal. Obj. 2: Further, what is before eternity, and… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 53, A i, ANS and REP 2-3 19d-21a; Q 94, AA 5-6 224d-226b✓ correct

Whether a Habit Can Be Corrupted? Objection 1: It would seem that a habit cannot be corrupted. For habit is within its subject like a second nature; wherefore it is pleasant to act from habit. Now so long as a thing is, its nature is not corrupted. Therefore neither can a habit be corrupted so long as its subject remains. Obj. 2: Further, whenever a form is corrupted, this is due either to… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 109, A i, ANS 338b-339c; PART in SUPPL, Q 91, A I,REP2l016b-1017c✓ correct

Whether Without Grace Man Can Know Any Truth? Objection 1: It would seem that without grace man can know no truth. For, on 1 Cor. 12:3: "No man can say, the Lord Jesus, but by the Holy Ghost," a gloss says: "Every truth, by whomsoever spoken is from the Holy Ghost." Now the Holy Ghost dwells in us by grace. Therefore we cannot know truth without grace. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 41, A 5, ANS and REP i 222b-223b; Q 72, A i, REP 4 368b-369d; Q 73, A 3, ANS 371d-372c; Q 78, A 2, REP 2-3 409a-4lOa; Q 90, A 2, ANS 481 d- 482c; Q 92, A i, ANS 488d-489d; A 4, ANS and RFP i 491b-d; Q 98 516d-519a; Q 115, A 2, RKP 3-4 587c-588c; A 3 588c-589c; Q 118, A I 600a-601c; Q 119 604c-608d✓ correct

Whether the Power of Begetting Signifies a Relation, and Not the Essence? Objection 1: It would seem that the power of begetting, or of spirating, signifies the relation and not the essence. For power signifies a principle, as appears from its definition: for active power is the principle of action, as we find in Metaph. v, text 17. But in God principle in regard to Person is said notionally.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 32, A2759d-760d✓ correct

Whether Operation Is the Proper Cause of Pleasure? Objection 1: It would seem that operation is not the proper and first cause of pleasure. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11), "pleasure consists in a perception of the senses," since knowledge is requisite for pleasure, as stated above (Q. 31, A. 1). But the objects of operations are knowable before the operations themselves. Therefore… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 105 307c-321a passim✓ correct

Whether the Old Law Enjoined Fitting Precepts Concerning Rulers? Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law made unfitting precepts concerning rulers. Because, as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 4), "the ordering of the people depends mostly on the chief ruler." But the Law contains no precept relating to the institution of the chief ruler; and yet we find therein prescriptions concerning the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 21, A 4, ANS and REP 3 719d-720a,c✓ correct

Whether a Human Action Is Meritorious or Demeritorious Before God, According As It Is Good or Evil? Objection 1: It would seem that man's actions, good or evil, are not meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God. Because, as stated above (A. 3), merit and demerit imply relation to retribution for good or harm done to another. But a man's action, good or evil, does no good or harm to God;… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 21, A 3 718d-719c; A 4, REP 3 719d-720a,c✓ correct

Whether a Human Action Is Meritorious or Demeritorious in So Far As It Is Good or Evil? Objection 1: It would seem that a human action is not meritorious or demeritorious on account of its goodness or malice. For we speak of merit or demerit in relation to retribution, which has no place save in matters relating to another person. But good or evil actions are not all related to another person,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 90, AA 2-3 206b-207c; Q 92, A i, REP 3 213c-214c; Q 94, A 2, ANS 221d-223a✓ correct

Whether the Law Is Always Something Directed to the Common Good? Objection 1: It would seem that the law is not always directed to the common good as to its end. For it belongs to law to command and to forbid. But commands are directed to certain individual goods. Therefore the end of the law is not always the common good. Obj. 2: Further, the law directs man in his actions. But human actions… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 90, A i, REP 3 205b-206b; A 3 207a-c; Q 95, A i✓ correct

Whether the Reason of Any Man Is Competent to Make Laws? Objection 1: It would seem that the reason of any man is competent to make laws. For the Apostle says (Rom. 2:14) that "when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law . . . they are a law to themselves." Now he says this of all in general. Therefore anyone can make a law for himself. Obj. 2:… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 97, AA 2-3 236d-238b✓ correct

Whether Human Law Should Always Be Changed, Whenever Something Better Occurs? Objection 1: It would seem that human law should be changed, whenever something better occurs. Because human laws are devised by human reason, like other arts. But in the other arts, the tenets of former times give place to others, if something better occurs. Therefore the same should apply to human laws. Obj. 2:… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 97, A 3 237b-238b✓ correct

Whether Custom Can Obtain Force of Law? Objection 1: It would seem that custom cannot obtain force of law, nor abolish a law. Because human law is derived from the natural law and from the Divine law, as stated above (Q. 93, A. 3; Q. 95, A. 2). But human custom cannot change either the law of nature or the Divine law. Therefore neither can it change human law. Obj. 2: Further, many evils cannot… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 59, A 4, REP 3 309a-310a; PART l-n, Q 45, A 4, ANS 8l2b-813a I to 3 CHAPTER 13: COURAGE 261✓ correct

Whether There Is an Irascible and a Concupiscible Appetite in the Angels? Objection 1: It would seem that there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that in the demons there is "unreasonable fury and wild concupiscence." But demons are of the same nature as angels; for sin has not altered their nature. Therefore there is an irascible and… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 35, A 6, REP 3 777b-778c✓ correct

Whether Sorrow Is to Be Shunned More Than Pleasure Is to Be Sought? Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 63): "There is nobody that does not shun sorrow more than he seeks pleasure." Now that which all agree in doing, seems to be natural. Therefore it is natural and right for sorrow to be shunned more than… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 60, A 4-cj 61, A 5 52b-59d; Q 65, AA 1-3 70b-73d; Q 66, AA 1-4 75b-79b; PART in SUPPL, Q 96, A 6, ANS and REP 3-4,8-9 1058a-1061b; A 12 1064d-1065b✓ correct

Whether There Are Different Moral Virtues About Different Passions? Objection 1: It would seem that there are not different moral virtues about different passions. For there is but one habit about things that concur in their source and end: as is evident especially in the case of sciences. But the passions all concur in one source, viz. love; and they all terminate in the same end, viz. joy or… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 44, A 4, ANS 809c-810a; Q 45, A 4, ANS 812b-813a✓ correct

Whether Fear Hinders Action? Objection 1: It would seem that fear hinders action. For action is hindered chiefly by a disturbance in the reason, which directs action. But fear disturbs reason, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore fear hinders action. Obj. 2: Further, those who fear while doing anything, are more apt to fail: thus a man who walks on a plank placed aloft, easily falls through fear;… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 105, A 3, REP 5-6 316a-318b✓ correct

Whether the Judicial Precepts Regarding Foreigners Were Framed in a Suitable Manner? Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts regarding foreigners were not suitably framed. For Peter said (Acts 10:34, 35): "In very deed I perceive that God is not a respecter of persons, but in every nation, he that feareth Him and worketh justice is acceptable to Him." But those who are acceptable… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theohgica, PART i-n, Q 45, A 4, ANS 812b-813a✓ correct

Whether the Brave Are More Eager at First Than in the Midst of Danger? Objection 1: It would seem that the daring are not more eager at first than in the midst of danger. Because trembling is caused by fear, which is contrary to daring, as stated above (A. 1; Q. 44, A. 3). But the daring sometimes tremble at first, as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 3). Therefore they are not more eager… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theohgica, PART HI SUPPL, Q 96, A 6 1058a-1061b✓ correct

Article 6. Whether an aureole is due to martyrs? Objection 1. It would seem that an aureole is not due to martyrs. For an aureole is a reward given for works of supererogation, wherefore Bede commenting on Exodus 25:25, "Thou shalt also make another . . . crown," says: "This may be rightly referred to the reward of those who by freely choosing a more perfect life go beyond the general… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 95, : 348b,d-363a,c / Political Economy, 367b; A 2 227c-228c; A 4, ANS 229b-230c; Q 96, A 2, ANS 231c-232b; Q 97, A 3, REP i 237b-238b✓ correct

Whether It Was Useful for Laws to Be Framed by Men? Objection 1: It would seem that it was not useful for laws to be framed by men. Because the purpose of every law is that man be made good thereby, as stated above (Q. 92, A. 1). But men are more to be induced to be good willingly by means of admonitions, than against their will, by means of laws. Therefore there was no need to frame laws. Obj.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 96, A 2, ANS 231c-232b✓ correct

Whether It Belongs to the Human Law to Repress All Vices? Objection 1: It would seem that it belongs to human law to repress all vices. For Isidore says (Etym. v, 20) that "laws were made in order that, in fear thereof, man's audacity might be held in check." But it would not be held in check sufficiently, unless all evils were repressed by law. Therefore human laws should repress all… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 92, : A I, REP i 213c-214c; A 2, REP 4 214d-215a,c; AA 2-3 236d-238b✓ correct

Whether the Acts of Law Are Suitably Assigned? Objection 1: It would seem that the acts of law are not suitably assigned as consisting in "command, prohibition, permission, and punishment." For "every law is a general precept," as the Jurist states. But command and precept are the same. Therefore the other three are superfluous. Obj. 2: Further, the effect of a law is to induce its subjects to… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-ri, Q 95, A 3 228c-229b; Q 97, AA 2-3 236d-238b 21 DANTE; D/ww Comedy, PURGATORY, vi [58- 151] 6lb-62c …✓ correct

Whether Adam Had All the Virtues? Objection 1: It would seem that Adam had not all the virtues. For some virtues are directed to curb passions: thus immoderate concupiscence is restrained by temperance, and immoderate fear by fortitude. But in the state of innocence no immoderation existed in the passions. Therefore neither did these virtues then exist. Obj. 2: Further, some virtues are… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 95, A 3 228c-229b; Q 96, A 2, ANS 231c-232b; Q 97, AA 2-3 236d-238b✓ correct

Whether Isidore's Description of the Quality of Positive Law Is Appropriate? Objection 1: It would seem that Isidore's description of the quality of positive law is not appropriate, when he says (Etym. v, 21): "Law shall be virtuous, just, possible to nature, according to the custom of the country, suitable to place and time, necessary, useful; clearly expressed, lest by its obscurity it lead… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART II-H, Q 4, A i, ANS 402a-403d; PART in, Q 2, A 2, ANS 711d-712d; Q 60, A 4, REP i 849c-850b✓ correct

Whether This Is a Fitting Definition of Faith: "Faith Is the Substance of Things to Be Hoped For, the Evidence of Things That Appear Not?" Objection 1: It would seem that the Apostle gives an unfitting definition of faith (Heb. 11:1) when he says: "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not." For no quality is a substance: whereas faith is a… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologtca, PART i, Q 85, A 3, REP 3 455b-457a✓ correct

Whether the More Universal Is First in Our Intellectual Cognition? Objection 1: It would seem that the more universal is not first in our intellectual cognition. For what is first and more known in its own nature, is secondarily and less known in relation to ourselves. But universals come first as regards their nature, because "that is first which does not involve the existence of its… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, o 3, A 4, REP i 16d-l7c; A 5, ANS 17c-18b; Q 29, A i, REP 3-4 162a-163b; Q 50, A 2, REP i 270a- 272a; A 4, REP i 273b-274b; Q 66, A 2, REP 2 345d-347b; Q 75, A 3, REP i 380c-381b; Q 76, A 3, ANS and REP 2,4 391a-393a; Q 77, A i, REP 7 399c-401b; Q 85, A 3 455b-457a; Q 88, A 2, REP 4 471c-472c; PART i-n, Q i, A } 611b-6l2a? Q 18, AA 5-11 697a-703a pas-✓ correct

The Definition of "Person" Objection 1: It would seem that the definition of person given by Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) is insufficient—that is, "a person is an individual substance of a rational nature." For nothing singular can be subject to definition. But "person" signifies something singular. Therefore person is improperly defined. Obj. 2: Further, substance as placed above in the definition… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-, Q 55, A 4 28c-29d✓ correct

Whether the Higher Angels Understand by More Universal Species Than the Lower Angels? Objection 1: It would seem that the higher angels do not understand by more universal species than the lower angels. For the universal, seemingly, is what is abstracted from particulars. But angels do not understand by species abstracted from things. Therefore it cannot be said that the species of the angelic…

Summa Theologica, PART i,< Q 10,✓ correct

Whether This Is a Good Definition of Eternity, "The Simultaneously- Whole and Perfect Possession of Interminable Life"? Objection 1: It seems that the definition of eternity given by Boethius (De Consol. v) is not a good one: "Eternity is the simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life." For the word "interminable" is a negative one. But negation only belongs to what is… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i~n, Q 49, AA 1-2 lb-4a; Q 55, A 4 28c-29d; Q 71, A 6 HOb-lllb; Q 90 205a-208b; PART n-n, Q 4, A i 402a-403d✓ correct

Whether Good Can Be the Cause of Evil? Objection 1: It would seem that good cannot be the cause of evil. For it is said (Matt. 7:18): "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit." Obj. 2: Further, one contrary cannot be the cause of another. But evil is the contrary to good. Therefore good cannot be the cause of evil. Obj. 3: Further, a deficient effect can proceed only from a deficient cause.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 105, A 2, ANS and REP 1-6 309d-316a 23 HOBBES: leviathan, PART n, 156b-157a 27 SHAKLSI>E\UE Conolanns, ACT i, sc i [1-226] 351a-353d✓ correct

Whether the Judicial Precepts Were Suitably Framed As to the Relations of One Man with Another? Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts were not suitably framed as regards the relations of one man with another. Because men cannot live together in peace, if one man takes what belongs to another. But this seems to have been approved by the Law: since it is written (Deut. 23:24):… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, QQ 5-0" 23b-30d passim; QQ 19-20 108d-124a passim; Q 26, A 2, ANS 150c-151a; Q 48, A 54 FREUD:✓ correct

Whether God Is Called Blessed in Respect of His Intellect? Objection 1: It seems that God is not called blessed in respect to His intellect. For beatitude is the highest good. But good is said to be in God in regard to His essence, because good has reference to being which is according to essence, according to Boethius (De Hebdom.). Therefore beatitude also is said to be in God in regard to His… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 5, A 3, REP 3 25a-d; Q 19, A i, REP 2 108d-109c; b 430b / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 6-7 Q 59, A 2, ANS 307c-308b; Q 81, A 2 429c- 430c; PART I-H, Q 27, A 3, ANS and REP 3-4 738c-739c✓ correct

Whether Every Being Is Good? Objection 1: It seems that not every being is good. For goodness is something superadded to being, as is clear from A. 1. But whatever is added to being limits it; as substance, quantity, quality, etc. Therefore goodness limits being. Therefore not every being is good. Obj. 2: Further, no evil is good: "Woe to you that call evil good and good evil" (Isa. 5:20). But… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 5, A 6, ANS and REP 2 27c-28b; PART i-n, Q i, AA 7-8 614c-615c; Q 2, A 6 619d-620d; Q 3, A 4 625a-626b; Q 4, AA 1-2 629d-631a; Q 5, A 8, #. REP 3 642d-643d; Q n 666b,d-669b; Q 27, A 3, nature or instinct ANS 738c-739c; Q 30, A 4, REP 3 751c-752b; QQ 31-34 752b-772b✓ correct

Whether Goodness Is Rightly Divided into the Virtuous*, the Useful and the Pleasant? [*"Bonum honestum" is the virtuous good considered as fitting. Cf. II-II, Q. 141, A. 3; Q. 145.] Objection 1: It seems that goodness is not rightly divided into the virtuous, the useful and the pleasant. For goodness is divided by the ten predicaments, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i). But the virtuous, the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART n-n, QQ 28-29 527b-533a; PART in SUPPL, Q 69, A 4, ANS 889c-890c

Whether Union Is an Effect of Love? Objection 1: It would seem that union is not an effect of love. For absence is incompatible with union. But love is compatible with absence; for the Apostle says (Gal. 4:18): "Be zealous for that which is good in a good thing always" (speaking of himself, according to a gloss), "and not only when I am present with you." Therefore union is not an effect of… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 87, A 2 466c-467b; PART i-ii, Q i, A 6, REP 3 614a-c✓ correct

Whether Our Intellect Knows the Habits of the Soul by Their Essence? Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect knows the habits of the soul by their essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 1): "Faith is not seen in the heart wherein it abides, as the soul of a man may be seen by another from the movement of the body; but we know most certainly that it is there, and conscience proclaims… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 23, A 2 724c-725c; A 4 726a-727a; Q 25, AA✓ correct

Whether the Contrariety of the Irascible Passions Is Based on the Contrariety of Good and Evil? Objection 1: It would seem that the contrariety of the irascible passions is based on no other contrariety than that of good and evil. For the irascible passions are ordained to the concupiscible passions, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1). But the contrariety of the concupiscible passions is no other… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologtca, PART i-n, Q 6, A A 6-7 649a-650d, Q 9, A 2, REP 3 658d- 659c; Q 10, A 3 664d-665c✓ correct

Whether Fear Causes Involuntariness Simply? Objection 1: It would seem that fear causes involuntariness simply. For just as violence regards that which is contrary to the will at the time, so fear regards a future evil which is repugnant to the will. But violence causes involuntariness simply. Therefore fear too causes involuntariness simply. Obj. 2: Further, that which is such of itself,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-ii, Q 77, A i 145a-d; PART ii-n, Q 29, A i 530b-531a, PART in, Q 18, A 6 814d-815d; PART in SUPPL, Q 96, AA ii-u 1063d-1065b✓ correct

Whether the Will Is Moved by a Passion of the Sensitive Appetite? Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite. For no passive power is moved except by its object. Now the will is a power both passive and active, inasmuch as it is mover and moved, as the Philosopher says of the appetitive power in general (De Anima iii, text. 54). Since therefore… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, QQ 5-6 23b-30d passim; Q 16, A i, ANS 94b-95c; A 4 97a-c; QQ 19-20 108d-124a passim; Q 26, A 2, ANS 150c-151a …✓ correct

Whether Good Is Logically Prior to the True? Objection 1: It seems that good is logically prior to the true. For what is more universal is logically prior, as is evident from Phys. i. But the good is more universal than the true, since the true is a kind of good, namely, of the intellect. Therefore the good is logically prior to the true. Obj. 2: Further, good is in things, but the true in the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 78, A i, REP 3 407b-409a; QQ 80-83 427a-440b; PART i-n, Q 27, A 2 737d-738c; Q 40, A 2 793d-794c✓ correct

Whether There Are to Be Distinguished Five Genera of Powers in the Soul? Objection 1: It would seem that there are not to be distinguished five genera of powers in the soul—namely, vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, locomotive, and intellectual. For the powers of the soul are called its parts. But only three parts of the soul are commonly assigned—namely, the vegetative soul, the sensitive… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART Hi, Q 18, A 2 811d-812b

Whether the Good or Evil of a Man's Action Is Derived from Its Object? Objection 1: It would seem that the good or evil of an action is not derived from its object. For the object of any action is a thing. But "evil is not in things, but in the sinner's use of them," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12). Therefore the good or evil of a human action is not derived from their… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 19, A i, REP 2 108d-109c; A 2, ANS 109c410b; Q 20, A i, ANS and REP 2 120a-121b; A 2, REP 3 121b-122a; Q 60, A 3, ANS 311d-312b, 724c-725c; A 4 726a-727a; Q 25, A 2 731b- REP 1-2 740b-741a; A 2, ANS 741a-742a, A 3, ANS and REP 2-3 742a-d; A 4 742d-743c, Q 30, A 2 749d-750d; Q 32, A 3, REP 3 760d-761c; A 8, ANS 764c-765b✓ correct

Whether God Wills Things Apart from Himself? Objection 1: It seems that God does not will things apart from Himself. For the divine will is the divine existence. But God is not other than Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than Himself. Obj. 2: Further, the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, 54. If, therefore, God wills anything… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 74, AA 5-10 131d-137c, Q 77, A i, ANS 145a-d✓ correct

Whether Sin Can Be in the Reason? Objection 1: It would seem that sin cannot be in the reason. For the sin of any power is a defect thereof. But the fault of the reason is not a sin, on the contrary, it excuses sin: for a man is excused from sin on account of ignorance. Therefore sin cannot be in the reason. Obj. 2: Further, the primary object of sin is the will, as stated above (A. 1). Now… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 75, AA 2-3 138c-139d, Q 77 144d-152a Death, 760d-761a …✓ correct

Whether Sin Has an Internal Cause? Objection 1: It would seem that sin has no internal cause. For that which is within a thing is always in it. If therefore sin had an internal cause, man would always be sinning, since given the cause, the effect follows. Obj. 2: Further, a thing is not its own cause. But the internal movements of a man are sins. Therefore they are not the cause of sin. Obj.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 10, A 3 664d-665c; Q 24 727a-730a✓ correct

Whether the Will Is Moved, of Necessity, by the Lower Appetite? Objection 1: It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by a passion of the lower appetite. For the Apostle says (Rom. 7:19): "The good which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do": and this is said by reason of concupiscence, which is a passion. Therefore the will is moved of necessity by a passion. Obj.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologtca, PART i-n, Q 30, A 4 751c-752b✓ correct

Whether Concupiscence Is Infinite? Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not infinite. For the object of concupiscence is good, which has the aspect of an end. But where there is infinity there is no end (Metaph. ii, 2). Therefore concupiscence cannot be infinite. Obj. 2: Further, concupiscence is of the fitting good, since it proceeds from love. But the infinite is without… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART 1-11, Q : 7 h. The restless search for the infinite: the de- 109, A 3 340c-341b; PART H-II, Q 27. A 6 sire for the vision of God 524c-525c; Q 28, A 3 528d-529c; PART in

Whether in Loving God We Ought to Observe Any Mode? Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to observe some mode in loving God. For the notion of good consists in mode, species and order, as Augustine states (De Nat. Boni iii, iv). Now the love of God is the best thing in man, according to Col. 3:14: "Above all . . . things, have charity." Therefore there ought to be a mode of the love of… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica PART i-n, Q 57, t A 6, REP 3 40a-41a✓ correct

Whether "Eubulia," "Synesis," and "Gnome" Are Virtues Annexed to Prudence? Objection 1: It would seem that "eubulia, synesis, and gnome" are unfittingly assigned as virtues annexed to prudence. For eubulia is "a habit whereby we take good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 9). Now it "belongs to prudence to take good counsel," as stated (Ethic. vi, 9). Therefore eubulia is not a virtue annexed to prudence,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 83, A i, ANS 436d-438a✓ correct

Whether Man Has Free-Will? Objection 1: It would seem that man has not free-will. For whoever has free-will does what he wills. But man does not what he wills; for it is written (Rom. 7:19): "For the good which I will I do not, but the evil which I will not, that I do." Therefore man has not free-will. Obj. 2: Further, whoever has free-will has in his power to will or not to will, to do or not… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 99, A 5 249a-250a; PART ii-n, o 4, A 7, REP 3 407d-409a; QQ 183-189 625a-700d passim✓ correct

Whether the Old Law Contains Any Others Besides the Moral, Judicial, and Ceremonial Precepts? Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains others besides the moral, judicial, and ceremonial precepts. Because the judicial precepts belong to the act of justice, which is between man and man; while the ceremonial precepts belong to the act of religion, whereby God is worshipped. Now besides… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Thcologica, PART I-H, Q 24, A 2 727d-728c✓ correct

Whether Every Passion of the Soul Is Evil Morally? Objection 1: It would seem that all the passions of the soul are morally evil. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "some call the soul's passions diseases or disturbances of the soul" [*Cf. Q. 22, A. 2, footnote]. But every disease or disturbance of the soul is morally evil. Therefore every passion of the soul is evil morally. Obj. 2:… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 13, A 5, REP 3 675c-676b✓ correct

Whether Choice Is Only of Possible Things? Objection 1: It would seem that choice is not only of possible things. For choice is an act of the will, as stated above (A. 1). Now there is "a willing of impossibilities" (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore there is also a choice of impossibilities. Obj. 2: Further, choice is of things done by us, as stated above (A. 4). Therefore it matters not, as far as… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 61, A 5, REP 3 58b-59d; Q 96, A A 4-6 233a- 235d; Q 105, AA 1-3 307d-318b✓ correct

Whether There Are Four Cardinal Virtues? Objection 1: It would seem that there are not four cardinal virtues. For prudence is the directing principle of the other moral virtues, as is clear from what has been said above (Q. 58, A. 4). But that which directs other things ranks before them. Therefore prudence alone is a principal virtue. Obj. 2: Further, the principal virtues are, in a way, moral… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q i, A i 3b-4a; Q 94, A 3, ANS 504a-505a✓ correct

Whether the First Man Knew All Things? Objection 1: It would seem that the first man did not know all things. For if he had such knowledge it would be either by acquired species, or by connatural species, or by infused species. Not, however, by acquired species; for this kind of knowledge is acquired by experience, as stated in Metaph. i, 1; and the first man had not then gained experience of… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 65, AA 1-2 70b-72d; Q 95, A i, ANS 226c-227c; A 3, ANS 228c-229b✓ correct

Whether the Moral Virtues Are Connected with One Another? Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues are not connected with one another. Because moral virtues are sometimes caused by the exercise of acts, as is proved in Ethic. ii, 1, 2. But man can exercise himself in the acts of one virtue, without exercising himself in the acts of some other virtue. Therefore it is possible to have one… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PROLOGUE la-b; b Sensibk, CH i [436 i8-437i7] 673d-674a PART Q 76, A 2, REP 5 388c-391a; Q 1 06 i, b b 545c-549a; Q 107, A 3, ANS and REP i 551a-c; Q in, A j 568c-569b; Q 117, AA 1-2 595d- 598c✓ correct

Whether Ignorance Is a Sin? Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance is not a sin. For sin is "a word, deed or desire contrary to God's law," as stated above (Q. 71, A. 5). Now ignorance does not denote an act, either internal or external. Therefore ignorance is not a sin. Obj. 2: Further, sin is more directly opposed to grace than to knowledge. Now privation of grace is not a sin, but a… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PROLOGUE la-b; PART i, Q i, A 5, REP 2 5c-6a; A 9 8d-9c; Q 79, A 10, REP 3 423d-424d; Q 84, A 3, REP 3 b 443d-444d; Q 106, A i, ANS 545d-546d; Q in, A i, ANS 568c-569b; Q 117, A i 595d-597c✓ correct

Whether Intelligence Is a Power Distinct from Intellect? Objection 1: It would seem that the intelligence is another power than the intellect. For we read in De Spiritu et Anima that "when we wish to rise from lower to higher things, first the sense comes to our aid, then imagination, then reason, then intellect, and afterwards intelligence." But imagination and sense are distinct powers.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART II-H, Q i, A 7, REP 2 385c-387a; Q 181, A 3, ANS and REP 2 618c-619b✓ correct

Whether Prudence Pertains to the Active Life? Objection 1: It would seem that prudence does not pertain to the active life. For just as the contemplative life belongs to the cognitive power, so the active life belongs to the appetitive power. Now prudence belongs not to the appetitive but to the cognitive power. Therefore prudence does not belong to the active life. Obj. 2: Further, Gregory…

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 76, A 2, REP 5 388c-391a; Q 84, A 3, REP 3 443d- 444d, Q 117, A i, ANS and REP 4 595d-597c✓ correct

Whether the Intellectual Principle Is Multiplied According to the Number of Bodies? Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual principle is not multiplied according to the number of bodies, but that there is one intellect in all men. For an immaterial substance is not multiplied in number within one species. But the human soul is an immaterial substance; since it is not composed of matter… Read the rest of this passage →

Sumrna Theologica, PART i, Q 84, A 6 447c-449a; Q 85, A i 451c-453c; Q 87, AA 1-3 465a-468a passim; Q 94, A 3, REP 3 504a-505a …✓ correct

Whether Intellectual Knowledge Is Derived from Sensible Things? Objection 1: It would seem that intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 9) that "we cannot expect to learn the fulness of truth from the senses of the body." This he proves in two ways. First, because "whatever the bodily senses reach, is continually being changed; and what is… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 9, A 4, REP i 766b-767b; Q 12, A i, REP i 776c- 777b; A 2 777b-778b; A 3, REP 2 778b*779a✓ correct

Whether the Will Is Moved by an Exterior Principle? Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by anything exterior. For the movement of the will is voluntary. But it is essential to the voluntary act that it be from an intrinsic principle, just as it is essential to the natural act. Therefore the movement of the will is not from anything exterior. Obj. 2: Further, the will cannot… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 63, A 3 65a-d; Q 68 87c-96c, Q 91, AA 4-5 210c- 212c; QQ 98-108 239b-337d✓ correct

Whether Any Moral Virtues Are in Us by Infusion? Objection 1: It would seem that no virtues besides the theological virtues are infused in us by God. Because God does not do by Himself, save perhaps sometimes miraculously, those things that can be done by second causes; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv), "it is God's rule to bring about extremes through the mean." Now intellectual and… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 33, A✓ correct

Whether It Belongs to the Father to Be the Principle? Objection 1: It would seem that the Father cannot be called the principle of the Son, or of the Holy Ghost. For principle and cause are the same, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv). But we do not say that the Father is the cause of the Son. Therefore we must not say that He is the principle of the Son. Obj. 2: Further, a principle is… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 115, A i, ANS and REP 3,5 585d-587c

Whether Flattery Is a Sin? Objection 1: It seems that flattery is not a sin. For flattery consists in words of praise offered to another in order to please him. But it is not a sin to praise a person, according to Prov. 31:28, "Her children rose up and called her blessed: her husband, and he praised her." Moreover, there is no evil in wishing to please others, according to 1 Cor. 10:33, "I . . .… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART ii-n, Q 179, A 2, REP 2 607a-c; PART in SUPPL, Q 80, A 3 958b-959c✓ correct

Whether Life Is Adequately Divided into Active and Contemplative? Objection 1: It would seem that life is not adequately divided into active and contemplative. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5) that there are three most prominent kinds of life, the life of "pleasure," the "civil" which would seem to be the same as the active, and the "contemplative" life. Therefore the division of life into… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 81, AA 2-3 429c-431d; PART i-n, QQ 22-48 720b,d~ 826a,c la to \b b b26- Xious, 432c-433d✓ correct

Whether the Sensitive Appetite Is Divided into the Irascible and Concupiscible As Distinct Powers? Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive appetite is not divided into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers. For the same power of the soul regards both sides of a contrariety, as sight regards both black and white, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 11). But suitable and… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theohgica, PART i-n, Q to, A 3, ANS and REP 2 664d-665c; Q 28, A 3, ANS 742a-d; Q 37, A 2, ANS and REP 3 784c-785b; A 4, REP 3 785d-786d 671c; 675b-676b / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and contents, 787a-b 3. Rationalization or the emotional determi- nation of thought✓ correct

Whether Ecstasy Is an Effect of Love? Objection 1: It would seem that ecstasy is not an effect of love. For ecstasy seems to imply loss of reason. But love does not always result in loss of reason: for lovers are masters of themselves at times. Therefore love does not cause ecstasy. Obj. 2: Further, the lover desires the beloved to be united to him. Therefore he draws the beloved to himself,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theohgica, PART i-n, Q 35, A 8, ANS 779c-780c✓ correct

Whether There Are Only Four Species of Sorrow? Objection 1: It would seem that Damascene's (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) division of sorrow into four species is incorrect; viz. into "torpor, distress," which Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] calls "anxiety,"—"pity," and "envy." For sorrow is contrary to pleasure. But there are not several species of pleasure. Therefore it is incorrect to… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 38 786d-789d✓ correct

Whether Pain or Sorrow Is Assuaged by Every Pleasure? Objection 1: It would seem that not every pleasure assuages every pain or sorrow. For pleasure does not assuage sorrow, save in so far as it is contrary to it: for "remedies work by contraries" (Ethic. ii, 3). But not every pleasure is contrary to every sorrow; as stated above (Q. 35, A. 4). Therefore not every pleasure assuages every… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 24 727a-730a;Q34768c-772b✓ correct

Whether Moral Good and Evil Can Be Found in the Passions of the Soul? Objection 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is morally good or evil. For moral good and evil are proper to man: since "morals are properly predicated of man," as Ambrose says (Super Luc. Prolog.). But passions are not proper to man, for he has them in common with other animals. Therefore no passion of the soul is… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i~ii, Q 56, A 4 32b-33c; Q 58, A 2, ANS 42a-43a; A 3, REP 2 43b-44a; Q 59 45d-49d; Q 60, A 2 50d-51b; AA 4-5 52b-54d; Q 62, A 2, REP 1,3 60d-61b, Q 63, A 4, ANS 65d-66c; Q 64, A i 66d-67c; Q 66, A 3, ANS and REP 2 77c-78b; Q 67, A i 81c-82c 23 HOBBES: leviathan, PART i, 61d-62a; 79a-80a; 85d; 95d-96b; PART n, 138d-139a; PART iv, 272c✓ correct

Whether an Angel Knows God by His Own Natural Principles? Objection 1: It would seem that the angels cannot know God by their natural principles. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that God "by His incomprehensible might is placed above all heavenly minds." Afterwards he adds that, "since He is above all substances, He is remote from all knowledge." Obj. 2: Further, God is infinitely above the…

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 75, A 3, REP 3 380c-381b; PART i-ii, Q 17, A 7, REP 2 690d-692a; Q 22 720b,d-723b passim✓ correct

Whether the Souls of Brute Animals Are Subsistent? Objection 1: It would seem that the souls of brute animals are subsistent. For man is of the same genus as other animals; and, as we have just shown (A. 2), the soul of man is subsistent. Therefore the souls of other animals are subsistent. Obj. 2: Further, the relation of the sensitive faculty to sensible objects is like the relation of the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, Q 70, A 2, REP 2,5 896a-897d✓ correct

Article 2. Whether the acts of the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul? Objection 1. It would seem that the acts of the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul. For Augustine says (De Spiritu et Anima xv): "When the soul leaves the body it derives pleasure or sorrow through being affected with these" (namely the imagination, and the concupiscible and irascible faculties)… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, QQ 26-48 733d-826a,c✓ correct

Whether Love Is in the Concupiscible Power? Objection 1: It would seem that love is not in the concupiscible power. For it is written (Wis. 8:2): "Her," namely wisdom, "have I loved, and have sought her out from my youth." But the concupiscible power, being a part of the sensitive appetite, cannot tend to wisdom, which is not apprehended by the senses. Therefore love is not in the concupiscible… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 81, A 3, ANS and RLP 2 430c-431d; Q 95, A 2, ANS and REP i 507c-508a; Q in, A 2, ANS 569c- 570b; PART i-ii, Q 9, A 2✓ correct

Whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites obey reason? Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason. For irascible and concupiscible are parts of sensuality. But sensuality does not obey reason, wherefore it is signified by the serpent, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12,13). Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-ii, Q 61, A 3, ANS 56b-57a; Q 77 144d-152a✓ correct

Whether Any Other Virtues Should Be Called Principal Rather Than These? Objection 1: It would seem that other virtues should be called principal rather than these. For, seemingly, the greatest is the principal in any genus. Now "magnanimity has a great influence on all the virtues" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity should more than any be called a principal virtue. Obj. 2: Further, that… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 72

Whether Sins Differ in Species According to Their Objects? Objection 1: It would seem that sins do not differ in species, according to their objects. For acts are said to be good or evil, in relation, chiefly, to their end, as shown above (Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, AA. 4, 6). Since then sin is nothing else than a bad human act, as stated above (Q. 71, A. 1), it seems that sins should differ… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 56, A 4 32b-33c; Q 59 45d-49d; Q 60, A 4-0, 61, A 5 52b-59d; Q 64, AA 1-2 66d-68b; Q 65, A i 70b-72a; PART in, Q 15, AA 4-9 790d-795b✓ correct

Whether the Irascible and Concupiscible Powers Are the Subject of Virtue? Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible powers cannot be the subject of virtue. For these powers are common to us and dumb animals. But we are now speaking of virtue as proper to man, since for this reason it is called human virtue. It is therefore impossible for human virtue to be in the irascible… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 51, A i, ANS 12b-13c; Q 63, A i 63a-64a; Q 65, A i, ANS 70b-72a✓ correct

Whether Any Habit Is from Nature? Objection 1: It would seem that no habit is from nature. For the use of those things which are from nature does not depend on the will. But habit "is that which we use when we will," as the Commentator says on De Anima iii. Therefore habit is not from nature. Obj. 2: Further, nature does not employ two where one is sufficient. But the powers of the soul are… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 99, A 6, ANS 250a-251a✓ correct

Whether the Old Law Should Have Induced Men to the Observance of Its Precepts, by Means of Temporal Promises and Threats? Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law should not have induced men to the observance of its precepts, by means of temporal promises and threats. For the purpose of the Divine law is to subject man to God by fear and love: hence it is written (Deut. 10:12): "And now,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 67 81b-87c; Q 68, A 6 93c-94c; Q 87, AA 3-5 187b- 189c; PART ii-n, Q 18, AA 2-3 462d-464c; Q 19, A n 472d-473d; Q 26, A 13 519d-520d✓ correct

Whether the Moral Virtues Remain After This Life? Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues do not remain after this life. For in the future state of glory men will be like angels, according to Matt. 22:30. But it is absurd to put moral virtues in the angels [*"Whatever relates to moral action is petty, and unworthy of the gods" (Ethic. x, 8)], as stated in Ethic. x, 8. Therefore neither… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 14, A 12, ANS 85d-86d; Q 46 250a-255d✓ correct

Whether God Can Know Infinite Things? Objection 1: It seems that God cannot know infinite things. For the infinite, as such, is unknown; since the infinite is that which, "to those who measure it, leaves always something more to be measured," as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii). Moreover, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii) that "whatever is comprehended by knowledge, is bounded by the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 91, A i 208b-d; Q 93 215b,d-220d; Q 94, A 4, ANS 223d-224d, AA 5-6 224d-226b; PART n-ii, Q i, A i, CONTRARY 380b-381a✓ correct

Whether There Is an Eternal Law? Objection 1: It would seem that there is no eternal law. Because every law is imposed on someone. But there was not someone from eternity on whom a law could be imposed: since God alone was from eternity. Therefore no law is eternal. Obj. 2: Further, promulgation is essential to law. But promulgation could not be from eternity: because there was no one to whom… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-ii, Q 81, A 2 164d-165c✓ correct

Whether Also Other Sins of the First Parent or of Nearer Ancestors Are Transmitted to Their Descendants? Objection 1: It would seem that also other sins, whether of the first parent or of nearer ancestors, are transmitted to their descendants. For punishment is never due unless for fault. Now some are punished by the judgment of God for the sin of their immediate parents, according to Ex. 20:5:… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 73, A i, REP 3 370a-371a✓ correct

Whether the Completion of the Divine Works Ought to Be Ascribed to the Seventh Day? Objection 1: It would seem that the completion of the Divine works ought not to be ascribed to the seventh day. For all things that are done in this world belong to the Divine works. But the consummation of the world will be at the end of the world (Matt. 13:39, 40). Moreover, the time of Christ's Incarnation is… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Jheologica, PART i, Q 72, A i, REP 1,3-4 368b-369d; Q 73, A i, REP 3 370a-371a; Q 75, A 6, REP i 383c-384c; QQ 90-92 480c-491d; Q 118 600a-604b✓ correct

ON THE WORK OF THE SIXTH DAY (In One Article) We must now consider the work of the sixth day. Objection 1: It would seem that this work is not fittingly described. For as birds and fishes have a living soul, so also have land animals. But these animals are not themselves living souls. Therefore the words, "Let the earth bring forth the living creature," should rather have been, "Let the earth…

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 23,✓ correct

Whether Men Are Predestined by God? Objection 1: It seems that men are not predestined by God, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): "It must be borne in mind that God foreknows but does not predetermine everything, since He foreknows all that is in us, but does not predetermine it all." But human merit and demerit are in us, forasmuch as we are the masters of our own acts by free will. All… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theohgica, PART i, Q 54, A 5 288a-d; Q 58, A 3, REP 3 301d-302d; Q 64, A i, REP 5 334a-335c✓ correct

Whether There Is Only Intellectual Knowledge in the Angels? Objection 1: It would seem that the knowledge of the angels is not exclusively intellectual. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei viii) that in the angels there is "life which understands and feels." Therefore there is a sensitive faculty in them as well. Obj. 2: Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono) that the angels have learnt many things… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 112, A 5, ANS and REP 1,5 359c-360c✓ correct

Whether Man Can Know That He Has Grace? Objection 1: It would seem that man can know that he has grace. For grace by its physical reality is in the soul. Now the soul has most certain knowledge of those things that are in it by their physical reality, as appears from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 31). Hence grace may be known most certainly by one who has grace. Obj. 2: Further, as knowledge is… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 79, AA 3-4 416a-418c; Q 84, A 6 447c-449a; Q 85, A i 451c-453c; A 3, ANS 455b-457a✓ correct

Whether There Is an Active Intellect? Objection 1: It would seem that there is no active intellect. For as the senses are to things sensible, so is our intellect to things intelligible. But because sense is in potentiality to things sensible, the sense is not said to be active, but only passive. Therefore, since our intellect is in potentiality to things intelligible, it seems that we cannot say… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 12, A 9 58b-59a; A n, REP 2 59d-60d; PART i-n, [1-44] 232c-233a / 1st Henry 77434a- Q 28, A 3, ANS 742a-d✓ correct

Whether What Is Seen in God by Those Who See the Divine Essence, Is Seen Through Any Similitude? Objection 1: It seems that what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen by means of some similitude. For every kind of knowledge comes about by the knower being assimilated to the object known. For thus the intellect in act becomes the actual intelligible, and the sense in act… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 92, A A 2-3 489d-491b; Q 98 516d-519a✓ correct

Whether Woman Should Have Been Made from Man? Objection 1: It would seem that woman should not have been made from man. For sex belongs both to man and animals. But in the other animals the female was not made from the male. Therefore neither should it have been so with man. Obj. 2: Further, things of the same species are of the same matter. But male and female are of the same species.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART n-ii, Q 186, A 4 655c-656b; PART in, Q 65, A 4, ANS and REP 3 883d-884a,c; PART mSUPPL, Q 96, AA 3-5 1053c-1058a; AA 11-12 1063d-1065b✓ correct

Whether Perpetual Continence Is Required for Religious Perfection? Objection 1: It would seem that perpetual continence is not required for religious perfection. For all perfection of the Christian life began with Christ's apostles. Now the apostles do not appear to have observed continence, as evidenced by Peter, of whose mother-in-law we read Matt. 8:14. Therefore it would seem that perpetual… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 72, A 2, REP 4 112b-113a; Q 94, A 2, ANS 221d- 223a; Q 105, A 4, ANS and REP 6-9 318b-321a; PART in SUPPL, Q 95 1042c-1049d passim✓ correct

Whether Spiritual Sins Are Fittingly Distinguished from Carnal Sins? Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual sins are unfittingly distinguished from carnal sins. For the Apostle says (Gal. 5:19): "The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, luxury, idolatry, witchcrafts," etc. from which it seems that all kinds of sins are works of the flesh. Now carnal… Read the rest of this passage →

Sitmma Theologica, PART i-ii, Q 102, A 5, REP 3 283c-292c; Q 105, A 4, ANS and REp8318b-321a✓ correct

Whether There Can Be Any Suitable Cause for the Sacraments of the Old Law? Objection 1: It would seem that there can be no suitable cause for the sacraments of the Old Law. Because those things that are done for the purpose of divine worship should not be like the observances of idolaters: since it is written (Deut. 12:31): "Thou shalt not do in like manner to the Lord thy God: for they have… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 6, A i, HEP 3 740b-741b

Whether There Is Anything Voluntary in Human Acts? Objection 1: It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in human acts. For that is voluntary "which has its principle within itself." as Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Natura Hom. xxxii.], Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24), and Aristotle (Ethic. iii, 1) declare. But the principle of human acts is not in man himself, but outside him: since… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 27, A 2 154c-155b; Q 28, A 4, ANS and REP 5 160c- 161d, Q 30, A 2, ANS and REP 1-2 168a-169b; Q 31, A 2 172b-173c …✓ correct

Whether Any Procession in God Can Be Called Generation? Objection 1: It would seem that no procession in God can be called generation. For generation is change from non-existence to existence, and is opposed to corruption; while matter is the subject of both. Nothing of all this belongs to God. Therefore generation cannot exist in God. Obj. 2: Further, procession exists in God, according to an… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 81 162d-167d passim✓ correct

Whether the First Sin of Our First Parent Is Contracted by His Descendants, by Way of Origin? Objection 1: It would seem that the first sin of our first parent is not contracted by others, by way of origin. For it is written (Ezech. 18:20): "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father." But he would bear the iniquity if he contracted it from him. Therefore no one contracts any sin from… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 98, A 2 517d-519a✓ correct

Whether in the State of Innocence There Would Have Been Generation by Coition? Objection 1: It would seem that generation by coition would not have existed in the state of innocence. For, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11; iv, 25), the first man in the terrestrial Paradise was "like an angel." But in the future state of the resurrection, when men will be like the angels, "they shall… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 84, A 4, ANS 176d-178a; PART in, Q 65, A i 879c- 881d✓ correct

Whether the Seven Capital Vices Are Suitably Reckoned? Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to reckon seven capital vices, viz. vainglory, envy, anger, sloth, covetousness, gluttony, lust. For sins are opposed to virtues. But there are four principal virtues, as stated above (Q. 61, A. 2). Therefore there are only four principal or capital vices. Obj. 2: Further, the passions of the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 99, :

Whether in the State of Innocence Children Would Have Had Perfect Strength of Body As to the Use of Its Members Immediately After Birth? Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have had perfect strength of the body, as to the use of its members, immediately after birth. For Augustine says (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 38): "This weakness of the body befits… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 94, A I, REP tO CONTRARY 221a-dj Q 95, A I 226C- 227c✓ correct

Whether the Natural Law Is a Habit? Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law is a habit. Because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5), "there are three things in the soul: power, habit, and passion." But the natural law is not one of the soul's powers: nor is it one of the passions; as we may see by going through them one by one. Therefore the natural law is a habit. Obj. 2: Further,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 105, A 4, ANS 318b-321a; PART n-n, Q 26, A n 518b-519a; PART in, Q 6, A i, REP 3 740b- 741 b✓ correct

Whether the Old Law Set Forth Suitable Precepts About the Members of the Household? Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law set forth unsuitable precepts about the members of the household. For a slave "is in every respect his master's property," as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 2). But that which is a man's property should be his always. Therefore it was unfitting for the Law to command… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART II-H, Q 26, AA 8-1 1 516a-519a✓ correct

Whether We Ought to Love More Those Who Are Connected with Us by Ties of Blood? Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to love more those who are more closely united to us by ties of blood. For it is written (Prov. 18:24): "A man amiable in society, shall be more friendly than a brother." Again, Valerius Maximus says (Fact. et Dict. Memor. iv 7): "The ties of friendship are most strong and… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 116 592d-595c 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xvi [52-84] 77b-c

Whether Quarreling Is Opposed to the Virtue of Friendship or Affability? Objection 1: It seems that quarreling is not opposed to the virtue of friendship or affability. For quarreling seems to pertain to discord, just as contention does. But discord is opposed to charity, as stated above (Q. 37, A. 1). Therefore quarreling is also. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 26:21): "An angry man… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Thcologica, PART i, QQ 23- 24 132b-143c; Q 116 592d-595c✓ correct

Whether There Be Such a Thing As Fate? Objection 1: It would seem that fate is nothing. For Gregory says in a homily for the Epiphany (Hom. x in Evang.): "Far be it from the hearts of the faithful to think that fate is anything real." Obj. 2: Further, what happens by fate is not unforeseen, for as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 4), "fate is understood to be derived from the verb 'fari' which… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Thcologica, PART i, Q 7, A i, ANS 31a-d; Q 9, A 2, REP 3 39c-40d; Q 14, A 8, b ANS 82c-83b; Q 15, A i, ANS 91b-92a; Q 18, A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 19, A i, ANS 108d-109c; Q 42, A i, REP i 224b-225d; Q 51, A i, REP 3 275b-276b; Q 65, A 4, ANS 342b-343c; Q 85, A 2, ANS 453d-455b; Q 104, A i, ANS and REP 1-2 534c-536c; Q 105, A 2, ANS 539c-540c; Q 115, AA 1-2 585d-588c; PART i-n, Q 5, A 6, REP 2 641a-642a✓ correct

Whether God Is Infinite? Objection 1: It seems that God is not infinite. For everything infinite is imperfect, as the Philosopher says; because it has parts and matter, as is said in Phys. iii. But God is most perfect; therefore He is not infinite. Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i), finite and infinite belong to quantity. But there is no quantity in God, for He is not a… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 62, A 3, REW L 61c-62b; PART in SUPPL, Q 92, A i, ANS 1025c-1032b✓ correct

Whether Faith, Hope, and Charity Are Fittingly Reckoned As Theological Virtues? Objection 1: It would seem that faith, hope, and charity are not fittingly reckoned as three theological virtues. For the theological virtues are in relation to Divine happiness, what the natural inclination is in relation to the connatural end. Now among the virtues directed to the connatural end there is but one… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 55, A 4, ANS and REP 1-2 28c-29d; PART n-n, Q 4, A i, ANS 402a-403d; PART in, Q 2, A 5, ANS 715a-716b 31 SPINOZA* Ethics, PARI i, DEF 4 355b; PROP 8, SCHOL 2, 357a-d; PART n, PROP 37 386b-c✓ correct

Whether Virtue Is Suitably Defined? Objection 1: It would seem that the definition, usually given, of virtue, is not suitable, to wit: "Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us, without us." For virtue is man's goodness, since virtue it is that makes its subject good. But goodness does not seem to be good, as… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 65, A 4, ANS 342b-343c; Q 115, A 3, REP 2 588c- 589c✓ correct

Whether the Forms of Bodies Are from the Angels? Objection 1: It would seem that the forms of bodies come from the angels. For Boethius says (De Trin. i): "From forms that are without matter come the forms that are in matter." But forms that are without matter are spiritual substances, and forms that are in matter are the forms of bodies. Therefore, the forms of bodies are from spiritual… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 52, A i, ANS 15d-18a; A 2 18a-19a✓ correct

Whether Habit Increases by Addition? Objection 1: It would seem that the increase of habits is by way of addition. For the word "increase," as we have said, is transferred to forms, from corporeal quantities. But in corporeal quantities there is no increase without addition: wherefore (De Gener. i, text. 31) it is said that "increase is an addition to a magnitude already existing." Therefore in… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q n, A 3, REP i 49a-c; Q 63, A 7, ANS 331c-332b; Q 115, A 3, REP i 588c-589c✓ correct

Whether the Highest Angel Among Those Who Sinned Was the Highest of All? Objection 1: It would seem that the highest among the angels who sinned was not the highest of all. For it is stated (Ezech. 28:14): "Thou wast a cherub stretched out, and protecting, and I set thee in the holy mountain of God." Now the order of the Cherubim is under the order of the Seraphim, as Dionysius says (Coel.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 74, A 10, REP 3 136c-137c; Q 102, A 5, REP i 283c- 292c; PART II-H, Q i, A 5, REP 3383b-384b; A 8, ANS and REP 1 387a-388c✓ correct

Whether Venial Sin Can Be in the Higher Reason As Such? Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin cannot be in the higher reason as such, i.e. as considering the eternal law. For the act of a power is not found to fail except that power be inordinately disposed with regard to its object. Now the object of the higher reason is the eternal law, in respect of which there can be no disorder without… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 42, A i, ANS 801c-802a; A 3, REP i 802d-803c✓ correct

Whether the Evil of Sin Is an Object of Fear? Objection 1: It would seem that the evil of sin can be an object of fear. For Augustine says on the canonical Epistle of John (Tract. ix), that "by chaste fear man fears to be severed from God." Now nothing but sin severs us from God; according to Isa. 59:2: "Your iniquities have divided between you and your God." Therefore the evil of sin can be an… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 67, A 4, REP 2 84d-85d; Q 68, A 4, REP 4 91b-92c; Q 69, A 3, REP 3 98c-100c; Q 99, A 6 250a-251a; PART II-H, Q 7, A 1 415c-416b; Q 19 465a-474d;✓ correct

Whether Hope Remains After Death, in the State of Glory? Objection 1: It would seem that hope remains after death, in the state of glory. Because hope perfects the human appetite in a more excellent manner than the moral virtues. But the moral virtues remain after this life, as Augustine clearly states (De Trin. xiv, 9). Much more then does hope remain. Obj. 2: Further, fear is opposed to hope.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 65, A 5, ANS and REP i 74c-75a; Q 66, A 6 80c-81b; Q 68, A 2, ANS 89c-90c; A 8, REP 2 95c-96c; Q ^.✓ correct

Whether Charity Can Be Without Faith and Hope? Objection 1: It would seem that charity can be without faith and hope. For charity is the love of God. But it is possible for us to love God naturally, without already having faith, or hope in future bliss. Therefore charity can be without faith and hope. Obj. 2: Further, charity is the root of all the virtues, according to Eph. 3:17: "Rooted and… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 22, A 3, ANS 130d-131c; Q 63, A 7, ANS 331c-332b✓ correct

Whether God Has Immediate Providence Over Everything? Objection 1: It seems that God has not immediate providence over all things. For whatever is contained in the notion of dignity, must be attributed to God. But it belongs to the dignity of a king, that he should have ministers; through whose mediation he provides for his subjects. Therefore much less has God Himself immediate providence over… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 88, A i, REP 2 193a-194b; Q 96, A 4 233a-d; Q 97, A 3, REP i 237b-238b; PART n-ii, Q 2, A 9, ANS 398c-399b; Q 4, A 7, REP 3 407d~409a; Q 33, A 7, REP 5 556a-557d; Q 186, A 7, REP 3 658d-660a; PART m, Q 7, A 3, REP 2 747b-748a 21 DANTE: Dwme Comedy, PARADISE, m [i]-v {87] 109b-113a; vn [19-120] 115b-116b (D) OT, Esther, Rest of Esther, 13:12-14✓ correct

Whether Venial Sin Is Fittingly Condivided with Mortal Sin? Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin is unfittingly condivided with mortal sin. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27): "Sin is a word, deed or desire contrary to the eternal law." But the fact of being against the eternal law makes a sin to be mortal. Consequently every sin is mortal. Therefore venial sin is not condivided… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 30, A i, REP i 749a-d✓ correct

Whether Concupiscence Is in the Sensitive Appetite Only? Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appetite. For there is a concupiscence of wisdom, according to Wis. 6:21: "The concupiscence [Douay: 'desire'] of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom." But the sensitive appetite can have no tendency to wisdom. Therefore concupiscence is not only in the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 99, A 3 247a-248a; A 4, REP 2 248a-d; QQ 101-103 265d-304a; PART II-H, Q 30, A 4, REP i 536a-d; Q 32, A 2, ANS 541a-542c …✓ correct

Whether the Old Law Comprises Ceremonial, Besides Moral, Precepts? Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law does not comprise ceremonial, besides moral, precepts. For every law that is given to man is for the purpose of directing human actions. Now human actions are called moral, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 3). Therefore it seems that the Old Law given to men should not comprise other than… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-ir, Q 55, A 2, REP 3 27a-d; Q 87, A 8, REP 2 191d-192d; Q 93, A 3 217b-218a; A 6, ANS 2I9d-220d; Q no, A 4, ANS 350d-351d; PART n-ii, Q 2, A 9, REP 3 398c-399b; Q 10, A n, ANS 435d-436b; Q 19, A 3, REP i 466d-467c; Q 31, A 3, REP 2 538b-539c; PART in, Q 4, A i, REP 2 730d- 731d, PART III SUPPL, Q 71, A 12, CONTRARY 914c-915c; Q 75, A i, REP 4 935b-937a; Q 91, A 2, CONTRARY 1017c-1020c; Q 92, A 3, RFP 9 1034b-1037c, Q 93, A i, REP i 1037d-1039a✓ correct

Whether the Angels Understand by Species Drawn from Things? Objection 1: It would seem that the angels understand by species drawn from things. For everything understood is apprehended by some likeness within him who understands it. But the likeness of the thing existing in another is there either by way of an exemplar, so that the likeness is the cause of the thing; or else by way of an image,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, QQ 3-11 14a-50b; Q 84, A 2, ANS 442b-443c✓ correct

Whether the Soul Understands Corporeal Things Through Its Essence? Objection 1: It would seem that the soul understands corporeal things through its essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 5) that the soul "collects and lays hold of the images of bodies which are formed in the soul and of the soul: for in forming them it gives them something of its own substance." But the soul understands… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 3, A 2, REP 3 724a-c✓ correct

Whether Happiness Is an Operation? Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is not an operation. For the Apostle says (Rom. 6:22): "You have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end, life everlasting." But life is not an operation, but the very being of living things. Therefore the last end, which is happiness, is not an operation. Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 64, A 4, REP 3 69b-70a; Q 87, A 4, REP 2 188b-d; PART II-II, Q 20, A 2, REP 2 475d-476cj Q 24, A 8, ANS 495b-496a; PART HI, Q i, A 2, REP 2 703a-704d; Q 2, A i, ANS 710a-711c; Q 3, A i, REP i 723b-724a; PART in SUPPL, Q 92, A i, REP 6,12 1025c-1032b✓ correct

Whether the Theological Virtues Observe the Mean? Objection 1: It would seem that theological virtue observes the mean. For the good of other virtues consists in their observing the mean. Now the theological virtues surpass the others in goodness. Therefore much more does theological virtue observe the mean. Obj. 2: Further, the mean of moral virtue depends on the appetite being ruled by… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 26 150a-152a,c; Q 62, A 3, REP 3 319c-320b; A 4, ANS 320b-321b; Q 63, A 3 327b-328b, Q 65, A 2, ANS 340b-341b; Q 70, A 2, ANS 364b-365a; Q 73, A 2, REP 3 371b-d; PART I-H, Q 2, A 2, REP 2 616d-617b; A 3, ANS and REP i 617b- 618a; Q 3, A i, REP i 622c-623a; A 2, REP 1,4 623a-624b; A 8, REP 2 628d-629c; Q 5, A 3, REP 2 638b-639a; A 7, ANS, 642a-d 20Ao T uNAS. Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 8, A 4, ANS 759b-d; Q 16, A 4, REP 2 799b-800b; Q 26, A i, REP 2 845b-846a; PART in SUPPL, Q 71, A 8, REP i 909d-910d; Q 92, A i, REP 5 1025c-1032b✓ correct

Whether Beatitude Belongs to God? Objection 1: It seems that beatitude does not belong to God. For beatitude according to Boethius (De Consol. iv) "is a state made perfect by the aggregation of all good things." But the aggregation of goods has no place in God; nor has composition. Therefore beatitude does not belong to God. Obj. 2: Further, beatitude or happiness is the reward of virtue,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 65, A 3, ANS 72d-73d; Q 66, A i, REP 3 75b-76b; Q 68, A i, ANS 87c-89c; Q 79, A i, REP 3 156b- 5b. toward God 157b; A 2, ANS and REP 1 157b-158a; Q 80, A i, ANS and REP 2-? 159d-160c; Q 85, A 6 182d- 184a; Q 93, A i 215b,d-216c; Q 100, A 6, REP 2 257c-258c; Q 102, A 3, ANS 272b-276c; Q 109, A i, ANS 338b-339c; Q no, A i, REP 2 347d- 349a; Q in, A 2, ANS 352d-353d; PART H-II, Q 18, A 4, ANS 464c-465a; PART in, Q 2, A 5, REP 3 715a-716b; Q 5, A 3, REP 2 737d-739a; Q 13, A 3, CONTRARY 782b-783b; PART in SUPPL, Q 74, A 2, REP 3 926c-927c; Q 75, A 3 938a-939d; Q 88, A i, ANS lOOOd-lOOld✓ correct

Whether Charity Can Be Without Moral Virtue? Objection 1: It would seem possible to have charity without the moral virtues. For when one thing suffices for a certain purpose, it is superfluous to employ others. Now charity alone suffices for the fulfilment of all the works of virtue, as is clear from 1 Cor. 13:4, seqq.: "Charity is patient, is kind," etc. Therefore it seems that if one has… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 55, A 2, REP 3 27a-d; Q 70, A i, REP 2 101d-102d; Q 72, A 4, ANS 114a-115a; A 5, ANS 115a-116b; Q 73, A 3, ANS 121c-122b …✓ correct

Whether Human Virtue Is an Operative Habit? Objection 1: It would seem that it is not essential to human virtue to be an operative habit. For Tully says (Tuscul. iv) that as health and beauty belong to the body, so virtue belongs to the soul. But health and beauty are not operative habits. Therefore neither is virtue. Obj. 2: Further, in natural things we find virtue not only in reference to… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART II-H, Q 26, A 2, REP 3 511a-d; PART HI SUPPL, Q 84, A 2 REP i 984c-985d✓ correct

Whether God Ought to Be Loved More Than Our Neighbor? Objection 1: It would seem that God ought not to be loved more than our neighbor. For it is written (1 John 4:20): "He that loveth not his brother whom he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not?" Whence it seems to follow that the more a thing is visible the more lovable it is, since loving begins with seeing, according to Ethic. ix,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3, A i, REP i 14b-15b; A 8 19d-20c; Q 8, A i, ANS and REP 1,3 34d-35c; Q 18, A 4 107d-108c; Q 51, A 3, REP 3 277a-278c; Q 61, A 3, REP 2 316a d; Q 90, A i, ANS 480d-481d; Q 103, A 2 529a- 530a; PART I-H, Q 17, A 8, REP 2 692a-c✓ correct

Whether God Enters into the Composition of Other Things? Objection 1: It seems that God enters into the composition of other things, for Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The being of all things is that which is above being—the Godhead." But the being of all things enters into the composition of everything. Therefore God enters into the composition of other things. Obj. 2: Further, God is a… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 93, J A 4, REP i 218b-d; Q 97, A 3, REP i 237b-238b; A i, ANS 823d-824d; A 4, ANS 826b-827c; Q 61, A 4, REP 3 857c-858b; Q 64, A 7, ANS 875d- 876c; PART in SUPPL, Q 72, A 3, ANS and REP 5 920c-922b; Q 74, A 4, ANS 928d-929d, Q 91, A i, REP 2 1016b-1017c; A 2, ANS 1017c-1020c, Q 92, A 3, REP 6 1034b-1037c✓ correct

Whether Necessary and Eternal Things Are Subject to the Eternal Law? Objection 1: It would seem that necessary and eternal things are subject to the eternal law. For whatever is reasonable is subject to reason. But the Divine will is reasonable, for it is just. Therefore it is subject to (the Divine) reason. But the eternal law is the Divine reason. Therefore God's will is subject to the eternal… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 19, A 6 113c-114d; A 9, ANS 116d-117d; Q 21 124b- 127c; Q 23, A 5 13Sd-137d; Q 62 317c-325b, Q 63, A 8, ANS 332c-333b; Q 64, A 2, REP 2 335d-336d; Q 65, A 2, REP 3 340b-341b; Q 66, A 3, ANS 347b-348d; Q 95, A 4 509b-510a; Q 96, A 3, REP 3 512a-c; Q 103, A 5, REP 2 531b-532b; Q 105, A 6, REP 2 543b-544a; Q 113, A 7, ANS 580b-581a; Q 114, A i, REP i 581d-582c; PART I-H, Q 5, A i 636d-637c; A 4, ANS 639a-640b; A 7 642a-d; Q 17, A 9, REP 3 692d-693d; Q 21, A 4 719d-720a,c; Q 39, A 2, REP 3 790d-791b; Q 47, A i, REP i 819c-820b✓ correct

Whether the Will of God Is Always Fulfilled? Objection 1: It seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:4): "God will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." But this does not happen. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled. Obj. 2: Further, as is the relation of knowledge to truth, so is that of the will to… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 62, A 6 80c-81b; Q 67, A 3 83b-84d; A 5 85d-86d; Q ioo, A 4, REP i 253d-255a; Q 108, A 2, REP i 332b-333d; Q no, A 3, REP i 350a-d; A 4, ANS 350d-35ld; PART H-II, QQ 1-16 380a-456d; Q 45, A i, REP 2 598d-599d; PART HI, Q 14, A i, ANS 784b-785c✓ correct

Whether Faith Precedes Hope, and Hope Charity? Objection 1: It would seem that the order of the theological virtues is not that faith precedes hope, and hope charity. For the root precedes that which grows from it. Now charity is the root of all the virtues, according to Eph. 3:17: "Being rooted and founded in charity." Therefore charity precedes the others. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De…

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 12, A 11, REP 2 59d-60d; Q 84, A 5 446c-447c

Whether Anyone in This Life Can See the Essence of God? Objection 1: It seems that one can in this life see the Divine essence. For Jacob said: "I have seen God face to face" (Gen. 32:30). But to see Him face to face is to see His essence, as appears from the words: "We see now in a glass and in a dark manner, but then face to face" (1 Cor. 13:12). Obj. 2: Further, the Lord said to Moses: "I… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 12 313b 314c; Q 62, A i, ANS 317d-318c; A 2, ANS 318d-319c; Q 84, A 5 446c-447c; Q 89, A 2, REP 3 475a-d; Q 93, A 8, REP 4 499b-500c; Q 94, A i 501d-503a; Q 100, A 2, ANS 521c-522b; PART i-n, Q 3, A 8 628d-629c; Q 4, AA 2-3 630b631d✓ correct

Whether Any Created Intellect Can See the Essence of God? Objection 1: It seems that no created intellect can see the essence of God. For Chrysostom (Hom. xiv. in Joan.) commenting on John 1:18, "No man hath seen God at any time," says: "Not prophets only, but neither angels nor archangels have seen God. For how can a creature see what is increatable?" Dionysius also says (Div. Nom. i), speaking… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 67, A 3, CONTRARY 83b-84d; A 4 84d-85d; A 6, REP 3 87a-c; Q 69, A 2, REP 3 97b-98c; A 4, ANS and REP 3 lOOc-lOlc; Q 98, A 3, REP a 241c-242b; PART n-n, Q i, A 8, ANS 387a-388c; Q 8, A 7, ANS 421d-422c; Q 9, A 4, REP 3 425d- 426c; Q 180, A 5 611d-613a; PART in, Q i, A 3, REP i 704d-706a; Q 9, A 2, ANS and REP 3 764c- 765a; PART HI SUPPL, Q 72, A i, ANS and REP i 917c-919a; Q 82, A 3, REP 4 971a-972d; Q 84, A 2, ANS and REP 4 984c-985d; Q 87, A 3, ANS 999d-1000c; Q 90, A 3 1014d-1016a; Q 99 1025b-1037c; Q 98, A 5, ANS 1075b-d✓ correct

Whether Faith Remains After This Life? Objection 1: It would seem that faith remains after this life. Because faith is more excellent than science. Now science remains after this life, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore faith remains also. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 3:11): "Other foundation no man can lay, but that which is laid; which is Christ Jesus," i.e. faith in Jesus Christ.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 93, : 7c. Divine government and law A 5, REP 3 219a-d; PART n-n, Q i, A 7, ANS 385c-387a; Q 25, A n, REP 3 508d-509c; PART in, Q 6 1, A i, ANS 855a-d; PART in SUPPL, Q 69, A 3, ANS 887d-889c; Q 71, A 5, ANS 905c-908b; Q 77, A i, ANS 943a-944d; Q 78, A 3, ANS 950b- 951a

Whether Natural Contingents Are Subject to the Eternal Law? Objection 1: It would seem that natural contingents are not subject to the eternal law. Because promulgation is essential to law, as stated above (Q. 90, A. 4). But a law cannot be promulgated except to rational creatures, to whom it is possible to make an announcement. Therefore none but rational creatures are subject to the eternal… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 71, A 2, REP 4 106d-107c; A 6 HOb-lllb; Q 72, A 2, ANS 112b-113a; A 4, ANS 114a-115a; Q 74, A 8, REP i 134b-136a; Q 91, AA 1-2 208b-209d; AA 4-5 210c-212c; Q 93 215b,d-220d; Q 97, A 3, ANS and REP i 237b-238b; A 4, REP 3 238b- 239b; QQ 98-108 239b-337d; PART II-H, Q 23, A 6, ANS 487a-d; Q 187, A 5, REP 3 671d-673b; PART III, Q 60, A 4, REP 2 849c-850bj PART III SUPPL, Q 69, A i, ANS 885c-886c; Q 72, A 2, ANS 919a-920c✓ correct

Whether Vice Is Contrary to Nature? Objection 1: It would seem that vice is not contrary to nature. Because vice is contrary to virtue, as stated above (A. 1). Now virtue is in us, not by nature but by infusion or habituation, as stated above (Q. 63, AA. 1, 2, 3). Therefore vice is not contrary to nature. Obj. 2: Further, it is impossible to become habituated to that which is contrary to… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART HI, Q 63, A i, REP i 864c-865b; PART HI SUPPL, Q 87, A i 997b-998c 8/o 8^✓ correct

Whether Virtue Is in Us by Nature? Objection 1: It would seem that virtue is in us by nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14): "Virtues are natural to us and are equally in all of us." And Antony says in his sermon to the monks: "If the will contradicts nature it is perverse, if it follow nature it is virtuous." Moreover, a gloss on Matt. 4:23, "Jesus went about," etc., says: "He… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 101, A 4, ANS and REP 1,4 269a-270b; Q 102, A 4 276d-283c t 23HoBBEs. Leviathan, PART in, 184c; 198a-b✓ correct

Whether the Ceremonies of the Old Law Are Suitably Divided into Sacrifices, Sacred Things, Sacraments, and Observances? Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law are unsuitably divided into "sacrifices, sacred things, sacraments, and observances." For the ceremonies of the Old Law foreshadowed Christ. But this was done only by the sacrifices, which foreshadowed the sacrifice… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 93, A i, REP 2 215b,d-216c; Q 106, A 4, REP 3 324a- 32 5c; PART n-ii, Q i, A 8, REP 3 387a-388c; Q 2, A 8 397d-398b …✓ correct

Whether the Eternal Law Is a Sovereign Type [*Ratio] Existing in God? Objection 1: It would seem that the eternal law is not a sovereign type existing in God. For there is only one eternal law. But there are many types of things in the Divine mind; for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 46) that God "made each thing according to its type." Therefore the eternal law does not seem to be a type… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART HI, Q 3 723a-730b, QQ 16-24 796a-839c; Q 25, A i 839d-840d, PART HI SUPPL, Q 95, A 3, ANS 1045b-1046d

Whether Happiness Is Something Uncreated? Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is something uncreated. For Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "We must needs confess that God is happiness itself." Obj. 2: Further, happiness is the supreme good. But it belongs to God to be the supreme good. Since, then, there are not several supreme goods, it seems that happiness is the same as God. Obj. 3:… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 51, A 2, REP i 276b-277a; A 3, REP 5 277a-278c; Q 113, A 4, REP i 578b-579a; Q 119, A 2, REP 4 607b- 608d✓ correct

Whether Angels Assume Bodies? Objection 1: It would seem that angels do not assume bodies. For there is nothing superfluous in the work of an angel, as there is nothing of the kind in the work of nature. But it would be superfluous for the angels to assume bodies, because an angel has no need for a body, since his own power exceeds all bodily power. Therefore an angel does not assume a… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART ii-n, Q i, A i, REP i 380b-381a; Q 18, A 2, REP i 462d- 463d; PART in, QQ 4-24 730c-839c; Q 25, AA 1-2 839d-841c; PART HI SUPPL, Q 76, A i 939d-941a; Q 90, AA 1-2 1012b-1014d; Q 92, A 3, REP 12 1034b-1037c✓ correct

Whether in the Blessed There Is Hope? Objection 1: It would seem that in the blessed there is hope. For Christ was a perfect comprehensor from the first moment of His conception. Now He had hope, since, according to a gloss, the words of Ps. 30:2, "In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped," are said in His person. Therefore in the blessed there can be hope. Obj. 2: Further, even as the obtaining of… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 62, A 9, REP 3 324a 325b; Q 64, A i, REP 4 334a- 335c; Q 73, A i, REP i 370a-37la; Q 95, A i, Paradise Lost, REP i 506b-507c; PART I-H, Q 5, A 7, REP 2 642a-d✓ correct

Whether a Beatified Angel Can Sin? Objection 1: It would seem that a beatified angel can sin. For, as as said above (A. 7), beatitude does not do away with nature. But it is of the very notion of created nature, that it can fail. Therefore a beatified angel can sin. Obj. 2: Further, the rational powers are referred to opposites, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. iv, text. 3). But the will of…

Summa Theologtca, PART i, Q 89, A 8, REP 2 479c-480c; Q 92, A 4, ANS 491b-d; Q 104, A 4, ANS 538a-c; Q 105, AA 6-8 543b- 545b; Q 106, A 3, ANS 547c-548b; Q no, A 4 567c-568b; Q 114, A 4 584a-585a; PART i-n, Q 10, A 4, REP 2 665d-666a,c✓ correct

Whether Separated Souls Know What Takes Place on Earth? Objection 1: It would seem that separated souls know what takes place on earth; for otherwise they would have no care for it, as they have, according to what Dives said (Luke 16:27, 28), "I have five brethren . . . he may testify unto them, lest they also come into the place of torments." Therefore separated souls know what passes on… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 63, A 4, REP 3 65d-66c; Q 81, A 4, ANS 166b-167a; Q 113, A 10 369c-370b; PART in SUPPL, Q 75, A 3, ANS 938a-939d; Q 83, A 3 978c-980d✓ correct

Whether Virtue by Habituation Belongs to the Same Species As Infused Virtue? Objection 1: It would seem that infused virtue does not differ in species from acquired virtue. Because acquired and infused virtues, according to what has been said (A. 3), do not differ seemingly, save in relation to the last end. Now human habits and acts are specified, not by their last, but by their proximate end.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, QQ 75-86 935a-996a,c; Q 93, A i 1037d-1039a✓ correct

Article 1. Whether the happiness of the saints will be greater after the judgment than before? Objection 1. It would seem that the happiness of the saints will not be greater after the judgment than before. For the nearer a thing approaches to the Divine likeness, the more perfectly does it participate happiness. Now the soul is more like God when separated from the body than when united to it.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 21, A 4, REP2l26c-127c✓ correct

Whether in Every Work of God There Are Mercy and Justice? Objection 1: It seems that not in every work of God are mercy and justice. For some works of God are attributed to mercy, as the justification of the ungodly; and others to justice, as the damnation of the wicked. Hence it is said: "Judgment without mercy to him that hath not done mercy" (James 2:13). Therefore not in every work of God do… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 91, AA 4-5 210c-212c; QQ 98-105 239b-321a✓ correct

Whether There Was Any Need for a Divine Law? Objection 1: It would seem that there was no need for a Divine law. Because, as stated above (A. 2), the natural law is a participation in us of the eternal law. But the eternal law is a Divine law, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore there was no need for a Divine law in addition to the natural law, and human laws derived therefrom. Obj. 2: Further,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologtca, PART HI, Q 7, : A 10, REP i 752c-753c; Q 25, A 5 843d-844b; PART III SUPPL, Q 83, A 3, CONTRARY 978C- 980d; Q 96, A 5, REP 2 1055c-1058a

Whether the Most Important Circumstances Are "Why" and "In What the Act Consists"? Objection 1: It would seem that these are not the most important circumstances, namely, "why" and those "in which the act is, [*hen ois e praxis]" as stated in Ethic. iii, 1. For those in which the act is seem to be place and time: and these do not seem to be the most important of the circumstances, since, of…

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 97, A i, REP 3 513c-514c; PART i-n, Q 5, A 7, REP 2 642a-d✓ correct

Whether in the State of Innocence Man Would Have Been Immortal? Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man was not immortal. For the term "mortal" belongs to the definition of man. But if you take away the definition, you take away the thing defined. Therefore as long as man was man he could not be immortal. Obj. 2: Further, corruptible and incorruptible are generically… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 85, A 5, REP 2 181d-182d; Q 87, A 7, REP 3 190c- 191d; Q 89, A 5, REP i 202c-203b; Q 91, A 5, REP 2 211c-212c …✓ correct

Whether Death and Other Bodily Defects Are the Result of Sin? Objection 1: It would seem that death and other bodily defects are not the result of sin. Because equal causes have equal effects. Now these defects are not equal in all, but abound in some more than in others, whereas original sin, from which especially these defects seem to result, is equal in all, as stated above (Q. 82, A. 4).… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 95, A i, REP i 506b-507c 20 AQUINAS* Summa Theologica, PART H-II, Q i, A 9, CONTRARY and REP 3,5 388d-389d …✓ correct

Whether the First Man Was Created in Grace? Objection 1: It would seem that the first man was not created in grace. For the Apostle, distinguishing between Adam and Christ, says (1 Cor. 15:45): "The first Adam was made into a living soul; the last Adam into a quickening spirit." But the spirit is quickened by grace. Therefore Christ alone was made in grace. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, Q 73, A i 922b-923c; A 3 924b-925b; Q 77, A 2, ANS 945a-946b; QQ 87-90 997a-1016a✓ correct

Article 3. Whether the virtues of heaven will be moved when our Lord shall come? Objection 1. It would seem that the virtues of heaven will not be moved when our Lord shall come. For the virtues of heaven can denote only the blessed angels. Now immobility is essential to blessedness. Therefore it will be impossible for them to be moved. Objection 2. Further, ignorance is the cause of wonder… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 17, A 4, REP 3 103c-104b; Q 67, A 4, ANS 352a- 354a✓ correct

Whether True and False Are Contraries? Objection 1: It seems that true and false are not contraries. For true and false are opposed, as that which is to that which is not; for "truth," as Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 5), "is that which is." But that which is and that which is not are not opposed as contraries. Therefore true and false are not contrary things. Obj. 2: Further, one of two… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 100, A 4, ANS 253d-255a; Q 101, A 3, ANS and REP 3 268a-269a; Q 102 270b 298a passim✓ correct

Whether the Precepts of the Decalogue Are Suitably Distinguished from One Another? Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably distinguished from one another. For worship is a virtue distinct from faith. Now the precepts are about acts of virtue. But that which is said at the beginning of the decalogue, "Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me," belongs to… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, QQ 4-6 20c-30d; Q 21, A i, REP 4 124b-125b; A 3, ANS✓ correct

Whether Mercy Can Be Attributed to God? Objection 1: It seems that mercy cannot be attributed to God. For mercy is a kind of sorrow, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14). But there is no sorrow in God; and therefore there is no mercy in Him. Obj. 2: Further, mercy is a relaxation of justice. But God cannot remit what appertains to His justice. For it is said (2 Tim. 2:13): "If we believe… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-u, Q 52, A i, ANS 15d-18a; Q 54, A 3, REP 2 24c-25b; Q 55, A 4, REP 1-2 28c-29d; Q 85, A 4 181b-d; PART ii-n, Q 2, A 3, ANS 392d-393c; Q 23, A 3, REP 3 485a-d; PART in, Q 7, A 9, ANS 751d-752c;

Whether an Angel Is in a Place? Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not in a place. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "The common opinion of the learned is that things incorporeal are not in a place." And again, Aristotle observes (Phys. iv, text 48,57) that "it is not everything existing which is in a place, but only a movable body." But an angel is not a body, as was shown above (Q. 50).… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 79, AA 1-2 156b-158a; Q 80 159d-162d; Q 81, AA 1-2 163a-165c; A 5 167a-d; PART in SUPPL, Q 69, A 7, REP 9 891d-893c; Q 74, A i, REP i 925c- 926c✓ correct

Whether God Is a Cause of Sin? Objection 1: It would seem that God is a cause of sin. For the Apostle says of certain ones (Rom. 1:28): "God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not right [Douay: 'convenient']," and a gloss comments on this by saying that "God works in men's hearts, by inclining their wills to whatever He wills, whether to good or to evil." Now… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 48, A 6, ANS 264a-d; Q 49, A i, REP i 264d-265d; Q 82, AA 1-2 431d-433c; Q 83, A i 436d-438a; Q 87, A 4, REP 2 468b-d; Q 105, A 4, ANS 541c- 542a; PART i-n, Q 10, AA 2-4 663d-666a,C✓ correct

Whether Pain Has the Nature of Evil More Than Fault Has? Objection 1: It would seem that pain has more of evil than fault. For fault is to pain what merit is to reward. But reward has more good than merit, as its end. Therefore pain has more evil in it than fault has. Obj. 2: Further, that is the greater evil which is opposed to the greater good. But pain, as was said above (A. 5), is opposed… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 5, A i, ANS 23c-24a; A 2, REP 4 24b-25a; A 4, ANS 25d- 26c; A 6, ANS 27c-28b; Q 6, A i, REP 2 28b-d; Q 20, A 2, ANS 121b-122a; PART I-II, Q 5, A 8 642d-643d; Q 8 655a-657c; Q n, A 3 667d- 668d; Q 12, AA 2-4 670b-672a; Q 22, A 3, REP 2 722d-723b; Q 23 723c-727a; Q 27, A i 737b-d; Q 41, A 3 799c-800b✓ correct

Whether Goodness Is Prior in Idea to Being? Objection 1: It seems that goodness is prior in idea to being. For names are arranged according to the arrangement of the things signified by the names. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) assigned the first place, amongst the other names of God, to His goodness rather than to His being. Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being. Obj. 2: Further, that… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 58, A 4✓ correct

Whether There Can Be Moral Without Intellectual Virtue? Objection 1: It would seem that moral can be without intellectual virtue. Because moral virtue, as Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) is "a habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Now though nature may be in accord with some sovereign reason that moves it, there is no need for that reason to be united to nature in the same… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologtca, PART H-II, QQ 28-29 527b-533a✓ correct

Whether Joy Is Effected in Us by Charity? Objection 1: It would seem that joy is not effected in us by charity. For the absence of what we love causes sorrow rather than joy. But God, Whom we love by charity, is absent from us, so long as we are in this state of life, since "while we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord" (2 Cor. 5:6). Therefore charity causes sorrow in us rather than… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 59, A A 4-5 48c-49d; Q 60, A 2 50d-51b; Q 97, A i, REP 3 236a-d✓ correct

Whether All the Moral Virtues Are About the Passions? Objection 1: It would seem that all the moral virtues are about the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue is about objects of pleasure and sorrow." But pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 4; Q. 31, A. 1; Q. 35, AA. 1, 2). Therefore all the moral virtues are about the passions. Obj. 2:… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 17, A i, ANS lOOd-lOld; Q 48, A 6, ANS 264a-d; Q 49, A i, REP 3 264d-265d; Q 63, A 9, REP i 333 b-d; Q 114, A 3 583 b-d; PART i-n, Q 20, A i 712a-d; Q 21, A 2 718a-d✓ correct

Whether Falsity Exists in Things? Objection 1: It appears that falsity does not exist in things. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 8), "If the true is that which is, it will be concluded that the false exists nowhere; whatever reason may appear to the contrary." Obj. 2: Further, false is derived from fallere (to deceive). But things do not deceive; for, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33),… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, QQ 75-84 137c-178a vm✓ correct

Whether Sin Has a Cause? Objection 1: It would seem that sin has no cause. For sin has the nature of evil, as stated above (Q. 71, A. 6). But evil has no cause, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore sin has no cause. Obj. 2: Further, a cause is that from which something follows of necessity. Now that which is of necessity, seems to be no sin, for every sin is voluntary. Therefore sin has… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 63, A 4, ANS 328b-329a; Q 80, A 2, REP 2 428a-d; Q 82, A 5, ANS 435c-436c; PART i-n, Q 2, A 6, ANS 619d-620d; Q 3, A 4, ANS 625a-626b, Q 4, A 2, REP 2 630b-631a; Q n, A 2, ANS 667b-d;, Q] 13, A 2, ANS 673c-674c; Q 30, A i, ANS 749a-d; Q 31, A 5 755c-756c; A 6, ANS 756d-757c✓ correct

Whether Any Demons Are Naturally Wicked? Objection 1: It would seem that some demons are naturally wicked. For Porphyry says, as quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11): "There is a class of demons of crafty nature, pretending that they are gods and the souls of the dead." But to be deceitful is to be evil. Therefore some demons are naturally wicked. Obj. 2: Further, as the angels are created… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 103, A 2, REP 1-2 529a-530a; PART i-n, Q 2, AA 1-4 615d-618d✓ correct

Whether the End of the Government of the World Is Something Outside the World? Objection 1: It would seem that the end of the government of the world is not something existing outside the world. For the end of the government of a thing is that whereto the thing governed is brought. But that whereto a thing is brought is some good in the thing itself; thus a sick man is brought back to health,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 60, A 5, ANS 313b-314c; Q 65, A 2, ANS 340b-341b; Q 92, A i, REP 1,3 488d-489d; Q 96, A 4 512d- 513c; PART i-n, Q i, A 5, ANS 613a-614a; AA 7-8 614c-615c; Q 19, A 10, ANS 710b-711d; Q 21, AA 3-4 718d-720a,c✓ correct

Whether an angel by natural love loves God more than he loves himself? Objection 1: It would seem that the angel does not love God by natural love more than he loves himself. For, as was stated (A. 4), natural love rests upon natural union. Now the Divine nature is far above the angelic nature. Therefore, according to natural love, the angel loves God less than self, or even than another… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART n-n, Q 45, A 3, REP 3 600c-601a; PART HI SUPPL, Q 96, A 7 1061b-1062a; A n, ANS and REP 5 1063d- 1064d; A 12 1064d-1065b CH ii 150a-151b; BK in, CH 3 178d-180a; BK iv, CH 5 228a-230b

Whether Some Defect Is a Cause of Daring? Objection 1: It would seem that some defect is a cause of daring. For the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 4) that "lovers of wine are strong and daring." But from wine ensues the effect of drunkenness. Therefore daring is caused by a defect. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those who have no experience of danger are bold."… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 94, A 4 223d-224d; PART n-n, Q 24, A u, ANS 498b-499c✓ correct

Whether the Natural Law Is the Same in All Men? Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law is not the same in all. For it is stated in the Decretals (Dist. i) that "the natural law is that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel." But this is not common to all men; because, as it is written (Rom. 10:16), "all do not obey the gospel." Therefore the natural law is not the same in all… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 90 205a-208b; Q 91, A 3 209d-210c; Q 92 213c- 215a,c; QQ 95-97 226b-239b✓ correct

Whether Law Is Something Pertaining to Reason? Objection 1: It would seem that law is not something pertaining to reason. For the Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): "I see another law in my members," etc. But nothing pertaining to reason is in the members; since the reason does not make use of a bodily organ. Therefore law is not something pertaining to reason. Obj. 2: Further, in the reason there is… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 96, A 4 512d-513c✓ correct

Whether in the State of Innocence Man Would Have Been Master Over Man? Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man would not have been master over man. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 15): "God willed that man, who was endowed with reason and made to His image, should rule over none but irrational creatures; not over men, but over cattle." Obj. 2: Further, what came into… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-u, Q 90, A i, REP 3 20Sb-206b; A 3 207a-c; Q 96, A 5, ANS and REP 3 233d-234d; Q 105, A i 307d- 309d 23 HOBBES* Leviathan, PART i, 71d-73a; 74b-c; 97c-d; PART ii, 100c-106d; 113d-114b; 130b-d; 131d-132a; 149d-150a; 153a-158a

Whether the Rational Soul Is Produced by God Immediately? Objection 1: It would seem that the rational soul is not immediately made by God, but by the instrumentality of the angels. For spiritual things have more order than corporeal things. But inferior bodies are produced by means of the superior, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore also the inferior spirits, who are the rational… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 56, A 3 8b-9a✓ correct

Whether the Intellect Can Be the Subject of Virtue? Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect is not the subject of virtue. For Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that all virtue is love. But the subject of love is not the intellect, but the appetitive power alone. Therefore no virtue is in the intellect. Obj. 2: Further, virtue is referred to good, as is clear from what has been said… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-ix, Q 12, A 5, ANS and REP 3 672a-c; Q 13, A 2, REP 2-3 673c-674c; Q 16, A 2, REP 2 684d-685b; Q 17, A 2, REP 3 687d-688b; Q 41, A i, REP 3 798b-d✓ correct

Whether the Created Intellect Needs Any Created Light in Order to See the Essence of God? Objection 1: It seems that the created intellect does not need any created light in order to see the essence of God. For what is of itself lucid in sensible things does not require any other light in order to be seen. Therefore the same applies to intelligible things. Now God is intelligible light.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, QQ 52-53 15d-22d; Q 54, A 4, REP 1,3 25b-d✓ correct

Whether One Habit Is Made Up of Many Habits? Objection 1: It would seem that one habit is made up of many habits. For whatever is engendered, not at once, but little by little, seems to be made up of several parts. But a habit is engendered, not at once, but little by little out of several acts, as stated above (Q. 51, A. 3). Therefore one habit is made up of several. Obj. 2: Further, a whole… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 86, A 2, ANS 462a-463a; Q 89, A 6, REP 3 478b-d✓ correct

Whether Our Intellect Can Know the Infinite? Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect can know the infinite. For God excels all infinite things. But our intellect can know God, as we have said above (Q. 12, A. 1). Much more, therefore, can our intellect know all other infinite things. Obj. 2: Further, our intellect can naturally know genera and species. But there is an infinity of species… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 16, A 6, REP 1 98b-d; Q 18, A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 79, AA 12-13 425c-427a; PART I-H, Q i, A 4, REP 2 612a-613a; A 5, ANS 613a-614a✓ correct

Whether There Is Only One Truth, According to Which All Things Are True? Objection 1: It seems that there is only one truth, according to which all things are true. For according to Augustine (De Trin. xv, 1), "nothing is greater than the mind of man, except God." Now truth is greater than the mind of man; otherwise the mind would be the judge of truth: whereas in fact it judges all things… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theohgica, PART i-n, Q 51, . A 4 15a-d; Q 55, A 4, ANS and REP 6 28c-29d; Q 63, A A 3-4 65a-66c; Q 68 87c-96c✓ correct

Whether Any Habits Are Infused in Man by God? Objection 1: It would seem that no habit is infused in man by God. For God treats all equally. If therefore He infuses habits into some, He would infuse them into all: which is clearly untrue. Obj. 2: Further, God works in all things according to the mode which is suitable to their nature: for "it belongs to Divine providence to preserve nature,"… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theohgica, PART i-n, 051, A 4 15a-d; Q 58, A 3, REP 3 43b-44a; Q 62 59d- 63a; Q 63, A 3 65a-d; Q 64, A 4 69b-70a; Q 67, AA 3-6 83b~87c; Q no, A 3, REP i 350a-d; A 4, ANS 350d-351d, PART n-n, Q 23 482c-489c✓ correct

Whether Virtue Is Adequately Divided into Moral and Intellectual? Objection 1: It would seem that virtue is not adequately divided into moral and intellectual. For prudence seems to be a mean between moral and intellectual virtue, since it is reckoned among the intellectual virtues (Ethic. vi, 3, 5); and again is placed by all among the four cardinal virtues, which are moral virtues, as we shall… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 83, A i, REP 5 436d-438a; A 2, ANS 438a-d✓ correct

Whether Free-Will Is a Power? Objection 1: It would seem that free-will is not a power. For free-will is nothing but a free judgment. But judgment denominates an act, not a power. Therefore free-will is not a power. Obj. 2: Further, free-will is defined as "the faculty of the will and reason." But faculty denominates a facility of power, which is due to a habit. Therefore free-will is a habit.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 26, b A 4, ANS and REP 2 151c-152a,c; PART i-n, Q i, A 7, ANS 614c-615a; Q 2, AA 1-5 615d-619c✓ correct

Whether All Other Beatitude Is Included in the Beatitude of God? Objection 1: It seems that the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes. For there are some false beatitudes. But nothing false can be in God. Therefore the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes. Obj. 2: Further, a certain beatitude, according to some, consists in things corporeal; as in pleasure,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 4, A 8 636a-c✓ correct

Whether the Fellowship of Friends Is Necessary for Happiness? Objection 1: It would seem that friends are necessary for Happiness. For future Happiness is frequently designated by Scripture under the name of "glory." But glory consists in man's good being brought to the notice of many. Therefore the fellowship of friends is necessary for Happiness. Obj. 2: Further, Boethius [*Seneca, Ep. 6]… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologtca, PART i-n, Q 66, A 5, REP 1-2 79b-80c✓ correct

Whether Wisdom Is the Greatest of the Intellectual Virtues? Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not the greatest of the intellectual virtues. Because the commander is greater than the one commanded. Now prudence seems to command wisdom, for it is stated in Ethic. i, 2 that political science, which belongs to prudence (Ethic. vi, 8), "orders that sciences should be cultivated in states, and… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theohgica, PART i-n, Q i 609a-615c passim; Q 5, A 8 642d-643d✓ correct

Whether Every Man Desires Happiness? Objection 1: It would seem that not all desire Happiness. For no man can desire what he knows not; since the apprehended good is the object of the appetite (De Anima iii, 10). But many know not what Happiness is. This is evident from the fact that, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 4), "some thought that Happiness consists in pleasures of the body; some, in a… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 5 636d643d✓ correct

Whether Man Can Attain Happiness? Objection 1: It would seem that man cannot attain happiness. For just as the rational is above the sensible nature, so the intellectual is above the rational, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv, vi, vii) in several passages. But irrational animals that have the sensitive nature only, cannot attain the end of the rational nature. Therefore neither can man, who… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 21, A i, ANS and REP 1,3 124b-125b; Q 60, A 5, ANS 313b-314c; Q 92, A i, RFP 3 488d-489d; Q 96, A 4 512d-513c; PART i-n, Q i, A 5, ANS 613a- 614a; A 7 614c-615a; Q 19, A 10, ANS 710b- 711d; Q 21, A 3 718d-719c; A 4, REP 3 719d- 720a,c✓ correct

Whether There Is Justice in God? Objection 1: It seems that there is not justice in God. For justice is divided against temperance. But temperance does not exist in God: neither therefore does justice. Obj. 2: Further, he who does whatsoever he wills and pleases does not work according to justice. But, as the Apostle says: "God worketh all things according to the counsel of His will" (Eph.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 85 7c. Eternal beatitude: the perfection of human 178b-184a; Q 91, A 6 212c-213c; Q 109, A 2 339c-340b; A A 7-8 344a-346a✓ correct

Whether Sin Diminishes the Good of Nature? Objection 1: It would seem that sin does not diminish the good of nature. For man's sin is no worse than the devil's. But natural good remains unimpaired in devils after sin, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore neither does sin diminish the good of human nature. Obj. 2: Further, when that which follows is changed, that which precedes remains… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theohgica, PART i, Q 95, A 4, ANS 509b-510a; Q 113, A 7 580b-581a; PART i-n, Q 2, A 3, REP i 6l7b-618a; Q 4, AA 1-2 629d-631a; Q 34, A 3 770c-771c✓ correct

Whether the Actions of the First Man Were Less Meritorious Than Ours Are? Objection 1: It would seem that the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are. For grace is given to us through the mercy of God, Who succors most those who are most in need. Now we are more in need of grace than was man in the state of innocence. Therefore grace is more copiously poured out upon us;… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART m, Q 19, A 3 819c-820c; Q 26, A i, REP 2 845b-846a; PART in SUPPL, Q 71, A 8, REP i 909d'910d; Q 92, A i, REP 5 1025c-1032b

Whether the Goodness of the Will Depends on Reason? Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on reason. For what comes first does not depend on what follows. But the good belongs to the will before it belongs to reason, as is clear from what has been said above (Q. 9, A. 1). Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on reason. Obj. 2: Further, the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 87, AA 3-5 187b-189c; PART in SUPPL, Q 70, A 3 897d-900d, Q 86 992b-996a,c; Q 87, A i, REP 4 997b-998c; Q 90, A 3 1014d-1016a; Q 94 1040d- 1042c, QQ 97-99 1066a-1085a,c✓ correct

Whether Any Sin Incurs a Debt of Eternal Punishment? Objection 1: It would seem that no sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment. For a just punishment is equal to the fault, since justice is equality: wherefore it is written (Isa. 27:8): "In measure against measure, when it shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it." Now sin is temporal. Therefore it does not incur a debt of eternal… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 97, A i, ANS 236a d✓ correct

Whether Human Law Should Be Changed in Any Way? Objection 1: It would seem that human law should not be changed in any way at all. Because human law is derived from the natural law, as stated above (Q. 95, A. 2). But the natural law endures unchangeably. Therefore human law should also remain without any change. Obj. 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), a measure should be… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 60, : A 5, ANS 53a-54d; Q 66, A 4, REP 3 78c-79b✓ correct

Whether the Moral Virtues Differ in Point of the Various Objects of the Passions? Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues do not differ according to the objects of the passions. For just as there are objects of passions, so are there objects of operations. Now those moral virtues that are about operations, do not differ according to the objects of those operations: for the buying and… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART n-ii, Q 25, A i, REP 2 501b-502a

Whether the Irascible Passions Precede the Concupiscible Passions, or Vice Versa? Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions. For the order of the passions is that of their objects. But the object of the irascible faculty is the difficult good, which seems to be the highest good. Therefore the irascible passions seem to precede the concupiscible… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 73, A 10, ANS 128a-d; PART n-ii, Q 25, A i, REP 2 501b-502a; Q 43 585a-592d✓ correct

Whether the Excellence of the Person Sinning Aggravates the Sin? Objection 1: It would seem that the excellence of the person sinning does not aggravate the sin. For man becomes great chiefly by cleaving to God, according to Ecclus. 25:13: "How great is he that findeth wisdom and knowledge! but there is none above him that feareth the Lord." Now the more a man cleaves to God, the less is a sin… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, Q 96, AA 5-7 1055c-1062a; AA 11-12 1063d- 1065b✓ correct

Article 1. Whether the aureole is the same as the essential reward which is called the aurea? Objection 1. It would seem that the aureole is not distinct from the essential reward which is called the "aurea." For the essential reward is beatitude itself. Now according to Boethius (De Consol. iii), beatitude is "a state rendered perfect by the aggregate of all goods." Therefore the essential… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, : Q 90, A 2 1013d-1014d; Q 96, A 7, REP 3 1061b- 1062a✓ correct

Article 2. Whether at the judgment Christ will appear in His glorified humanity? Objection 1. It would seem that at the judgment Christ will not appear in His glorified humanity. For a gloss [St. Augustine, Tract. cxx in Joan.] on John 19:37, "They shall look on him whom they pierced," says: "Because He will come in the flesh wherein He was crucified." Now He was crucified in the form of… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theohgica, PART i, Q 62 317c-325b; PART i-n, Q 2, A 3, ANS and REP i 617b-618a; Q 4, A 8, REP i 636a-c .

Whether the Angels Were Created in Beatitude? Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were created in beatitude. For it is stated (De Eccl. Dogm. xxix) that "the angels who continue in the beatitude wherein they were created, do not of their nature possess the excellence they have." Therefore the angels were created in beatitude. Obj. 2: Further, the angelic nature is nobler than the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologtca, PART i-n, Q 14, A 6, ANS 680c-681a b BK xi, CH 3✓ correct

Whether the Process of Counsel Is Indefinite? Objection 1: It would seem that the process of counsel is indefinite. For counsel is an inquiry about the particular things with which action is concerned. But singulars are infinite. Therefore the process of counsel is indefinite. Obj. 2: Further, the inquiry of counsel has to consider not only what is to be done, but how to avoid obstacles. But… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologtca, PART i, Q 84, : AA 1-2 440d-443c; A 4, ANS 444d-446b; AA 5-7 446c-450b; Q 85, A i, ANS and REP 1-2 451c- 4S3c; A 2, ANS 453d-455b …✓ correct

Whether the Intelligible Species Are Derived by the Soul from Certain Separate Forms? Objection 1: It would seem that the intelligible species are derived by the soul from some separate forms. For whatever is such by participation is caused by what is such essentially; for instance, that which is on fire is reduced to fire as the cause thereof. But the intellectual soul forasmuch as it is… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 9, A 3 765b-766b; A 4, REP 2-3 766b-767b; PART in SUPPL, Q 92, A i, ANS 1025c-l032b

Whether the Will Moves Itself? Objection 1: It would seem that the will does not move itself. For every mover, as such, is in act: whereas what is moved, is in potentiality; since "movement is the act of that which is in potentiality, as such" [*Aristotle, Phys. iii, 1]. Now the same is not in potentiality and in act, in respect of the same. Therefore nothing moves itself. Neither, therefore,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 12, A (2. The origin or derivation of ideas in the human A 4, REP 2 160c-161d; 9, REP 2 58b-59a; Q 28, mind. 2c. The acquirement of ideas by Q 85, A 2 453d-455b; Q 87, A 3 467b-468a perception or intuition: simple ideas orforms as direct objects of the understanding.)✓ correct

Whether Any Created Intellect by Its Natural Powers Can See the Divine Essence? Objection 1: It seems that a created intellect can see the Divine essence by its own natural power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "An angel is a pure mirror, most clear, receiving, if it is right to say so, the whole beauty of God." But if a reflection is seen, the original thing is seen. Therefore since an… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 14, PREAMBLE 75c-d; A 4, ANS 78b-79a; A 5 79a- 80a; A 6✓ correct

Whether the Act of God's Intellect Is His Substance? Objection 1: It seems that the act of God's intellect is not His substance. For to understand is an operation. But an operation signifies something proceeding from the operator. Therefore the act of God's intellect is not His substance. Obj. 2: Further, to understand one's act of understanding, is to understand something that is neither great… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART HI, Q 10, A 2, REP 3 768b-769c; PART in SUPPL, Q 92, A i, REP 2 1025c-1032b

Whether the Will Is Moved, of Necessity, by Its Object? Objection 1: It seems that the will is moved, of necessity, by its object. For the object of the will is compared to the will as mover to movable, as stated in De Anima iii, 10. But a mover, if it be sufficient, moves the movable of necessity. Therefore the will can be moved of necessity by its object. Obj. 2: Further, just as the will is… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 34, A i, ANS 185b-187b; Q 85, A 2, REP 3 453d-455b; Q 107, A i, ANS 549b-550b✓ correct

Whether Word in God Is a Personal Name? Objection 1: It would seem that Word in God is not a personal name. For personal names are applied to God in a proper sense, as Father and Son. But Word is applied to God metaphorically, as Origen says on (John 1:1), "In the beginning was the Word." Therefore Word is not a personal name in God. Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. ix,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 13, A 9 71b-72c; Q 29, A i 162a-163b; A 4, ANS and REP 4 165c-167a; Q 30, A 4 170c-171b; Q 33, A 3, REP i 182c-183c; Q 36, A i, ANS 191a~192a; Q 40, A 3, ANS 215c-216d; Q 55, A 3, REP 3 291a-d; Q 57, A 2, REP 3 295d-297a; Q 76, A 2, REP 3 388c-391a; Q 85, A 2, REP 2 453d- 455b; A 3, REP 1,4 455b-457a; Q 86, A 2, REP 4 462a-463a; PART i-n, Q 30, A 4, REP 2 751c- 752b✓ correct

Whether This Name "God" Is Communicable? Objection 1: It seems that this name "God" is communicable. For whosoever shares in the thing signified by a name shares in the name itself. But this name "God" signifies the divine nature, which is communicable to others, according to the words, "He hath given us great [Vulg.: 'most great'] and precious promises, that by these we [Vulg.: 'ye'] may be… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 64, A 3, REP 3 68b-69b; Q 67, A 3, ANS 83b-84d; Q 71, A 6, REP i llOb-lllb; Q 72, A 6 116b- 117a; PART ii-n, Q 21, A 3, REP 2-3 479c-480b✓ correct

Whether the Intellectual Virtues Observe the Mean? Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not observe the mean. Because moral virtue observes the mean by conforming to the rule of reason. But the intellectual virtues are in reason itself, so that they seem to have no higher rule. Therefore the intellectual virtues do not observe the mean. Obj. 2: Further, the mean of moral… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 15, A i Q 29, A 2, REP 4 163b-164b; Q 76, A 2, REP 3 388c-391a; Q 79, A 3, ANS 416a-417a; Q 84, A i, ANS 440d-442a …✓ correct

Whether Ideas Are Many? Objection 1: It seems that ideas are not many. For an idea in God is His essence. But God's essence is one only. Therefore there is only one idea. Obj. 2: Further, as the idea is the principle of knowing and operating, so are art and wisdom. But in God there are not several arts or wisdoms. Therefore in Him there is no plurality of ideas. Obj. 3: Further, if it be said… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 16, A 2 95c-96b; Q 17, AA 2-3 102a-103c; Q 58, A 4, ANS 302d-303c; Q 85, A i, REP i 451c-453c; A 6 458d-459c; Q 89, A 5, ANS 477a-478b; Q 94, A 4 505a-506a✓ correct

Whether Truth Resides Only in the Intellect Composing and Dividing? Objection 1: It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that as the senses are always true as regards their proper sensible objects, so is the intellect as regards "what a thing is." Now composition and division are neither in the senses nor in the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theohgtca, PART i-n, Q 85, A 6 182d-184a✓ correct

Whether Death and Other Defects Are Natural to Man? Objection 1: It would seem that death and such like defects are natural to man. For "the corruptible and the incorruptible differ generically" (Metaph. x, text. 26). But man is of the same genus as other animals which are naturally corruptible. Therefore man is naturally corruptible. Obj. 2: Further, whatever is composed of contraries is… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 61, A 2, REP 3 3l5c-316a; Q 75, A 2 379c-380c; A 6 383c-384c; Q 76, A i 385d-388c; A 3, REP 1-2 391a-393a; PART i-n, Q 22, A i, REP 3 720d- 721c✓ correct

Whether the Angel Was Produced by God from Eternity? Objection 1: It would seem that the angel was produced by God from eternity. For God is the cause of the angel by His being: for He does not act through something besides His essence. But His being is eternal. Therefore He produced the angels from eternity. Obj. 2: Further, everything which exists at one period and not at another, is subject… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, Q 77, A i, ANS 943a-944d; Q 79, A i, ANS 951 b- 953b✓ correct

Article 1. Whether the time of our resurrection should be delayed till the end of the world? Objection 1. It would seem that the time of the resurrection ought not to be delayed till the end of the world, so that all may rise together. For there is more conformity between head and members than between one member and another, as there is more between cause and effect than between one effect and… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, Q 69, A 2, ANS and REP 2 886c-887d; A 7, ANS and REP 6 891d-893c; Q 71, A 6 908b-909c; Q 97, A i, REP 2 1066b-d✓ correct

Article 2. Whether souls are conveyed to heaven or hell immediately after death? Objection 1. It would seem that no souls are conveyed to heaven or hell immediately after death. For a gloss on Psalm 36:10, "Yet a little while and the wicked shall not be," says that "the saints are delivered at the end of life; yet after this life they will not yet be where the saints will be when it is said to… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, Q 69 885a-893c; Q 70, A 3 897d-900d; Q 86 992b-996a,c; Q 87, A i, REP 4 997b-998c; Q 90, A 3 1014d-1016a, QQ 97-99 1066a-1085a,c✓ correct

Article 1. Whether places are appointed to receive souls after death? Objection 1. It would seem that places are not appointed to receive souls after death. For as Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "Wise men are agreed that incorporeal things are not in a place," and this agrees with the words of Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32): "We can answer without hesitation that the soul is not conveyed to… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 79, A 12, ANS 425c-426b✓ correct

Whether Synderesis Is a Special Power of the Soul Distinct from the Others? Objection 1: It would seem that "synderesis" is a special power, distinct from the others. For those things which fall under one division, seem to be of the same genus. But in the gloss of Jerome on Ezech. 1:6, "synderesis" is divided against the irascible, the concupiscible, and the rational, which are powers.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 48, A i, REP 4 259b-260c; PART MI, Q i, A 4 612a- 613a; Q 7, A 2, REP 2 652d-653c✓ correct

Whether Evil Is a Nature? Objection 1: It would seem that evil is a nature. For every genus is a nature. But evil is a genus; for the Philosopher says (Praedic. x) that "good and evil are not in a genus, but are genera of other things." Therefore evil is a nature. Obj. 2: Further, every difference which constitutes a species is a nature. But evil is a difference constituting a species of… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 36, A 3, REP 4 194c-195d; PART MI, Q i, A 4, REP 2 612a-613a✓ correct

Whether the Holy Ghost Proceeds from the Father Through the Son? Objection 1: It would seem that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Father through the Son. For whatever proceeds from one through another, does not proceed immediately. Therefore, if the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son, He does not proceed immediately; which seems to be unfitting. Obj. 2: Further, if the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, Q 84, A 3, CONTRARY 985 d -989 b✓ correct

Article 3. Whether the movement of the saints will be instantaneous? Objection 1. It would seem that movement of the saints will be instantaneous. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii, 30) that "wherever the spirit listeth there will the body be." Now the movement of the will, whereby the spirit wishes to be anywhere, is instantaneous. Therefore the body's movement will be… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 63, A 3 327b-328b; PART i-n, Q i, A 4 612a-613a; Q 2, A i, REP 3 615d-616c; Q 30, A 4 751c- 752b 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART ii-n, Q 27, A 6 524c-525c; Q 28, A 3 528d-529c✓ correct

Whether the Devil Desired to Be As God? Objection 1: It would seem that the devil did not desire to be as God. For what does not fall under apprehension, does not fall under desire; because the good which is apprehended moves the appetite, whether sensible, rational, or intellectual; and sin consists only in such desire. But for any creature to be God's equal does not fall under apprehension,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theohgica, PART i-n, Q 113, A 9 368d-369c, PART n-n, Q 23, A 2, REP 3 483d-484d; PART in, Q 10, A 3, REP 3 769d-771b✓ correct

Whether the Justification of the Ungodly Is God's Greatest Work? Objection 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly is not God's greatest work. For it is by the justification of the ungodly that we attain the grace of a wayfarer. Now by glorification we receive heavenly grace, which is greater. Hence the glorification of angels and men is a greater work than the justification of… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 14, A i, ANS 75d-76c; A 3 77d-78b; A 12 85d-86d; Q 16, A 5, ANS 97c-98b; Q 18, A 4 107d-108c; Q 54, A 2, ANS 285d-286c; Q 79, A 2, ANS 414d- 416a; PART i-n, Q i, A 4, REP i 612a-613a✓ correct

Whether God Comprehends Himself? Objection 1: It seems that God does not comprehend Himself. For Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that "whatever comprehends itself is finite as regards itself." But God is in all ways infinite. Therefore He does not comprehend Himself. Obj. 2: If it is said that God is infinite to us, and finite to Himself, it can be urged to the contrary, that… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 57, A 5, REP 3 39a-40a; Q 90, A i, REP 2 205b- 206b; A 2, REP 3 206b-207a; Q 94, A 4, ANS 223d-224d; PART in, Q n, A i, REP 3 772b- 773a; Q 13, A i, REP 3 780a-781b✓ correct

Whether Prudence Is a Virtue Necessary to Man? Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a virtue necessary to lead a good life. For as art is to things that are made, of which it is the right reason, so is prudence to things that are done, in respect of which we judge of a man's life: for prudence is the right reason about these things, as stated in Ethic. vi, 5. Now art is not necessary… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 14, A 16 90b-91b; Q 79, AA 11-13 424d-427a; PART i-u, Q 13, A 6, REP 2 676c-677b✓ correct

Whether God Has a Speculative Knowledge of Things? Objection 1: It seems that God has not a speculative knowledge of things. For the knowledge of God is the cause of things, as shown above (A. 8). But speculative knowledge is not the cause of the things known. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative. Obj. 2: Further, speculative knowledge comes by abstraction from things; which does… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 13, A 12 74c-75b, Q 85, A 2, REP 3 453d-455b✓ correct

Whether Affirmative Propositions Can Be Formed About God? Objection 1: It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed about God. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii) that "negations about God are true; but affirmations are vague." Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii) that "a simple form cannot be a subject." But God is the most absolutely simple form, as shown (Q. 3): therefore… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Thtologica, PART i, Q 14, A 7, ANS 81d-82b; Q 58, A 3 301d-302d; A 4,✓ correct

Whether the Knowledge of God Is Discursive? Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is discursive. For the knowledge of God is not habitual knowledge, but actual knowledge. Now the Philosopher says (Topic. ii): "The habit of knowledge may regard many things at once; but actual understanding regards only one thing at a time." Therefore as God knows many things, Himself and others, as… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 57, A 2 36a-37b; Q 94, A 2, ANS 221d-223a; A 4, ANS 223d-224d; PART n-ii, Q i, A 4, ANS 382c- 383b; Q 8, A i, REP 2 417a-d✓ correct

Whether There Are Only Three Habits of the Speculative Intellect, Viz. Wisdom, Science and Understanding? Objection 1: It would seem unfitting to distinguish three virtues of the speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, science and understanding. Because a species is a kind of science, as stated in Ethic. vi, 7. Therefore wisdom should not be condivided with science among the intellectual… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 51, A 3 14b-15a; Q 67, A 3, ANS 83b-84d; PART n-ii, Q i, AA 4-5 382c-384b; Q 4, A 8 409a- d; Q 9, A i, ANS and REP i 423c-424b, A 2, ANS 424b-425a; Q 18, A 4 464c-465a; PART HI, Q 7, A 3, REP 3 747b-748a✓ correct

Whether a Habit Can Be Caused by One Act? Objection 1: It would seem that a habit can be caused by one act. For demonstration is an act of reason. But science, which is the habit of one conclusion, is caused by one demonstration. Therefore habit can be caused by one act. Obj. 2: Further, as acts happen to increase by multiplication so do they happen to increase by intensity. But a habit is… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 66, A 4, REP i 78c-79b; Q 114, A 4 373a-d; PART n-ii, Q 23, A 3, REP i 485a-d; Q 29, A 3 531d- 532c; Q 31, A i, REP 3 536d-537c✓ correct

Whether Justice Is the Chief of the Moral Virtues? Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not the chief of the moral virtues. For it is better to give of one's own than to pay what is due. Now the former belongs to liberality, the latter to justice. Therefore liberality is apparently a greater virtue than justice. Obj. 2: Further, the chief quality of a thing is, seemingly, that in which it… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 60, A 3, ANS 51c-52b; Q 64, A 2 67d-68b, Q 114, A i, ANS 370c-371c✓ correct

Whether There Is Only One Moral Virtue About Operations? Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one moral virtue about operations. Because the rectitude of all external operations seems to belong to justice. Now justice is but one virtue. Therefore there is but one virtue about operations. Obj. 2: Further, those operations seem to differ most, which are directed on the one side to the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 94, AA 5-6 224d-226b; Q 96, A 6 235a-d; Q 97 235d-239b✓ correct

Whether the Natural Law Can Be Changed? Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law can be changed. Because on Ecclus. 17:9, "He gave them instructions, and the law of life," the gloss says: "He wished the law of the letter to be written, in order to correct the law of nature." But that which is corrected is changed. Therefore the natural law can be changed. Obj. 2: Further, the slaying of… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologjca, PART ii-n, Q 183, A 4, ANS 627d-628d✓ correct

Whether the Difference of States Applies to Those Who Are Beginning, Progressing, or Perfect? Objection 1: It would seem that the difference of states does not apply to those who are beginning, progressing, or perfect. For "diverse genera have diverse species and differences" [*Aristotle, Categ. ii]. Now this difference of beginning, progress, and perfection is applied to the degrees of… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 96, A 4 233a-d; Q 100, A 2, ANS 252b-253a 23 HOBBES. leviathan, PART i, 86b; 91a-b, PART n, 132a✓ correct

Whether Human Law Binds a Man in Conscience? Objection 1: It would seem that human law does not bind man in conscience. For an inferior power has no jurisdiction in a court of higher power. But the power of man, which frames human law, is beneath the Divine power. Therefore human law cannot impose its precept in a Divine court, such as is the court of conscience. Obj. 2: Further, the judgment… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 100, A 2, ANS 252b-253a; Q 105, A 2, ANS 309d- 316a✓ correct

Whether the Moral Precepts of the Law Are About All the Acts of Virtue? Objection 1: It would seem that the moral precepts of the Law are not about all the acts of virtue. For observance of the precepts of the Old Law is called justification, according to Ps. 118:8: "I will keep Thy justifications." But justification is the execution of justice. Therefore the moral precepts are only about… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 91, a A 3 209d-210c; 93, A 3 217b-218a; Q 94, A 4 223d-224d; Q 95, A 2 227c-228c; Q 96, A 4, ANS 233a-d✓ correct

Whether There Is a Human Law? Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a human law. For the natural law is a participation of the eternal law, as stated above (A. 2). Now through the eternal law "all things are most orderly," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 6). Therefore the natural law suffices for the ordering of all human affairs. Consequently there is no need for a human law. Obj.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologtca, PART i-n, Q 96, ANS and REP i 2 59 d- 261 a 23HoBBEs: Leviathan, PART i, 94d; PART n, 132d; 134b-135d; 136b; 142a-144d; 156b-c✓ correct

Whether Human Law Should Be Framed for the Community Rather Than for the Individual? Objection 1: It would seem that human law should be framed not for the community, but rather for the individual. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the legal just . . . includes all particular acts of legislation . . . and all those matters which are the subject of decrees," which are also individual… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 72, A 5 115a-116b; Q 73, A 9, REP 3 126d-128a; A io> REP 2 128a-d; Q 79, AA 3-4 158a-159c, Q 81, A 2, REP 1 164d-165c; Q 87 185c-192d; Q 91, AA 4-6 210c-213c, Q 94, A 5, REP 2 224d-225d; QQ 98-108 239b-337d, PART ii-n, Q 19, A i, REP 2 465a-d, Q 24, A 12 499c-500d; PART in SUPPL, QQ 97-99 1066a-1085a,c✓ correct

Whether the Division of Sins According to Their Debt of Punishment Diversifies Their Species? Objection 1: It would seem that the division of sins according to their debt of punishment diversifies their species; for instance, when sin is divided into "mortal" and "venial." For things which are infinitely apart, cannot belong to the same species, nor even to the same genus. But venial and mortal… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologtca, PART i-ii, Q 87 : 185c-192d; Q 95, A i 226c-227c; Q 105, A 2, ANS and REP 9-12 309d-316a; Q 108, A 3, REP 2 334a-336b; PART n-n, Q 25, A 6, REP 2 ij-2 5 ] 504d-505d; PART in SUPPL, Q 89, A 6, ANS and REP i 1009d-1010c; A 7 IQlOd-lOllb; A 8, ANS 1011b-1012a, Q 99 1078b-1085a,c✓ correct

Whether the Debt of Punishment Is an Effect of Sin? Objection 1: It would seem that the debt of punishment is not an effect of sin. For that which is accidentally related to a thing, does not seem to be its proper effect. Now the debt of punishment is accidentally related to sin, for it is beside the intention of the sinner. Therefore the debt of punishment is not an effect of sin. Obj. 2:… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 21, A 2 125c-d✓ correct

Whether the Justice of God Is Truth? Objection 1: It seems that the justice of God is not truth. For justice resides in the will; since, as Anselm says (Dial. Verit. 13), it is a rectitude of the will, whereas truth resides in the intellect, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi; Ethic. vi, 2,6). Therefore justice does not appertain to truth. Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 91, A 5, ANS 211c-212c; Q 94, A 4 223d-224d; Q 95, AA 1-3 226b-229b✓ correct

Whether There Is but One Divine Law? Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one Divine law. Because, where there is one king in one kingdom there is but one law. Now the whole of mankind is compared to God as to one king, according to Ps. 46:8: "God is the King of all the earth." Therefore there is but one Divine law. Obj. 2: Further, every law is directed to the end which the lawgiver… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Tkeohgtca, PART i-n, Q 50, A 5, REP i lOb-d; Q 51, A i, REP 2 12b-13c; PART in SUPPL, Q 82, A 3 971a-972d; Q 92, A i 1025c-1032b 23 HOBBES: leviathan, PART i, 49a-d; PART n, 162c; PART iv, 261a; 262a-b✓ correct

Whether Any Habit Is in the Will? Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a habit in the will. For the habit which is in the intellect is the intelligible species, by means of which the intellect actually understands. But the will does not act by means of species. Therefore the will is not the subject of habit. Obj. 2: Further, no habit is allotted to the active intellect, as there is to… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologtca, PART i, Q 12, A i, ANS 50c-51c; A 2, ANS and REP i 51c-52c; AA 3-6 52c-56a; A 8, REP 4 57b-58b; A u, ANS and REP 3 59d-60d; A 12 60d-61c; Q 14, A 2, REP 3 76d-77d; A 10, REP i 83d~84c; Q 18, A 2, ANS and REP i 105c-106b; Q 26, A 2, ANS 150c-151a; Q 54, A 4 287b-288a; Q 60, A 2, ANS 311a-d; o 61, A 2, REP 3 315c-316a; Q 62, A i, ANS 3l7d-318c; Q 75, A 2, ANS 379c-380c; Q 78, A i, ANS and REP 3 407b-409a; Q 79 413d- 427a; Q 84, AA 1-3 440d-444d; Q 88, A i, REP 2 469a-471c; Q 117, A i 595d-597c; PART i-n, Q 3, A 8, ANS 628d-629c, g 22, A i, RLP i 720d- 721c✓ correct

Whether the Essence of God Is Seen by the Created Intellect Through an Image? Objection 1: It seems that the essence of God is seen through an image by the created intellect. For it is written: "We know that when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall see Him as He is" (1 John 3:2). Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v): "When we know God, some… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i -11, Q 50, A 3, RLP 3 8b-9a; PART in, Q 10, A 4, REP i 77lb-772a; Q n, A i, ANS and RHP i 772b- 773a, PART in SUPPL, Q 92, A i, ANS and REP 2,15 1025c-1032b✓ correct

Whether the Angels Exist in Any Great Number? Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not in great numbers. For number is a species of quantity, and follows the division of a continuous body. But this cannot be in the angels, since they are incorporeal, as was shown above (A. 1). Therefore the angels cannot exist in any great number. Obj. 2: Further, the more a thing approaches to unity,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 93, : A 2, ANS 216c-217b, PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A 3, REP 8 1034b-1037c 21 DANTE* Divine Comedy, PARADISE, iv [115]- v [12] llld-112b✓ correct

Whether the Eternal Law Is Known to All? Objection 1: It would seem that the eternal law is not known to all. Because, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:11), "the things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God." But the eternal law is a type existing in the Divine mind. Therefore it is unknown to all save God alone. Obj. 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) "the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q i, A 8, REP 2 7c-8d, Q 12, A 7, ANS and REP 2-3 56a- 57b; A 13, REP 3 61c-62b; Q 14, A 15, REP 3 89b-90b; Q 16, A 8 99d-100d; Q 57, A 3, ANS 297b-298a; Q 79, A 9, REP 3-4 422b-423d; Q 108, A 7, REP 2 560b-561a; PART i-n, Q 17, A 6, ANS 690b-d✓ correct

Whether Those Who See the Essence of God Comprehend Him? Objection 1: It seems that those who see the divine essence, comprehend God. For the Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): "But I follow after, if I may by any means comprehend [Douay: 'apprehend']." But the Apostle did not follow in vain; for he said (1 Cor. 9:26): "I . . . so run, not as at an uncertainty." Therefore he comprehended; and in the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theohgica, PART r, Q 12, A 3, ANS and REP 3 52c-53b; A n, REP i 59d- Doctrine, 60d; A 13, ANS and REP 2 61c-62b; Q 17, A 2, REP 2 102a-d; Q 54, A 5 288a d; Q 57, A i, REP 2 295a-d; Q 78, A 4, ANS 411d-413d; Q 84, A 2, REP i 442b-443c; A 6, REP 1-2 447c-449a; A 7, REP 2 449b-450b; A 8, REP 2 450b-451b; Q 93, A 6, REP 4 496b-498a; PART i-n, Q 17, A 7, REP 3 690d-692a✓ correct

Whether One Can Intend Two Things at the Same Time? Objection 1: It would seem that one cannot intend several things at the same time. For Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 14, 16, 17) that man's intention cannot be directed at the same time to God and to bodily benefits. Therefore, for the same reason, neither to any other two things. Obj. 2: Further, intention designates a movement… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theohgica, PART HI SUPPL, : Q 23, A 4 135a-d; Q 27, AA 3-5 155c-157c; Q 28, Q 70, A 2, REP 3 896a-897d✓ correct

Article 3. Whether it is always a mortal sin to communicate with an excommunicated person in other cases than those in which it is allowed? Objection 1. It would seem that it is always a mortal sin to hold communion with an excommunicated person in other cases than those in which it is allowed. Because a certain decretal (Cap. Sacris: De his quae vi, metuve, etc.) declares that "not even through…

Summa Theologica, PART in, Q n, A i, REP 2 772b-773a; Q 12, A i, REP 3 776c- 777b; PART in SUPPL, Q 92, A i, ANS and REP 12 1025c-1032b

Whether Intention Is an Act of the Intellect or of the Will? Objection 1: It would seem that intention is an act of the intellect, and not of the will. For it is written (Matt. 6:22): "If thy eye be single, thy whole body shall be lightsome": where, according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13) the eye signifies intention. But since the eye is the organ of sight, it signifies the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 14, A 2, REP 1,3 76d-77d; Q 56, A i 292a-d; Q 78, A 4, REP 2 411d-413d; Q 87 464d-468d; Q 88, A i, REP i 469a-471c; A 2, REP 3 471c-472c; Q 89, A 2, ANS 475a-d✓ correct

Whether God Understands Himself? Objection 1: It seems that God does not understand Himself. For it is said by the Philosopher (De Causis), "Every knower who knows his own essence, returns completely to his own essence." But God does not go out from His own essence, nor is He moved at all; thus He cannot return to His own essence. Therefore He does not know His own essence. Obj. 2: Further, to… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q i, A i 3b-4a; A 5, ANS and REP i 5c-6a; Q 84, A i, ANS 440d-442a; Q 85, A 2, ANS 453d-455b; more Q 88, A i 469a-471c more 20 AQUINAS* Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 64, AA 3-4 68b-70a; PART II-H, Q 4, A 8 409a-d✓ correct

Whether the Soul Knows Bodies Through the Intellect? Objection 1: It would seem that the soul does not know bodies through the intellect. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 4) that "bodies cannot be understood by the intellect; nor indeed anything corporeal unless it can be perceived by the senses." He says also (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24) that intellectual vision is of those things that are in the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 12, A 3 52c-53b; A 4, ANS and REP 3 53b-54c; Q 14, A i, ANS 75d-76c; A 2, REP i 76d-77d; Q 18, A 2, ANS and REP i 105c-106b; A 3, ANS 106b- 107c; Q 85, A i, ANS 451c-453c✓ correct

Whether the Essence of God Can Be Seen with the Bodily Eye? Objection 1: It seems that the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye. For it is written (Job 19:26): "In my flesh I shall see . . . God," and (Job 42:5), "With the hearing of the ear I have heard Thee, but now my eye seeth Thee." Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxix, 29): "Those eyes" (namely the glorified)… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, Q 82, AA 3-4 971a-974c✓ correct

Article 1. Whether the bodies of the saints will be impassible after the resurrection? Objection 1. It seems that the bodies of the saints will not be impassible after the resurrection. For everything mortal is passible. But man, after the resurrection, will be "a mortal rational animal," for such is the definition of man, which will never be dissociated from him. Therefore the body will be… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, QQ 57-58 35a-45c 23HoBBEs: Leviathan, PART i, 58a-61a; 65c-d; 71c; PART n, 163a; PART iv, 267a-c✓ correct

Whether the Habits of the Speculative Intellect Are Virtues? Objection 1: It would seem that the habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues. For virtue is an operative habit, as we have said above (Q. 55, A. 2). But speculative habits are not operative: for speculative matter is distinct from practical, i.e. operative matter. Therefore the habits of the speculative intellect are not… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART U-n, Q 8 416d-423b; Q 9, A i, REP i 423c-424b; Q 180, AA 3-6 609c-614d; PART in, Q n, AA 3-4 773d-775a; PART ni SUPPL, Q 92, A 3 1034b- 1037c

Whether the Will Is of Good Only? Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not of good only. For the same power regards opposites; for instance, sight regards white and black. But good and evil are opposites. Therefore the will is not only of good, but also of evil. Obj. 2: Further, rational powers can be directed to opposite purposes, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2). But the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 54, A 4, ANS and REP i 287b-288a; Q 55, A 2 289d- 290d; Q 57, A i, REP 3 295a-d; Q 58, A i 300c- 301a; Q 60, A i, REP 3 310b-311a; A 2, ANS 311a-d; Q 84, A 3 443d-444d; A 4, ANS 444d- 446b; A 6, ANS 447c-449a; Q 89, A i, REP 3 473b-475a; Q 117, A i, ANS 595d-597c✓ correct

Whether There Is an Active and a Passive Intellect in an Angel? Objection 1: It would seem that there is both an active and a passive intellect in an angel. The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 17) that, "in the soul, just as in every nature, there is something whereby it can become all things, and there is something whereby it can make all things." But an angel is a kind of nature.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 6: A 3 61c-62b; Q 67, A 3 83b-84d; Q 100, A ^ REP i 253d-255a; Q 108, A 2, REP i 332b 333d; Q 109, A i 338b-339c; Q no, A 3, REP 350a-d; A 4, ANS 350d-351d; Q 112, A 5 359c 360c; PART ii-n, Q i, AA 4-5 382c-384b; Q 2 409d; QQ 8-9 416d-426c; Q 19, A 7 469d-470c Q 45 598c-603c; Q 188, A 5, REP 2-3 679d 681a; PART in, QQ 9-12 763b-779d; PART n SUPPL, Q 92 1025b-1037c✓ correct

Whether There Can Be Voluntariness Without Any Act? Objection 1: It would seem that voluntariness cannot be without any act. For that is voluntary which proceeds from the will. But nothing can proceed from the will, except through some act, at least an act of the will. Therefore there cannot be voluntariness without act. Obj. 2: Further, just as one is said to wish by an act of the will, so… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica^ PART i, Q 12, BK iji, CH 6 181d-182b AA 7-8 56a-58b; A 12 60d-61c; Q 14, A 3 77d- 78b; A 5!, ANS 79a-80a; A 6 80a-81c; Q 17, A 4, ANS 103c-104b}>Q 56, A 3, REP 1-2 294a-d; 57, A 5, REP 2 299b-300b; Q 84, A 2,\ ANS 267c 442b-443c; A 7* ANS and REP i 449b*45Qb; Q 85, A^ 4fl5b-457a; A 7 459c-460b; A 8, REP i 5a-b; A 5, ANS 5a-6a; Q 14, A i, JUBP 2 75d-76c; 460b-461b; Q 8* A r,. ANS 473b-475a; A 2 A 16 90b-91b; Q 15, A 3 93b-94a; N Q 34, A 3 475a-d; A 3, ANS and REP 2,4 475d-476c; 188b-J89a; <* 79, A 9, ANS ,4,99^4^$ AA n- A 4, AN8>nd,iftBp 4 476c-477a; Q n7,tA i, , 13 4JMd-4^7a; Q 84, A>8, ANS ^SOb^Slb; I dn^p 4 595d-S97c; PART I-H Q 27^ A a,tRp 2 Q 86, A i, REP 2 461c-462a; A 3, CONTRARY 737d-738c r 4^brd; PART.I-IJ, Q i, A 6, REP 2 614a^cj Q 3, 20 AQUINAS iSumrrHt Tfatilogictt, PART -n; 0-67, 6>(2) to la CHAPTER 43: KNOWLEDGE 909✓ correct

Whether God Can Be Known in This Life by Natural Reason? Objection 1: It seems that by natural reason we cannot know God in this life. For Boethius says (De Consol. v) that "reason does not grasp simple form." But God is a supremely simple form, as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 7). Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know Him. Obj. 2: Further, the soul understands nothing by natural reason… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q ai f A 2, ANS I25c-d; Q 65, A 2, asp 3 340b-341b; PART i-n, Q 34, A i, REP 3 768c-7$9d✓ correct

Whether Corporeal Things Were Made on Account of God's Goodness? Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures were not made on account of God's goodness. For it is said (Wis. 1:14) that God "created all things that they might be." Therefore all things were created for their own being's sake, and not on account of God's goodness. Obj. 2: Further, good has the nature of an end; therefore… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 67, AA 2-3 82c-84d; Q 69, A 2, REP 3 97b-98c; PART ii-n, Q 180, A 5 6lld-6l3a; PART in, Q n, A i, REP 2 772b-773a; A 2, ANS and REP 1-2 773a-d; PART in SUPPL, Q 72, A i, REP i 917c-919a; Q 82, A 3, REP 4 971a-972d; Q 92, A i, REP 3,5,13,15 1025c-1032b; A 2, ANS 1032b-1034b✓ correct

Whether the Intellectual Virtues Remain After This Life? Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not remain after this life. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:8, 9) that "knowledge shall be destroyed," and he states the reason to be because "we know in part." Now just as the knowledge of science is in part, i.e. imperfect; so also is the knowledge of the other intellectual… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologjca, PART i, Q i, A 6, REP 3 6b-7a; Q 14, A 10 83d-84c; Q 15, A 3, REP I 93b-94a; Q 18, A 4, REP 4 107d-108c; Q 22, A i 127d-128d; A 3, REP 3 130d-131c; Q 54, A 5 288a-d; Q 59, A 3, ANS 308b-309a; Q 79, AA 11-13 424d-427a; PART i-n, Q i, A 6, REP 3 614a-c; Q 2, A i, REP i 615d-616c; Q 19, AA 3-6 704c-708a 20 AQUWA&: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 51, AA 2-3 13c-15a; Q 58, A 2 42a-43a; Q 76 140d- 144d; PART n-ii, Q 18, A 4, ANS 464c-465a; Q 45, AA 3-5 600c-602b; PART in SUPPL, Q 87 997a4000c✓ correct

Whether God Knows Evil Things? Objection 1: It seems that God does not know evil things. For the Philosopher (De Anima iii) says that the intellect which is not in potentiality does not know privation. But "evil is the privation of good," as Augustine says (Confess. iii, 7). Therefore, as the intellect of God is never in potentiality, but is always in act, as is clear from the foregoing (A. 2),… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q i, A 6, ANS 6b-7a; Q 22, A i 127d-128d✓ correct

Whether Providence Can Suitably Be Attributed to God? Objection 1: It seems that providence is not becoming to God. For providence, according to Tully (De Invent. ii), is a part of prudence. But prudence, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5, 9, 18), it gives good counsel, cannot belong to God, Who never has any doubt for which He should take counsel. Therefore providence cannot… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART II-H, Q 8, A 7 421d-422c; Q 9, A 4 425d-426c; QQ 179-180 606a-616d; Q 182 620b-624d; PART in, Q 9, A 2 764c-765a; A 3, REP 3 765b-766b; Q 10, A 4, ANS and REP i 771b-772a; Q n, A 3, REP 3 773d-774c; Q 15, A 10 795b-796a; PART in SUPPL, Q 70, A 3, ANS and REP 5 897d-900d; Q 90, A 3, ANS 1014d-1016a; Q 92, A i 1025c- 1032b; A 2, REP 6 1032b-1034b; A 3, REP 5,7- Sc.✓ correct

Whether the Sixth Beatitude, "Blessed Are the Clean of Heart," etc., Responds to the Gift of Understanding? Objection 1: It would seem that the sixth beatitude, "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God," does not respond to the gift of understanding. Because cleanness of heart seems to belong chiefly to the appetite. But the gift of understanding belongs, not to the appetite, but… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, Q 96, A 7 1061b-1062a; A n, ANS and REP 5 1063d-1064d; A 12 1064d-106Sb 23HOBBES- Leviathan, PART n, 102d-103a; 114d-115a; 149b-d; 150c-151a; 155d-156b; PART iv, 274c-d; CONCLUSION, 282d-283a✓ correct

Article 7. Whether an aureole is due to doctors? Objection 1. It would seem that an aureole is not due to doctors. For every reward to be had in the life to come will correspond to some act of virtue. But preaching or teaching is not the act of a virtue. Therefore an aureole is not due to teaching or preaching. Objection 2. Further, teaching and preaching are the result of studying and being… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART H-II, Q 187, A 3 666a-669b✓ correct

Whether Religious Are Bound to Manual Labor? Objection 1: It would seem that religious are bound to manual labor. For religious are not exempt from the observance of precepts. Now manual labor is a matter of precept according to 1 Thess. 4:11, "Work with your own hands as we commanded you"; wherefore Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxx): "But who can allow these insolent men," namely religious… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART H-II, Q : 187, A 3 666a-669b✓ correct

Whether the Object of Faith Is the First Truth? Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not the First Truth. For it seems that the object of faith is that which is proposed to us to be believed. Now not only things pertaining to the Godhead, i.e. the First Truth, are proposed to us to be believed, but also things concerning Christ's human nature, and the sacraments of the Church,…

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 13, A i, : ANS and REP 3 62c-63c; Q 34, A i, ANS and REP 1-3 185b-187b; A 3, ANS 188b<189a; Q 63, A 8, REP 1 332c-333b;Q 107, A i, REP 1-2 549b-550b✓ correct

Whether a Name Can Be Given to God? Objection 1: It seems that no name can be given to God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that, "Of Him there is neither name, nor can one be found of Him;" and it is written: "What is His name, and what is the name of His Son, if thou knowest?" (Prov. 30:4). Obj. 2: Further, every name is either abstract or concrete. But concrete names do not belong to God,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 13, A 2, REP 2 63c-64d; A 8 70d-71b; Q 37, A 2, ANS✓ correct

Whether Any Name Can Be Applied to God Substantially? Objection 1: It seems that no name can be applied to God substantially. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 9): "Everything said of God signifies not His substance, but rather shows forth what He is not; or expresses some relation, or something following from His nature or operation." Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "You will… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 13, AA 1-2 62c-64d; A 3, ANS 64d-65c✓ correct

Whether Any Name Can Be Applied to God in Its Literal Sense? Objection 1: It seems that no name is applied literally to God. For all names which we apply to God are taken from creatures; as was explained above (A. 1). But the names of creatures are applied to God metaphorically, as when we say, God is a stone, or a lion, or the like. Therefore names are applied to God in a metaphorical… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 90, A 4 207d-208b✓ correct

Whether Promulgation Is Essential to a Law? Objection 1: It would seem that promulgation is not essential to a law. For the natural law above all has the character of law. But the natural law needs no promulgation. Therefore it is not essential to a law that it be promulgated. Obj. 2: Further, it belongs properly to a law to bind one to do or not to do something. But the obligation of… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 57, A 4, ANS 298a-299a; Q 104, A 4, ANS and REP i 538a-c✓ correct

Whether Angels Know Secret Thoughts? Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know secret thoughts. For Gregory (Moral. xviii), explaining Job 28:17: "Gold or crystal cannot equal it," says that "then," namely in the bliss of those rising from the dead, "one shall be as evident to another as he is to himself, and when once the mind of each is seen, his conscience will at the same time be… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, QQ 106-107 545c-S52b✓ correct

Whether One Angel Enlightens Another? Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not enlighten another. For the angels possess now the same beatitude which we hope to obtain. But one man will not then enlighten another, according to Jer. 31:34: "They shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his brother." Therefore neither does an angel enlighten another now. Obj. 2:… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 19, A 4 705b-c✓ correct

Whether the Goodness of the Will Depends on the Eternal Law? Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the human will does not depend on the eternal law. Because to one thing there is one rule and one measure. But the rule of the human will, on which its goodness depends, is right reason. Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on the eternal law. Obj. 2: Further, "a measure is… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART MI, Q 63, A 2 t ANS 64b-65a; Q 91 208b-213c; Q 97, A 3, RHP i 237b-238b; Q too, A i 251b-252a; A 2, ANS 252b-253a; Q 107, A i, ANS 325c-327b 3(2) to✓ correct

Whether Any Virtue Is Caused in Us by Habituation? Objection 1: It would seem that virtues can not be caused in us by habituation. Because a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi cvi.] commenting on Rom. 14:23, "All that is not of faith is sin," says: "The whole life of an unbeliever is a sin: and there is no good without the Sovereign Good. Where knowledge of the truth is lacking,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 95, A 2, REP 3 227c-228c; Q 96, A 2, ANS 231c- 232b; Q 97, AA 2-3 236d-238b b✓ correct

Whether Every Human Law Is Derived from the Natural Law? Objection 1: It would seem that not every human law is derived from the natural law. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the legal just is that which originally was a matter of indifference." But those things which arise from the natural law are not matters of indifference. Therefore the enactments of human laws are not derived… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 96, A 6 235a-d; Q 97, A 4 238b-239b; Q 100, A 8, ANS and REP i 259d-261a✓ correct

Whether He Who Is Under a Law May Act Beside the Letter of the Law? Objection 1: It seems that he who is subject to a law may not act beside the letter of the law. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 31): "Although men judge about temporal laws when they make them, yet when once they are made they must pass judgment not on them, but according to them." But if anyone disregard the letter of the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologtca, PART i-n, Q 96, A 5, REP 3 233d-234d✓ correct

Whether All Are Subject to the Law? Objection 1: It would seem that not all are subject to the law. For those alone are subject to a law for whom a law is made. But the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:9): "The law is not made for the just man." Therefore the just are not subject to the law. Obj. 2: Further, Pope Urban says [*Decretals. caus. xix, qu. 2]: "He that is guided by a private law need not… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART ir-4i, Q 10, Q 12, A 2 443b-444b✓ correct

Whether the Will Is Moved to Anything Naturally? Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved to anything naturally. For the natural agent is condivided with the voluntary agent, as stated at the beginning of Phys. ii, 1. Therefore the will is not moved to anything naturally. Obj. 2: Further, that which is natural is in a thing always: as "being hot" is in fire. But no movement is… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 89, A 2, REP i 475a-d; PART i-n, Q 9, A 2 658d- 659c; Q 10, A 3 664d-665c✓ correct

Whether the Separated Soul Understands Separate Substances? Objection 1: It would seem that the separated soul does not understand separate substances. For the soul is more perfect when joined to the body than when existing apart from it, being an essential part of human nature; and every part of a whole is more perfect when it exists in that whole. But the soul in the body does not understand… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 82, A 2 432d-433c; Q 83, A i 436d-438a; Q 116, A i 592d-593d✓ correct

Whether the Will Desires of Necessity, Whatever It Desires? Objection 1: It would seem that the will desires all things of necessity, whatever it desires. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside the scope of the will." Therefore the will tends of necessity to the good which is proposed to it. Obj. 2: Further, the object of the will is compared to the will as the mover to the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART n-ii, Q 182, A i,REP2620b-621d✓ correct

Whether the Active Life Is More Excellent Than the Contemplative? Objection 1: It would seem that the active life is more excellent than the contemplative. For "that which belongs to better men would seem to be worthier and better," as the Philosopher says (Top. iii, 1). Now the active life belongs to persons of higher rank, namely prelates, who are placed in a position of honor and power;… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 108, A i 331a-332b✓ correct

Whether the New Law Ought to Prescribe or Prohibit Any External Acts? Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law should not prescribe or prohibit any external acts. For the New Law is the Gospel of the kingdom, according to Matt. 24:14: "This Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in the whole world." But the kingdom of God consists not in exterior, but only in interior acts, according to Luke… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 56, A i, REP i 30a-c; PART II-H, Q 23, A 2, REP 2 483d-484d; PART in, Q 2, A 5 715a-716b; Q 5, A 3 737d-739a 3d-4b; BK n [865-930] 26a-d✓ correct

Whether the Subject of Virtue Is a Power of the Soul? Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of virtue is not a power of the soul. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "virtue is that by which we live righteously." But we live by the essence of the soul, and not by a power of the soul. Therefore virtue is not a power, but in the essence of the soul. Obj. 2: Further, the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, o 18, A REP i 105c-106b; A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 50, 2, A 4, REP i 273b-274b; QQ 71-72 367a-369d; Q 76, A 5, REP 3 394c-396a; Q 78, A i, ANS and REP 4 407b-409a

Whether the Angels Differ in Species? Objection 1: It would seem that the angels do not differ in species. For since the "difference" is nobler than the 'genus,' all things which agree in what is noblest in them, agree likewise in their ultimate constitutive difference; and so they are the same according to species. But all angels agree in what is noblest in them—that is to say, in… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 69, A 2 361c-362c; QQ 71-72 367a 369d; Q 118, A i, REP 3 600a-601c✓ correct

Whether It Was Fitting That the Production of Plants Should Take Place on the Third Day? Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that the production of plants should take place on the third day. For plants have life, as animals have. But the production of animals belongs to the work, not of distinction, but of adornment. Therefore the production of plants, as also belonging to the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, CH 9, 195c-196a Q 70, A i, REP 7 893d-89Sd 12 JJUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [558-565]✓ correct

Article 1. Whether the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul? [Cf. I, 77, 8] Objection 1. It would seem that the sensitive powers remain in the sensitive soul. For Augustine says (De Spir. et Anim. xv): "The soul withdraws from the body taking all with itself, sense and imagination, reason, understanding and intelligence, the concupiscible and irascible powers." Now sense, imagination,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-ii, Q 71, A i, REP 3 105d-106c; Q 72, A 5, ANS 115a-116b; 194b✓ correct

Whether Vice Is Contrary to Virtue? Objection 1: It would seem that vice is not contrary to virtue. For one thing has one contrary, as proved in Metaph. x, text. 17. Now sin and malice are contrary to virtue. Therefore vice is not contrary to it: since vice applies also to undue disposition of bodily members or of any things whatever. Obj. 2: Further, virtue denotes a certain perfection of… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 65, A i, ANS 879c-881d; A 2, ANS and REP 5 881d- 882c; A 3, ANS 882d-883d; PART in SUPPL, Q 71 900d-917b

Whether Moral Virtues Can Be Without Charity? Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtues can be without charity. For it is stated in the Liber Sentent. Prosperi vii, that "every virtue save charity may be common to the good and bad." But "charity can be in none except the good," as stated in the same book. Therefore the other virtues can be had without charity. Obj. 2: Further, moral virtues… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 85, ' A 8, REP 2 460b-461b✓ correct

Whether the Intellect Understands the Indivisible Before the Divisible? Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible. For the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1) that "we understand and know from the knowledge of principles and elements." But principles are indivisible, and elements are of divisible things. Therefore the indivisible is known to us… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART MI, Q 76, : A i, ANS 141a-c; Q 77, A 2, REP 4 145d-147c; Q 95, A 2 227c-228c; A 4 229b-230c✓ correct

Whether Ignorance Can Be a Cause of Sin? Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance cannot be a cause of sin: because a non-being is not the cause of anything. Now ignorance is a non-being, since it is a privation of knowledge. Therefore ignorance is not a cause of sin. Obj. 2: Further, causes of sin should be reckoned in respect of sin being a turning to something, as was stated above (Q. 75,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART MI, Q 102, A 2 271b-272a; PART n-n, Q i, A 5, REP 2 383b-384b; Q 2, A 10 399b-400b; PART in SUPPL, Q 75, A 3, REP 2 938a-939d✓ correct

Whether the Ceremonial Precepts Have a Literal Cause or Merely a Figurative Cause? Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonial precepts have not a literal, but merely a figurative cause. For among the ceremonial precepts, the chief was circumcision and the sacrifice of the paschal lamb. But neither of these had any but a figurative cause: because each was given as a sign. For it is written… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theobgica, PART i, Q 20, A i, ANS and REP i 120a-121b; Q 27, A 3, ANS ['If to Ic GHAJPTER 50: tOVE 1061 44 Bos WELL: Johnson, 64a✓ correct

Whether Love Exists in God? Objection 1: It seems that love does not exist in God. For in God there are no passions. Now love is a passion. Therefore love is not in God. Obj. 2: Further, love, anger, sorrow and the like, are mutually divided against one another. But sorrow and anger are not attributed to God, unless by metaphor. Therefore neither is love attributed to Him. Obj. 3: Further,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 23, A 4 726a-727a; Q 25, A 2 731b-732a; A 3, ANS 732a~733a; Q 26, A 2, ANS and REP 3 734d- 735c; Q 27, A 4 739c-740a; Q 28, A i 740b- 741a; A 5 743c-744b; Q 29, A 3, ANS and REP 1,3 746b-747a; Q 30, A 2 749d-750d; Q 31, A 6, REP 3 756d-757c; Q 32, A 3, REP 3 760d- 761c; A 4, ANS and REP 3 761c-762a; AA 5-6 762a-763c; A 8, ANS 764c-765b; Q 38, A 3 788b-d✓ correct

Whether in the Same Power, There Are Any Passions, Specifically Different, but Not Contrary to One Another? Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be, in the same power, specifically different passions that are not contrary to one another. For the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. Now the objects of the soul's passions are good and evil; and on this distinction is… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica^ PART n-n, QQ 31-33 536d-558d

Whether Delight Is a Passion? Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not a passion. For Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes operation from passion, and says that "operation is a movement in accord with nature, while passion is a movement contrary to nature." But delight is an operation, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 5). Therefore delight is not a passion. Obj.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theohgica, PART MI, Q 29, A 3 746b-747a✓ correct

Whether Hatred Is Stronger Than Love? Objection 1: It would seem that hatred is stronger than love. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 36): "There is no one who does not flee from pain, more than he desires pleasure." But flight from pain pertains to hatred; while desire for pleasure belongs to love. Therefore hatred is stronger than love. Obj. 2: Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Thealogica, PART i r Q 20, A 2, REP 3 121b-122a; Q 60, AA i^ 310b- 312b; Q 82, A 5, HEP i 435o436c; PART Mi, Q 26 733d- 73 7a✓ correct

Whether God Loves All Things? Objection 1: It seems that God does not love all things. For according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 1), love places the lover outside himself, and causes him to pass, as it were, into the object of his love. But it is not admissible to say that God is placed outside of Himself, and passes into other things. Therefore it is inadmissible to say that God loves things… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART n-ii, Q 15, A 3 453c-454c; Q 46, A 3 604d-605a,c; PART in, Q 65, A i, REP 5 879c-881d

Whether Consent Is Directed to the End or to the Means? Objection 1: It would seem that consent is directed to the end. Because that on account of which a thing is such is still more such. But it is on account of the end that we consent to the means. Therefore, still more do we consent to the end. Obj. 2: Further, the act of the intemperate man is his end, just as the act of the virtuous man… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART H-II, QQ 23-33 482c-558d passim b✓ correct

Whether Charity Is Friendship? Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not friendship. For nothing is so appropriate to friendship as to dwell with one's friend, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5). Now charity is of man towards God and the angels, "whose dwelling [Douay: 'conversation'] is not with men" (Dan. 2:11). Therefore charity is not friendship. Obj. 2: Further, there is no… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Thcologica, PART i-n, Q 65, PART ii-n, Q 19, A 6 469a-d; Q 23, A r 482d- 483d✓ correct

Whether in Some Cases It May Be Lawful to Maim Anyone? Objection 1: It would seem that in no case can it be lawful to maim anyone. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 20) that "sin consists in departing from what is according to nature, towards that which is contrary to nature." Now according to nature it is appointed by God that a man's body should be entire in its members, and it is contrary… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART n-ii, Q 23, A i, REP 3482d-483d; A 3, REP i 485a-d; A 5, ANS and REP 3 486b-487a

Whether Any Passion of the Soul Has No Contrary? Objection 1: It would seem that every passion of the soul has a contrary. For every passion of the soul is either in the irascible or in the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (A. 1). But both kinds of passion have their respective modes of contrariety. Therefore every passion of the soul has its contrary. Obj. 2: Further, every passion of… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 60, A 4, REP 3 312c-313b; PART I-H, Q 4, A 8 636a-c; Q 27, A i 737b-d✓ correct

Whether the Angel Loves Himself with Both Natural Love, and Love of Choice? Objection 1: It would seem that the angel does not love himself both with natural love and a love of choice. For, as was said (A. 2), natural love regards the end itself; while love of choice regards the means to the end. But the same thing, with regard to the same, cannot be both the end and a means to the end.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 23, A 5, REP 3 135d-I37d 20 AouiNAs: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 66, A 4, REP i 78c-79b; Q 114, A 4 373a-d; PART II-H, Q 23, A 3, REP i 485a-d; QQ 25-27 501a-527b; QQ 31-33 536d-558d; Q 44 592d- 596c✓ correct

Whether the Foreknowledge of Merits Is the Cause of Predestination? Objection 1: It seems that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. For the Apostle says (Rom. 8:29): "Whom He foreknew, He also predestined." Again a gloss of Ambrose on Rom. 9:15: "I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy" says: "I will give mercy to him who, I foresee, will turn to Me with his whole… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART n-ii, Q 26, A 4, REP 2 512c-513b; A 5✓ correct

Whether Love Is Properly Divided into Love of Friendship and Love of Concupiscence? Objection 1: It would seem that love is not properly divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence. For "love is a passion, while friendship is a habit," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5). But habit cannot be the member of a division of passions. Therefore love is not properly divided… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 99, A i, REP 2 245c-246b; A 2, ANS 246b-247a; PART II-II, Q 26, A 3, ANS 511d-512c| A 8, ANS and REP 3 516a 51 7a; QQ 37-42 570c- 584d; Q 45, A 6 602b-603c✓ correct

Whether the Old Law Contains Moral Precepts? Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains no moral precepts. For the Old Law is distinct from the law of nature, as stated above (Q. 91, AA. 4, 5; Q. 98, A. 5). But the moral precepts belong to the law of nature. Therefore they do not belong to the Old Law. Obj. 2: Further, the Divine Law should have come to man's assistance where human… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-u, Q 109, : 738c; Q 28, A 5 743c-744b; Q 35, A 5, REP i A 3 340c-341b; PART ii-n, Q 24, A 2, REP 2 490 b-d; Q 25, A 12 509c-510b; Q 26, AA 2-3 511a-512c; Q 27, A 3 522c-523b; A 8 526c-527b

Whether There Are Orders Among the Demons? Objection 1: It would seem that there are no orders among the demons. For order belongs to good, as also mode, and species, as Augustine says (De Nat. Boni iii); and on the contrary, disorder belongs to evil. But there is nothing disorderly in the good angels. Therefore in the bad angels there are no orders. Obj. 2: Further, the angelic orders are… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 87 464d-468d✓ correct

Whether the Intellectual Soul Knows Itself by Its Essence? Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul knows itself by its own essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), that "the mind knows itself, because it is incorporeal." Obj. 2: Further, both angels and human souls belong to the genus of intellectual substance. But an angel understands itself by its own essence. Therefore… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, QQ 77- 83 399b-440b✓ correct

Whether the Essence of the Soul Is Its Power? Objection 1: It would seem that the essence of the soul is its power. For Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4), that "mind, knowledge, and love are in the soul substantially, or, which is the same thing, essentially": and (De Trin. x, 11), that "memory, understanding, and will are one life, one mind, one essence." Obj. 2: Further, the soul is nobler than… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 82, A i 168a-d; A 4, REP i 170b-171a; Q 85, A i, ANS 178b-179b; Q 91, A 6, ANS 212c-213c✓ correct

Whether Original Sin Is Equally in All? Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not equally in all. Because original sin is inordinate concupiscence, as stated above (A. 3). Now all are not equally prone to acts of concupiscence. Therefore original sin is not equally in all. Obj. 2: Further, original sin is an inordinate disposition of the soul, just as sickness is an inordinate… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 84, A 7, ANS 449b-450b; Q 115, A 5, REP i 590d- 591c; PART i-n, Q 6, A 7, REP 3 650a-d; o 10, A 3, ANS and REP 2 664d-665c; Q 24, A 2 727d- 728c; Q 28, A 3, ANS and REP i 742a-d; Q 31, A 7 757c-758b; Q 37, A 4, REP 3 785d-786d✓ correct

Whether the Intellect Can Actually Understand Through the Intelligible Species of Which It Is Possessed, Without Turning to the Phantasms? Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible species of which it is possessed, without turning to the phantasms. For the intellect is made actual by the intelligible species by which it is informed. But if the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 85, A 7 459c-460b; o 96, AA 3-4 512a-513c; Q 113, A 2, REP 3 576d-577d; PART MI, Q 46, A 5, ANS 815d-816d✓ correct

Whether One Person Can Understand One and the Same Thing Better Than Another Can? Objection 1: It would seem that one person cannot understand one and the same thing better than another can. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 32), "Whoever understands a thing otherwise than as it is, does not understand it at all. Hence it is clear that there is a perfect understanding, than which none other is… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 77, A 8, REP 3 406b-407a; Q 96, A 3, ANS 512a-c; PART i-n, g 34, A i, REP 2 768c-769d; Q 40, A 5, REP 2 795d-796c; A 6 796c-797a✓ correct

Whether All the Powers Remain in the Soul When Separated from the Body? Objection 1: It would seem that all the powers of the soul remain in the soul separated from the body. For we read in the book De Spiritu et Anima that "the soul withdraws from the body, taking with itself sense and imagination, reason and intelligence, concupiscibility and irascibility." Obj. 2: Further, the powers of the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 76, : : A 5, REP i 394c-396a; QQ 94-102 501c-527a,c✓ correct

Whether the Intellectual Soul Is Properly United to Such a Body? Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul is improperly united to such a body. For matter must be proportionate to the form. But the intellectual soul is incorruptible. Therefore it is not properly united to a corruptible body. Obj. 2: Further, the intellectual soul is a perfectly immaterial form; a proof whereof is… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 89, : A 3 200d-201d; Q 109, A 2, ANS 339c-340b; A 3, ANS 340c-341b; A 4, ANS 341c>342a; A 8, ANS 344d-346a; PART 11-11, Q 2, A 7, ANS 396a- 397c; Q 5, A i, ANS 410a-411b; PART in, Q i, A 3, REP i 704d-706a✓ correct

Whether Man Could Commit a Venial Sin in the State of Innocence? Objection 1: It would seem that man could commit a venial sin in the state of innocence. Because on 1 Tim. 2:14, "Adam was not seduced," a gloss says: "Having had no experience of God's severity, it was possible for him to be so mistaken as to think that what he had done was a venial sin." But he would not have thought this unless… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 98 239b-245b; QQ 106-167 321a-330d; PART ii-n, Q i, A 7, REP 4 385c-387a✓ correct

Whether the Old Law Was Good? Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law was not good. For it is written (Ezech. 20:25): "I gave them statutes that were not good, and judgments in which they shall not live." But a law is not said to be good except on account of the goodness of the precepts that it contains. Therefore the Old Law was not good. Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to the goodness of a… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 17, A 8, REP 2 692a-c✓ correct

Whether the Act of the Vegetal Soul Is Commanded? Objection 1: It would seem that the acts of the vegetal soul are subject to the command of reason. For the sensitive powers are of higher rank than the vegetal powers. But the powers of the sensitive soul are subject to the command of reason. Much more, therefore, are the powers of the vegetal soul. Obj. 2: Further, man is called a "little… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, QQ 81- 83 162d-174b; Q 85, A i, ANS 178b-179b; A 3 180b-181b; A 5 181d-182d; Q 91, A 6, ANS 212c-213c; Q 109 338a-347d passim …✓ correct

Whether Weakness, Ignorance, Malice and Concupiscence Are Suitably Reckoned As the Wounds of Nature Consequent Upon Sin? Objection 1: It would seem that weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are not suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent upon sin. For one same thing is not both effect and cause of the same thing. But these are reckoned to be causes of sin, as appears from… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q i, A i, REP 2 3b-4a; Q 85, A i, REP 2 451c-453c✓ correct

Whether Our Intellect Understands Corporeal and Material Things by Abstraction from Phantasms? Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect does not understand corporeal and material things by abstraction from the phantasms. For the intellect is false if it understands an object otherwise than as it really is. Now the forms of material things do not exist as abstracted from the particular… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 47, A i, ANS 256a-257b; Q 115, A i, ANS and REP 3,5 585d-587c✓ correct

Whether the Multitude and Distinction of Things Come from God? Objection 1: It would seem that the multitude and distinction of things does not come from God. For one naturally always makes one. But God is supremely one, as appears from what precedes (Q. 11, A. 4). Therefore He produces but one effect. Obj. 2: Further, the representation is assimilated to its exemplar. But God is the exemplar… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 76, Meditations, n 77d-81d passim; vi 96b 103d✓ correct

Whether the Intellectual Principle Is United to the Body As Its Form? Objection 1: It seems that the intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that the intellect is "separate," and that it is not the act of any body. Therefore it is not united to the body as its form. Obj. 2: Further, every form is determined according to the nature… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 75, A 2, ANS 379c-380c; A 3, ANS and REP 2 380c- 381b; Q 76, A 5, ANS 394c-396a; Q 78, A 3, ANS 410a-411d; Q 84, A 2, ANS 442b-443c …✓ correct

Whether the Human Soul Is Something Subsistent? Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul is not something subsistent. For that which subsists is said to be "this particular thing." Now "this particular thing" is said not of the soul, but of that which is composed of soul and body. Therefore the soul is not something subsistent. Obj. 2: Further, everything subsistent operates. But the soul… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART HI, Q 84, A 3, REP 2 985d-989b

Whether Any Other Special Sins, Besides Pride and Avarice, Should Be Called Capital? Objection 1: It would seem that no other special sins, besides pride and avarice, should be called capital. Because "the head seems to be to an animal, what the root is to a plant," as stated in De Anima ii, text. 38: for the roots are like a mouth. If therefore covetousness is called the "root of all evils,"… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 26, : A 2, ANS 734d-735c✓ correct

Whether Love Is a Passion? Objection 1: It would seem that love is not a passion. For no power is a passion. But every love is a power, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore love is not a passion. Obj. 2: Further, love is a kind of union or bond, as Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10). But a union or bond is not a passion, but rather a relation. Therefore love is not a passion. Obj. 3:… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 105, A 4, REP i 541c-542a; PART i-n, Q 23, A 4 726a-727a✓ correct

Whether God Can Move the Created Will? Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot move the created will. For whatever is moved from without, is forced. But the will cannot be forced. Therefore it is not moved from without; and therefore cannot be moved by God. Obj. 2: Further, God cannot make two contradictories to be true at the same time. But this would follow if He moved the will; for to be… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 53, A 3, ANS and REP 2 283b-284d; Q 67 349d- 354a; Q 104, A i, ANS and REP 1,4 534c-536c✓ correct

Whether the Movement of an Angel Is Instantaneous? Objection 1: It would seem that an angel's movement is instantaneous. For the greater the power of the mover, and the less the moved resist the mover, the more rapid is the movement. But the power of an angel moving himself exceeds beyond all proportion the power which moves a body. Now the proportion of velocities is reckoned according to the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 73, A 3, ANS 121c-122b; A 7, ANS 124d~125c✓ correct

Whether the Gravity of Sins Varies According to Their Objects? Objection 1: It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary according to their objects. Because the gravity of a sin pertains to its mode or quality: whereas the object is the matter of the sin. Therefore the gravity of sins does not vary according to their various objects. Obj. 2: Further, the gravity of a sin is the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-u, Q 73, : Jeremiah, 8:21-22; 30:12-17; 33:6; 46:11 (D) A 2, ANS 120d-121c; A 3, ANS 121c-122b; Q 77, A 3, ANS 147c-148b; Q 82, A i, REP i 168a-d; A 4, REP 2 170b-171a; PART HI SUPPL, Q 80, A 3 958b-959c; Q 82, A i, ANS and REP 4 968a-970c

Whether God Rested on the Seventh Day from All His Work? Objection 1: It would seem that God did not rest on the seventh day from all His work. For it is said (John 5:17), "My Father worketh until now, and I work." God, then, did not rest on the seventh day from all His work. Obj. 2: Further, rest is opposed to movement, or to labor, which movement causes. But, as God produced His work without… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 117, A 3, REP 3 598c-599b; PART i-n, Q 28, A 5, ANS 743c-744b

Whether Using Money Is the Act of Liberality? Objection 1: It seems that using money is not the act of liberality. For different virtues have different acts. But using money is becoming to other virtues, such as justice and magnificence. Therefore it is not the proper act of liberality. Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to a liberal man, not only to give but also to receive and keep. But receiving… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 115, A 5, REP i 590d-591c; PART i-n, Q 6, A 7, REP 3 650a-d; Q 10, A 3, ANS and REP 2 664d- 665c; Q 24, A 2, ANS 727d-728c; Q 28, A 3, ANS and REP i 742a-d; Q 37, A 4, REP 3 785d- 786d; Q 48, AA 3-4 824c-826a,c

Whether Flattery Is a Mortal Sin? Objection 1: It seems that flattery is a mortal sin. For, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), "a thing is evil because it is harmful." But flattery is most harmful, according to Ps. 9:24, "For the sinner is praised in the desires of his soul, and the unjust man is blessed. The sinner hath provoked the Lord." Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. ad Celant): "Nothing…

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, o 81, A i, ANS 163a-164d; Q 82, A 2, ANS 168d- 169c; A 4, REP 2 170b-171a; Q 83, A 4, ANS

Whether There Are Several Original Sins in One Man? Objection 1: It would seem that there are many original sins in one man. For it is written (Ps. 1:7): "Behold I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins did my mother conceive me." But the sin in which a man is conceived is original sin. Therefore there are several original sins in man. Obj. 2: Further, one and the same habit does not incline… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 13, A 3, REP 3 782b-783b

Whether Choice Is Only of the Means, or Sometimes Also of the End? Objection 1: It would seem that choice is not only of the means. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 12) that "virtue makes us choose aright; but it is not the part of virtue, but of some other power to direct aright those things which are to be done for its sake." But that for the sake of which something is done is the end.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART HI SUPPL, Q 98, A 7, REP 3 1076d-1077b✓ correct

Article 7. Whether the damned can make use of the knowledge they had in this world? [Cf. I, 89] Objection 1. It would seem that the damned are unable to make use of the knowledge they had in this world. For there is very great pleasure in the consideration of knowledge. But we must not admit that they have any pleasure. Therefore they cannot make use of the knowledge they had heretofore, by… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 54, 290d; Q 57, A i, REP 3 295a-d; Q 58, A i 443d-444d; A 4, ANS 444d-446b; A 6, ANS 447c-449a; Q 89, A i, REP 3 473b-475a; Q 117, A i, ANS and REP 4 595d-597c✓ correct

Whether an Angel's Act of Understanding Is His Substance? Objection 1: It would seem that the angel's act of understanding is his substance. For the angel is both higher and simpler than the active intellect of a soul. But the substance of the active intellect is its own action; as is evident from Aristotle (De Anima iii) and from his Commentator [*Averroes, A.D. 1126-1198]. Therefore much more… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, Q 87, A i 997b-998c; o 98, A 7 1076d-1077b

Article 3. Whether all merits and demerits, one's own as well as those of others, will be seen by anyone at a single glance? Objection 1. It would seem that not all merits and demerits, one's own as well as those of others, will be seen by anyone at a single glance. For things considered singly are not seen at one glance. Now the damned will consider their sins singly and will bewail them,…

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 17, A 2, REP 2 102a-d; Q 51, A 2, ANS 276b-277a; A 8, REP 2 450b-451b; Q in, A 3, ANS and REP 4 570b-571b✓ correct

Whether There Is Falsity in the Senses? Objection 1: It seems that falsity is not in the senses. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33): "If all the bodily senses report as they are affected, I do not know what more we can require from them." Thus it seems that we are not deceived by the senses; and therefore that falsity is not in them. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 24)… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 53, A 3, ANS 21d-22d✓ correct

Whether a Habit Is Corrupted or Diminished Through Mere Cessation from Act? Objection 1: It would seem that a habit is not corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act. For habits are more lasting than passion-like qualities, as we have explained above (Q. 49, A. 2, ad 3; Q. 50, A. 1). But passion-like qualities are neither corrupted nor diminished by cessation from act: for whiteness… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 46, A i, REP 8 250a-252d✓ correct

Whether the Universe of Creatures Always Existed? Objection 1: It would seem that the universe of creatures, called the world, had no beginning, but existed from eternity. For everything which begins to exist, is a possible being before it exists: otherwise it would be impossible for it to exist. If therefore the world began to exist, it was a possible being before it began to exist. But… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-ii, Q 50, A 4, REP 1,3 9a-10b✓ correct

Whether There Is Any Habit in the Intellect? Objection 1: It would seem that there are no habits in the intellect. For habits are in conformity with operations, as stated above (A. 1). But the operations of man are common to soul and body, as stated in De Anima i, text. 64. Therefore also are habits. But the intellect is not an act of the body (De Anima iii, text. 6). Therefore the intellect is… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 79, A 2, ANS 414d-416a; Q 84, A 3 443d-444d; A 6 447c-449a; Q 89, A i, REP 3 473b-475a; Q 117, A i, ANS 595d-597c✓ correct

Whether the Intellect Is a Passive Power? Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect is not a passive power. For everything is passive by its matter, and acts by its form. But the intellectual power results from the immateriality of the intelligent substance. Therefore it seems that the intellect is not a passive power. Obj. 2: Further, the intellectual power is incorruptible, as we have… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 9, A i, ANS 763b-764c a✓ correct

Whether the Will Is Moved by the Intellect? Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by the intellect. For Augustine says on Ps. 118:20: "My soul hath coveted to long for Thy justifications: The intellect flies ahead, the desire follows sluggishly or not at all: we know what is good, but deeds delight us not." But it would not be so, if the will were moved by the intellect: because… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART HI, Q 5, A 4 739a-740b; Q 6, A 2 741c-742a; QQ 9-12 763b-779d; PART in SUPPL, Q 92 1025b-1037c

Whether Happiness Once Had Can Be Lost? Objection 1: It would seem that Happiness can be lost. For Happiness is a perfection. But every perfection is in the thing perfected according to the mode of the latter. Since then man is, by his nature, changeable, it seems that Happiness is participated by man in a changeable manner. And consequently it seems that man can lose Happiness. Obj. 2:… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 89, A i, ANS 473b-475a; Q 117, A i, ANS 595d-597c✓ correct

Whether the Separated Soul Can Understand Anything? Objection 1: It would seem that the soul separated from the body can understand nothing at all. For the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4) that "the understanding is corrupted together with its interior principle." But by death all human interior principles are corrupted. Therefore also the intellect itself is corrupted. Obj. 2: Further, the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 10, A 4, REP i 771b-772a

Whether the Will Is Moved of Necessity by the Exterior Mover Which Is God? Objection 1: It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by God. For every agent that cannot be resisted moves of necessity. But God cannot be resisted, because His power is infinite; wherefore it is written (Rom. 9:19): "Who resisteth His will?" Therefore God moves the will of necessity. Obj. 2: Further, the will… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 17, xxv A i, ANS and REP 2 lOOd-lOld; A 3 102d-103c; Q 84, A 8 450b-451b; Q 85, A i, REP i 451c- 453c; A 6 458d-459c; Q 89, A 5, ANS 477a- 478b; Q 94, A 4 505a-506a✓ correct

Whether Falsity Is in the Intellect? Objection 1: It seems that falsity is not in the intellect. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 32), "Everyone who is deceived, understands not that in which he is deceived." But falsity is said to exist in any knowledge in so far as we are deceived therein. Therefore falsity does not exist in the intellect. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 68, A 2 89c-90c; Q 91, A 4 210c-211c; Q 216c-217b; Q 109, A i 338b-339c; Q 112, A 5 359c-360c; PART H-II, Q 2, A 3 392d-393c; Q 8, A i 417a-d; Q 9, A i 423c-424b✓ correct

Whether the Gifts Are Necessary to Man for Salvation? Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts are not necessary to man for salvation. Because the gifts are ordained to a perfection surpassing the ordinary perfection of virtue. Now it is not necessary for man's salvation that he should attain to a perfection surpassing the ordinary standard of virtue; because such perfection falls, not under… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q A 8, CONTRARY and REP 2 450b-451b; Q 86, A 4, REP 2 463d-464d✓ correct

Whether Our Intellect Knows Singulars? Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect knows singulars. For whoever knows composition, knows the terms of composition. But our intellect knows this composition; "Socrates is a man": for it belongs to the intellect to form a proposition. Therefore our intellect knows this singular, Socrates. Obj. 2: Further, the practical intellect directs to action.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, Q 82, A 3, ANS 971a-972d✓ correct

Article 3. Whether impassibility excludes actual sensation from glorified bodies? Objection 1. It would seem that impassibility excludes actual sensation from glorified bodies. For according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 11), "sensation is a kind of passion." But the glorified bodies will be impassible. Therefore they will not have actual sensation. Objection 2. Further, natural alteration… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 103, A 3 530a-c✓ correct

Whether the World Is Governed by One? Objection 1: It would seem that the world is not governed by one. For we judge the cause by the effect. Now, we see in the government of the universe that things are not moved and do not operate uniformly, but some contingently and some of necessity in variously different ways. Therefore the world is not governed by one. Obj. 2: Further, things which are… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-ii, Q 21, A i, REP 1-2 717a-d✓ correct

Whether a Human Action Is Right or Sinful, in So Far As It Is Good or Evil? Objection 1: It seems that a human action is not right or sinful, in so far as it is good or evil. For "monsters are the sins of nature" (Phys. ii, 8). But monsters are not actions, but things engendered outside the order of nature. Now things that are produced according to art and reason imitate those that are produced… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 84, A i, REP 3 174b-175a✓ correct

Whether Covetousness Is the Root of All Sins? Objection 1: It would seem that covetousness is not the root of all sins. For covetousness, which is immoderate desire for riches, is opposed to the virtue of liberality. But liberality is not the root of all virtues. Therefore covetousness is not the root of all sins. Obj. 2: Further, the desire for the means proceeds from desire for the end. Now… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 112, A 3, ANS and REP i 358a-d; PART in, Q✓ correct

Whether Grace Is Necessarily Given to Whoever Prepares Himself for It, or to Whoever Does What He Can? Objection 1: It would seem that grace is necessarily given to whoever prepares himself for grace, or to whoever does what he can, because, on Rom. 5:1, "Being justified . . . by faith, let us have peace," etc. the gloss says: "God welcomes whoever flies to Him, otherwise there would be… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART II-H, Q 32, A 6 545b-546b✓ correct

Whether One Ought to Give Alms Out of What One Needs? Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to give alms out of what one needs. For the order of charity should be observed not only as regards the effect of our benefactions but also as regards our interior affections. Now it is a sin to contravene the order of charity, because this order is a matter of precept. Since, then, the order of… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, QQ 3- ii 14a-50b passim; Q 14, A 6, ANS 80a-81c; Q 16, A 6 98b-d; QQ 30-31 167a-175c; QQ 44-45 238a-250a; Q 47 256a-259a …✓ correct

Whether God Knows Things Other Than Himself by Proper Knowledge? Objection 1: It seems that God does not know things other than Himself by proper knowledge. For, as was shown (A. 5), God knows things other than Himself, according as they are in Himself. But other things are in Him as in their common and universal cause, and are known by God as in their first and universal cause. This is to know… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 6, A 3, REP i 29c-30b; Q 8, A 2, REP 2 35c-36b; Q 10, A i, ANS and REP 1,3,5 40d-41d; Q n, A i, ANS 46d-47d; A 2, REP 4 47d-48d; AA 3-4 49a-50b; Q 29, A 4, ANS and REP 3 165c-167a; Q 30, A i, REP 3 167a-168a; Q 40, A 2, REP i 214b-215b; Q 42, A 2, REP 4 225d-227a; Q 50, A 2 270a-272a; Q 52, A 2 279b-280a; Q 53, A i, REP i 280d-282a; A 2, ANS 282a-283b; Q 76, A 8 397d-399b; Q 85, A 8, ANS and REP 2 : 460b-461b; PART i-n, Q 13, A 4, REP 2 675a-c✓ correct

Whether God Is the Supreme Good? Objection 1: It seems that God is not the supreme good. For the supreme good adds something to good; otherwise it would belong to every good. But everything which is an addition to anything else is a compound thing: therefore the supreme good is a compound. But God is supremely simple; as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 7). Therefore God is not the supreme good. Obj.…

Summa Theologica, PART i-ii, Q 17, A 4, ANS 688d 689c✓ correct

Whether Command and the Commanded Act Are One Act, or Distinct? Objection 1: It would seem that the commanded act is not one with the command itself. For the acts of different powers are themselves distinct. But the commanded act belongs to one power, and the command to another; since one is the power that commands, and the other is the power that receives the command. Therefore the commanded… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, Q 79, A 2, REP 2 953b-955c✓ correct

Article 2. Whether it will be identically the same man that shall rise again? Objection 1. It would seem that it will not be identically the same man that shall rise again. For according to the Philosopher (De Gener. ii): "Whatsoever things are changed in their corruptible substance are not repeated identically." Now such is man's substance in his present state. Therefore after the change… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q i, A 3, REP 2 4c-5a; Q 78, AA 3-4 410a-413d✓ correct

Whether the Five Exterior Senses Are Properly Distinguished? Objection 1: It would seem inaccurate to distinguish five exterior senses. For sense can know accidents. But there are many kinds of accidents. Therefore, as powers are distinguished by their objects, it seems that the senses are multiplied according to the number of the kinds of accidents. Obj. 2: Further, magnitude and shape, and… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 58, A 2 301b-d; Q 85, A 4 457a-d; A 8 460b-461b✓ correct

Whether an Angel Can Understand Many Things at the Same Time? Objection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot understand many things at the same time. For the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 4) that "it may happen that we know many things, but understand only one." Obj. 2: Further, nothing is understood unless the intellect be informed by an intelligible species; just at the body is formed by… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 79, A 9, REP 4 422b-423d; Q 83, A i, ANS 436d- 438a; Q 108, A 7, REP 2 560b-561a; PART i-n, Q 13, A 4, REP 2 675a-c [35-62] 425d-426a / Julius Caesar, ACT in,✓ correct

Whether the Higher and Lower Reason Are Distinct Powers? Objection 1: It would seem that the higher and lower reason are distinct powers. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4,7), that the image of the Trinity is in the higher part of the reason, and not in the lower. But the parts of the soul are its powers. Therefore the higher and lower reason are two powers. Obj. 2: Further, nothing flows… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 17, A 6 690b-d✓ correct

Whether the Act of the Reason Is Commanded? Objection 1: It would seem that the act of the reason cannot be commanded. For it seems impossible for a thing to command itself. But it is the reason that commands, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore the act of the reason is not commanded. Obj. 2: Further, that which is essential is different from that which is by participation. But the power whose… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 16, A 8 99d-100d; Q 79, A 9, REP 3 422b-423d; Q 83, A i, ANS 436d-438a; Q 85, A 6, REP 2 458d-459c✓ correct

Whether Truth Is Immutable? Objection 1: It seems that truth is immutable. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 12), that "Truth and mind do not rank as equals, otherwise truth would be mutable, as the mind is." Obj. 2: Further, what remains after every change is immutable; as primary matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, since it remains after all generation and corruption. But truth… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theohgica, PART i, Q r, AA 1-2 3b 4c; A 5, REP 1-2 5c-6a; A 6 6b-7a; A 8 7c-8d; Q 12, A 13, REP 3 61c-62b; Q 32, A i, REP 2 175d-178a; Q 84, A 5 446c-447c✓ correct

Whether by Grace a Higher Knowledge of God Can Be Obtained Than by Natural Reason? Objection 1: It seems that by grace a higher knowledge of God is not obtained than by natural reason. For Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol. i) that whoever is the more united to God in this life, is united to Him as to one entirely unknown. He says the same of Moses, who nevertheless obtained a certain excellence… Read the rest of this passage →

Sttmma Theologica, PART i, Q 65, A i, REP 2-3 339b-340b [i 107*27-34] 23HonBEs: Leviathan, PART i, 57d-58a; 61d- 62a; 78b-c; 96a; PART n, 140b; 149b-d; PART iv, 272c✓ correct

Whether Corporeal Creatures Are from God? Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures are not from God. For it is said (Eccles. 3:14): "I have learned that all the works which God hath made, continue for ever." But visible bodies do not continue for ever, for it is said (2 Cor. 4:18): "The things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal." Therefore God… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 7 651d-655a✓ correct

Whether a Circumstance Is an Accident of a Human Act? Objection 1: It would seem that a circumstance is not an accident of a human act. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhetor. i) that a circumstance is that from "which an orator adds authority and strength to his argument." But oratorical arguments are derived principally from things pertaining to the essence of a thing, such as the definition, the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 89, A 5, ANS 477a-478b✓ correct

Whether the Habit of Knowledge Here Acquired Remains in the Separated Soul? Objection 1: It would seem that the habit of knowledge acquired in this life does not remain in the soul separated from the body: for the Apostle says: "Knowledge shall be destroyed" (1 Cor. 13:8). Obj. 2: Further, some in this world who are less good enjoy knowledge denied to others who are better. If, therefore, the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 71, A 6, REP i llOb-lllb✓ correct

Whether Sin Is Fittingly Defined As a Word, Deed, or Desire Contrary to the Eternal Law? Objection 1: It would seem that sin is unfittingly defined by saying: "Sin is a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the eternal law." Because "word," "deed," and "desire" imply an act; whereas not every sin implies an act, as stated above (A. 5). Therefore this definition does not include every sin. Obj. 2:… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, g 66, A 2, ANS 345d-347b; Q 91, A i, ANS and REP 3 484a-485b✓ correct

Whether the Body of the First Man Was Made of the Slime of the Earth? Objection 1: It would seem that the body of the first man was not made of the slime of the earth. For it is an act of greater power to make something out of nothing than out of something; because "not being" is farther off from actual existence than "being in potentiality." But since man is the most honorable of God's lower… Read the rest of this passage →

Sitmma Theologica, PART n-n, Q 24, A 12 499c-500d 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, x [70-93] 68a-b✓ correct

Whether Any Passion Is Good or Evil in Its Species? Objection 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is good or evil morally according to its species. Because moral good and evil depend on reason. But the passions are in the sensitive appetite; so that accordance with reason is accidental to them. Since, therefore, nothing accidental belongs to a thing's species, it seems that no passion…

Summa Theologica, PART n-n, Q 25, A 7 506a-d; Q 29, A 3, REP 2 531d-532c; QQ 37-42 570c-584d; Q 179 606a-607c; PART in SUPPL, Q 81, A 3 966a-c; Q 82, A 3, REP 4

Whether These Are the Four Principal Passions: Joy, Sadness, Hope and Fear? Objection 1: It would seem that joy, sadness, hope and fear are not the four principal passions. For Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3, 7 sqq.) omits hope and puts desire in its place. Obj. 2: Further, there is a twofold order in the passions of the soul: the order of intention, and the order of execution or generation.…

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, Q 70, A 3 897d-900d; Q 98, A 7 1076d4077b✓ correct

Article 3. Whether the separated soul can suffer from a bodily fire? Objection 1. It would seem that the separated soul cannot suffer from a bodily fire. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii): "The things that affect the soul well or ill after its separation from the body, are not corporeal but resemble corporeal things." Therefore the separated soul is not punished with a bodily… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 3, A 4, REP i 625a-626b; Q 32, A 4, REP 2 761c- 762a; Q 33 765b-768c; Q 35, A 3, REP 3 774a-c; QQ37-38783c-789d✓ correct

Whether, If Happiness Is in the Intellective Part, It Is an Operation of the Intellect or of the Will? Objection 1: It would seem that happiness consists in an act of the will. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 10, 11), that man's happiness consists in peace; wherefore it is written (Ps. 147:3): "Who hath placed peace in thy end [Douay: 'borders']". But peace pertains to the will. Therefore… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, Q 86, A 3, REP 3-4 994d-996a,c✓ correct

Article 3), even as now the corruptibility of bodies serves the purpose of Divine providence, by which through the corruption of one thing another is generated. Secondly, this happens through the principle of corruption being hindered, and in this way the body of Adam was incorruptible, because the conflicting qualities that exist in man's body were withheld by the grace of innocence from… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 64, : : A 3 337a-c; PART I-H, Q 2, A 6, ANS and REP 2-3 619d-620d; Q 31, AA 3-7 7S4a-758b; Q 35 772b-780c✓ correct

Whether There Is Sorrow in the Demons? Objection 1: It would seem that there is no sorrow in the demons. For since sorrow and joy are opposites, they cannot be together in the same subject. But there is joy in the demons: for Augustine writing against the Maniches (De Gen. Contra Manich. ii, 17) says: "The devil has power over them who despise God's commandments, and he rejoices over this… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 22, A i, ANS 720d-721c; QQ 31-39 752b-792d; Q 48, A i 822d-823b✓ correct

Whether Any Passion Is in the Soul? Objection 1: It would seem that there is no passion in the soul. Because passivity belongs to matter. But the soul is not composed of matter and form, as stated in the First Part (Q. 75, A. 5). Therefore there is no passion in the soul. Obj. 2: Further, passion is movement, as is stated in Phys. iii, 3. But the soul is not moved, as is proved in De Anima i,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, 8 1, A 4, REP 4 966d-967d✓ correct

Article 3. Whether attrition can become contrition? Objection 1. It would seem that attrition can become contrition. For contrition differs from attrition, as living from dead. Now dead faith becomes living. Therefore attrition can become contrition. Objection 2. Further, matter receives perfection when privation is removed. Now sorrow is to grace, as matter to form, because grace quickens…

Summa Theologica, PART n-n, Q 180, A 7 614d-616a; PART in SUPPL, Q 90, A 3 1014d-1016a✓ correct

Whether There Is Delight in Contemplation? Objection 1: It would seem that there is no delight in contemplation. For delight belongs to the appetitive power; whereas contemplation resides chiefly in the intellect. Therefore it would seem that there is no delight in contemplation. Obj. 2: Further, all strife and struggle is a hindrance to delight. Now there is strife and struggle in… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 34, AA 1-3 768c-771c✓ correct

Whether Every Pleasure Is Evil? Objection 1: It would seem that every pleasure is evil. For that which destroys prudence and hinders the use of reason, seems to be evil in itself: since man's good is to be "in accord with reason," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure destroys prudence and hinders the use of reason; and so much the more, as the pleasure is greater: wherefore "in sexual… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 59, : 8a. Pleasure and pain in relation to virtue: the restraints of temperance and the endur- 53a-54d; Q 61, A 2, ANS 55c-56b; A 3, ANS ance of courage✓ correct

Whether Moral Virtue Is a Passion? Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue is a passion. Because the mean is of the same genus as the extremes. But moral virtue is a mean between two passions. Therefore moral virtue is a passion. Obj. 2: Further, virtue and vice, being contrary to one another, are in the same genus. But some passions are reckoned to be vices, such as envy and anger.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 99, : 554c-d / Laws, BK i 640a-652d✓ correct

Whether the Old Law Contains Only One Precept? Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains but one precept. Because a law is nothing else than a precept, as stated above (Q. 90, AA. 2, 3). Now there is but one Old Law. Therefore it contains but one precept. Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 13:9): "If there be any other commandment, it is comprised in this word: Thou shalt… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 31, A 7 757c-758b✓ correct

Whether Any Pleasure Is Not Natural? Objection 1: It would seem that no pleasure is not natural. For pleasure is to the emotions of the soul what repose is to bodies. But the appetite of a natural body does not repose save in a connatural place. Neither, therefore, can the repose of the animal appetite, which is pleasure, be elsewhere than in something connatural. Therefore no pleasure is… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 101, A 2, REP 2 267a-268a✓ correct

Whether the Ceremonial Precepts Are Figurative? Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonial precepts are not figurative. For it is the duty of every teacher to express himself in such a way as to be easily understood, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. iv, 4, 10) and this seems very necessary in the framing of a law: because precepts of law are proposed to the populace; for which reason a… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 46, A 2, REP 4 253a-255a✓ correct

Whether It Is an Article of Faith That the World Began? Objection 1: It would seem that it is not an article of faith but a demonstrable conclusion that the world began. For everything that is made has a beginning of its duration. But it can be proved demonstratively that God is the effective cause of the world; indeed this is asserted by the more approved philosophers. Therefore it can be… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 113,✓ correct

Whether Men Are Guarded by the Angels? Objection 1: It would seem that men are not guarded by the angels. For guardians are deputed to some because they either know not how, or are not able, to guard themselves, as children and the sick. But man is able to guard himself by his free-will; and knows how by his natural knowledge of natural law. Therefore man is not guarded by an angel. Obj. 2:… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologtca, PART MI, Q 56, A 2, RI.P } 30c-31a; A 3, ANS 31a-32b; A 4, REP 4 32b 33c; o 57, A 4, ANS 38a-39a; A 5, ANS and REP 3 39a-40a; Q 58, A 3, REP 2 43b-44a; b A 4, ANS and REP i 44a-d; A 5 44d-45c; Q 65, A i, ANS and REP 3-4 70b-72a; A 2, ANS and REP 3 72a-d; A 3, ANS and REP i 72d-73d; PART n -n, Q 181, A 2 617d-618c✓ correct

Whether One Virtue Can Be in Several Powers? Objection 1: It would seem that one virtue can be in several powers. For habits are known by their acts. But one act proceeds in various way from several powers: thus walking proceeds from the reason as directing, from the will as moving, and from the motive power as executing. Therefore also one habit can be in several powers. Obj. 2: Further, the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 58, A 2, ANS 42a-43a; A 3, REP 2 43b-44a; Q 65, A i 70b-72a✓ correct

Whether Moral Virtue Differs from Intellectual Virtue? Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue does not differ from intellectual virtue. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv, 21) "that virtue is the art of right conduct." But art is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral and intellectual virtue do not differ. Obj. 2: Further, some authors put science in the definition of virtues: thus some… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 108, A 3, REP 5 334a-336b✓ correct

Whether the New Law Directed Man Sufficiently As Regards Interior Actions? Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law directed man insufficiently as regards interior actions. For there are ten commandments of the decalogue directing man to God and his neighbor. But Our Lord partly fulfilled only three of them: as regards, namely, the prohibition of murder, of adultery, and of perjury.… Read the rest of this passage →

Swnma Theologica, PART i-n, Q 13, A A 4-6 675a-677b; Q 14, A A 3-6 678c-681a✓ correct

Whether Choice Is of Those Things Only That Are Done by Us? Objection 1: It would seem that choice is not only in respect of human acts. For choice regards the means. Now, not only acts, but also the organs, are means (Phys. ii, 3). Therefore choice is not only concerned with human acts. Obj. 2: Further, action is distinct from contemplation. But choice has a place even in contemplation; in so… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i -n, Q 14, A 2 678b-c; Q 15, A 3 682c 683b✓ correct

Whether Counsel Is of the End, or Only of the Means? Objection 1: It would seem that counsel is not only of the means but also of the end. For whatever is doubtful, can be the subject of inquiry. Now in things to be done by man there happens sometimes a doubt as to the end and not only as to the means. Since therefore inquiry as to what is to be done is counsel, it seems that counsel can be of… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 48, AA 5-6 263a-264d; g 64, A 3 337a-c; PART i-n, O 39, A 4, CONTRARY 792a-d; Q 46, A 6, REP 2 816d-817d

Whether Evil Is in Good As in Its Subject? Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not in good as its subject. For good is something that exists. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 4) that "evil does not exist, nor is it in that which exists." Therefore, evil is not in good as its subject. Obj. 2: Further, evil is not a being; whereas good is a being. But "non-being" does not require being as… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 87, A 2, ANS 186c-187b; A 4, ANS 188b-d; A 6 189c-190c; PART ii-n, Q 19, A i 465b-d✓ correct

Whether Sin Can Be the Punishment of Sin? Objection 1: It would seem that sin cannot be the punishment of sin. For the purpose of punishment is to bring man back to the good of virtue, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 9). Now sin does not bring man back to the good of virtue, but leads him in the opposite direction. Therefore sin is not the punishment of sin. Obj. 2: Further, just… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 79, A 4 158d-159c; Q 87, A 2, REP i 186c-187b; AA 6-8 189c-192d; Q 105, A 2, REP 9 309d- : 316a; PART H-II, Q 33 550a-558d; PART in SUPPL, Q 99, A i, REP 3 1078c-1081a✓ correct

Whether Blindness and Hardness of Heart Are Directed to the Salvation of Those Who Are Blinded and Hardened? Objection 1: It would seem that blindness and hardness of heart are always directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened. For Augustine says (Enchiridion xi) that "as God is supremely good, He would nowise allow evil to be done, unless He could draw some good from every… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 64, A 2 335d-336d; PART I-H, Q 21, A 2 718a-d

Whether the Will of the Demons Is Obstinate in Evil? Objection 1: It would seem that the will of the demons is not obstinate in evil. For liberty of will belongs to the nature of an intellectual being, which nature remains in the demons, as we said above (A. 1). But liberty of will is directly and firstly ordained to good rather than to evil. Therefore the demons' will is not so obstinate in… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 73, A 5 123a-d; Q 74, AA 1-2 129a-130a; Q 75 137c-140d; Q 76, AA 3-4 142d-144d; Q 78 152b-156a; QQ 80-81 159d-167d; Q 83, A 3 173a-c; Q 105, A 2, REP 9 309d-316a✓ correct

Whether Carnal Sins Are of Less Guilt Than Spiritual Sins? Objection 1: It would seem that carnal sins are not of less guilt than spiritual sins. Because adultery is a more grievous sin than theft: for it is written (Prov. 6:30, 32): "The fault is not so great when a man has stolen . . . but he that is an adulterer, for the folly of his heart shall destroy his own soul." Now theft belongs to… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PARTI-II, Q 87, A 3, REP 1 187b-188b; Q 105, A 2, ANS and REP 9-12 309d-316a; PART in SUPPL, Q 99, A i, ANS and REP 1-2,6 1078c-1081a

Article 1. Whether by Divine justice an eternal punishment is inflicted on sinners? [Cf. I-II, 87, 3,4 Objection 1. It would seem that an eternal punishment is not inflicted on sinners by Divine justice. For the punishment should not exceed the fault: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be" (Deuteronomy 25:2). Now fault is temporal. Therefore the punishment… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 35, A 5, REP i 775d-777a; Q 37, A 2, REP i 784c- 785b✓ correct

Whether There Is Any Sorrow Contrary to the Pleasure of Contemplation? Objection 1: It would seem that there is a sorrow that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. For the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:10): "The sorrow that is according to God, worketh penance steadfast unto salvation." Now to look at God belongs to the higher reason, whose act is to give itself to contemplation, according to… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 87, A 6 189c-190c; A 7, ANS and REP 3 190c-191d; A 8, ANS 191d-192d; PART in SUPPL, Q 97, A 2 1066d-1067b; Q 98, A 2 1073b-1074a; A 7 1076d-1077b✓ correct

Whether the Debt of Punishment Remains After Sin? Objection 1: It would seem that there remains no debt of punishment after sin. For if the cause be removed the effect is removed. But sin is the cause of the debt of punishment. Therefore, when the sin is removed, the debt of punishment ceases also. Obj. 2: Further, sin is removed by man returning to virtue. Now a virtuous man deserves, not… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologies PART i-n, Q 79, AA 3-4 158a-159c; QQ 85-87 178b-192d; Q 91, A 6 212c-213c; Q 105, A 2, ANS and REP 9-12 309d-316a; PART n-ii, Q 33, A 7, REP 1-2 556a-557d; PART in SUPPL, Q 69 885a-893c; Q 70, A 3 897d-900d; Q 74, AA 7-9 932b- 935a,c; Q 86 992b-996a,c; QQ 91-99 1016a- 1085a,c✓ correct

Whether God Is the Cause of Spiritual Blindness and Hardness of Heart? Objection 1: It would seem that God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 3) that God is not the cause of that which makes man worse. Now man is made worse by spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. Therefore God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 67,✓ correct

Whether the Word "Light" Is Used in Its Proper Sense in Speaking of Spiritual Things? Objection 1: It would seem that "light" is used in its proper sense in spiritual things. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 28) that "in spiritual things light is better and surer: and that Christ is not called Light in the same sense as He is called the Stone; the former is to be taken literally, and the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART HI SUPPL, Q 92, A 2, ANS 1032b-1034b 3* to 3d CHAPTER 75: QUALITY 523 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 9-15 414d-416a; SECT 25 417d-418a; SECT 73 427b-c; SECT 102 432d-433a✓ correct

Article 2. Whether after the resurrection the saints will see God with the eyes of the body? [Cf. I, 12, 3] Objection 1. It would seem that after the resurrection the saints will see God with the eyes of the body. Because the glorified eye has greater power than one that is not glorified. Now the blessed Job saw God with his eyes (Job 42:5): "With the hearing of the ear, I have heard Thee, but… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 4, A 3, ANS 22b-23b; Q 8, A 2, REP 3 35c-36b; Q 42, A i, REP i 224b-225d; Q 45, A 5, REP 2-3 245c-247a; Q 48, A 4, ANS and REP 3 262a- 263a; PART i-n, Q 22, A 2, REP i 721c-722c✓ correct

Whether Any Creature Can Be Like God? Objection 1: It seems that no creature can be like God. For it is written (Ps. 85:8): "There is none among the gods like unto Thee, O Lord." But of all creatures the most excellent are those which are called by participation gods. Therefore still less can other creatures be said to be like God. Obj. 2: Further, likeness implies comparison. But there can be… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologies PART I-H, Q 35, A 4, ANS 774d-775d✓ correct

Whether All Sorrow Is Contrary to All Pleasure? Objection 1: It would seem that all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure. Because, just as whiteness and blackness are contrary species of color, so pleasure and sorrow are contrary species of the soul's passions. But whiteness and blackness are universally contrary to one another. Therefore pleasure and sorrow are so too. Obj. 2: Further, remedies… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 5, A 5,✓ correct

Whether the Essence of Goodness Consists in Mode, Species and Order? Objection 1: It seems that the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order. For goodness and being differ logically. But mode, species and order seem to belong to the nature of being, for it is written: "Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight" (Wis. 11:21). And to these three can be… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART A 3, REP 4 32c-33c; Q 25, A 2, REP 3 144c- 145b✓ correct

Whether Love Is the First of the Concupiscible Passions? Objection 1: It would seem that love is not the first of the concupiscible passions. For the concupiscible faculty is so called from concupiscence, which is the same passion as desire. But "things are named from their chief characteristic" (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore desire takes precedence of love. Obj. 2: Further, love implies a certain… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 14, A 5 680a-c✓ correct

Whether the Process of Counsel Is One of Analysis? Objection 1: It would seem that the process of counsel is not one of analysis. For counsel is about things that we do. But the process of our actions is not one of analysis, but rather one of synthesis, viz. from the simple to the composite. Therefore counsel does not always proceed by way of analysis. Obj. 2: Further, counsel is an inquiry of… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 44, A i, REP i 238b-239a✓ correct

Whether It Is Necessary That Every Being Be Created by God? Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary that every being be created by God. For there is nothing to prevent a thing from being without that which does not belong to its essence, as a man can be found without whiteness. But the relation of the thing caused to its cause does not appear to be essential to beings, for some… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART n-n, Q 28, : A 2, REP 3 511a-d

Whether Mutual Indwelling Is an Effect of Love? Objection 1: It would seem that love does not cause mutual indwelling, so that the lover be in the beloved and vice versa. For that which is in another is contained in it. But the same cannot be container and contents. Therefore love cannot cause mutual indwelling, so that the lover be in the beloved and vice versa. Obj. 2: Further, nothing can… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 54, : A i, REP i 22d-23d; Q 61, A i, REP i 54d-55c; Q 72, A 7, ANS 117a-118a; PART in, Q 2, A i, ANS 710a-711c✓ correct

Whether Many Habits Can Be in One Power? Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be many habits in one power. For when several things are distinguished in respect of the same thing, if one of them be multiplied, the others are too. Now habits and powers are distinguished in respect of the same thing, viz. their acts and objects. Therefore they are multiplied in like manner. Therefore there… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theohgica, PART i-n, Q 64:1-7 / Jeremiah, 1-44 passim✓ correct

Whether Moral Virtues Observe the Mean? Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue does not observe the mean. For the nature of a mean is incompatible with that which is extreme. Now the nature of virtue is to be something extreme; for it is stated in De Coelo i that "virtue is the limit of power." Therefore moral virtue does not observe the mean. Obj. 2: Further, the maximum is not a mean.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART ii-n, Q 3, A i, ANS 400c-401a; Q 32 540a-550a; Q 187, A 2 665a-666a; A 3, ANS and REP 4 666a-669b; AA 4-5 669b-673b; PART in SUPPL, Q 71, A 9, ANS and REP 1-2,6 910d-912b✓ correct

Whether Confession Is an Act of Faith? Objection 1: It would seem that confession is not an act of faith. For the same act does not belong to different virtues. Now confession belongs to penance of which it is a part. Therefore it is not an act of faith. Obj. 2: Further, man is sometimes deterred by fear or some kind of confusion, from confessing his faith: wherefore the Apostle (Eph. 6:19)… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theohgica, PART i-n, Q 102, A 4, REP 4 276d-283c; PART ii-n, Q i, AA 9-10 388d-390d; Q 2, AA 5-8 394b-398b; Q 5 410a-413c; QQ 183-189 625a-700d …✓ correct

Whether Sufficient Reason Can Be Assigned for the Ceremonies Pertaining to Holy Things? Objection 1: It would seem that no sufficient reason can be assigned for the ceremonies of the Old Law that pertain to holy things. For Paul said (Acts 17:24): "God Who made the world and all things therein; He being Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made by hands." It was therefore unfitting… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART II-H, Q 185, A 7 647c-649b; Q 187, A A 4-5 669b- 673b; PART in, Q 65, A i, REP 7 879c-881d✓ correct

Whether Bishops Sin Mortally If They Distribute Not to the Poor the Ecclesiastical Goods Which Accrue to Them? Objection 1: It would seem that bishops sin mortally if they distribute not to the poor the ecclesiastical goods which they acquire. For Ambrose [*Basil, Serm. lxiv, de Temp., among the supposititious works of St. Jerome] expounding Luke 12:16, "The land of a certain . . . man brought… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 99, AA 4-5 248a-250a; QQ 104-105 304a-321a✓ correct

Whether, Besides the Moral and Ceremonial Precepts, There Are Also Judicial Precepts? Objection 1: It would seem that there are no judicial precepts in addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts in the Old Law. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. vi, 2) that in the Old Law there are "precepts concerning the life we have to lead, and precepts regarding the life that is foreshadowed." Now the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART II-H, Q 187, A 2 665a-666a; Q 188, AA 2-4 675d-679d✓ correct

Whether It Is Lawful for Religious to Occupy Themselves with Secular Business? Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to occupy themselves with secular business. For in the decree quoted above (A. 1) of Pope Boniface it is said that the "Blessed Benedict bade them to be altogether free from secular business; and this is most explicitly prescribed by the apostolic doctrine and the… Read the rest of this passage →

Sttmma Theologica, PART ii-n, Q 6, : A i, ANS and REP 2 413d-414c; Q ro, A 12, REP 5 436b-437d; Q 187, A 3, REP 5 666a-669b; Q 188, A 4 678b-679d; PART in SUPPL, Q 96, A 7 1061b-1062a✓ correct

Whether Faith Is Infused into Man by God? Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not infused into man by God. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv) that "science begets faith in us, and nourishes, defends and strengthens it." Now those things which science begets in us seem to be acquired rather than infused. Therefore faith does not seem to be in us by Divine infusion. Obj. 2: Further, that to… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 62, A 2, REP 3 318d-319c; A 4, REP 2 320b-321b✓ correct

Whether an Angel Needs Grace in Order to Turn to God? Objection 1: It would seem that the angel had no need of grace in order to turn to God. For, we have no need of grace for what we can accomplish naturally. But the angel naturally turns to God: because he loves God naturally, as is clear from what has been said (Q. 60, A. 5). Therefore an angel did not need grace in order to turn to… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART II-H, Q 10, A 8 432b-433b; A 9, ANS 433b-434c; A 12 436b-437d; Q 11, A 4 441b-442b✓ correct

Whether Unbelievers Ought to Be Compelled to the Faith? Objection 1: It would seem that unbelievers ought by no means to be compelled to the faith. For it is written (Matt. 13:28) that the servants of the householder, in whose field cockle had been sown, asked him: "Wilt thou that we go and gather it up?" and that he answered: "No, lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root up the wheat also… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologies PART i-n, Q 98, : A 2, ANS 240c-241b✓ correct

Whether the Old Law Was from God? Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law was not from God. For it is written (Deut. 32:4): "The works of God are perfect." But the Law was imperfect, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore the Old Law was not from God. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Eccles. 3:14): "I have learned that all the works which God hath made continue for ever." But the Old Law does not… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART II-H, Q 10, A 9, ANS 433b-434c; A n 435d-436b; A 12, ANS 436b-437d; Q n, A 3 440b-441a✓ correct

Whether It Is Lawful to Communicate with Unbelievers? Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:27): "If any of them that believe not, invite you, and you be willing to go, eat of anything that is set before you." And Chrysostom says (Hom. xxv super Epist. ad Heb.): "If you wish to go to dine with pagans, we permit it without… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 28, A I, CONTRARY 157c-158d; A 3, CONTRARY 160a-c; Q 31, A 2, ANS 172b-173c✓ correct

Whether the Relations in God Are Really Distinguished from Each Other? Objection 1: It would seem that the divine relations are not really distinguished from each other. For things which are identified with the same, are identified with each other. But every relation in God is really the same as the divine essence. Therefore the relations are not really distinguished from each other. Obj. 2:… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theohgica, PART i-n, Q 98, A 6 244c-245b; Q 102, A 6, REP i-n 292c- 298a passim; Q 103 298b-304a; Q 106, AA 3-4 323a-325c✓ correct

Whether the Old Law Was Suitably Given at the Time of Moses? Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law was not suitably given at the time of Moses. Because the Old Law disposed man for the salvation which was to come through Christ, as stated above (AA. 2, 3). But man needed this salutary remedy immediately after he had sinned. Therefore the Law should have been given immediately after… Read the rest of this passage →

Sttmma Theologica, PART n-n, Q 42 583c-584d

Whether the Object of Fear Is Good or Evil? Objection 1: It would seem that good is the object of fear. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 83) that "we fear nothing save to lose what we love and possess, or not to obtain that which we hope for." But that which we love is good. Therefore fear regards good as its proper object. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "power and to… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theohgica, PART i-n, Q 27, A 2, REP 2 737d-738c✓ correct

Whether Knowledge Is a Cause of Love? Objection 1: It would seem that knowledge is not a cause of love. For it is due to love that a thing is sought. But some things are sought without being known, for instance, the sciences; for since "to have them is the same as to know them," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 35), if we knew them we should have them, and should not seek them. Therefore knowledge… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART HI, Q 17 806d-809d; Q 79 951b-956b passim

Whether Command Is an Act of the Reason or of the Will? Objection 1: It would seem that command is not an act of the reason but of the will. For command is a kind of motion; because Avicenna says that there are four ways of moving, "by perfecting, by disposing, by commanding, and by counselling." But it belongs to the will to move all the other powers of the soul, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 1).… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 42, A 257b-258c✓ correct

Whether There Is Equality in God? Objection 1: It would seem that equality is not becoming to the divine persons. For equality is in relation to things which are one in quantity as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 20). But in the divine persons there is no quantity, neither continuous intrinsic quantity, which we call size, nor continuous extrinsic quantity, which we call place and time.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 27, A 4, REP 2 156b-d; Q 30, A 2, REP 2 168a-169b; PART I-II, Q 25, A 2, REP 2 731b-732aj Q 27, A 3 738c-739c; Q 28, A i 740b-741a; Q 32, A 7 763c-764b✓ correct

Whether the Procession of Love in God Is Generation? Objection 1: It would seem that the procession of love in God is generation. For what proceeds by way of likeness of nature among living things is said to be generated and born. But what proceeds in God by way of love proceeds in the likeness of nature; otherwise it would be extraneous to the divine nature, and would be an external procession.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i -u, Q 57, A 5, Rhp 3 39a-40a✓ correct

Whether the Angels Know the Mysteries of Grace? Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know mysteries of grace. For, the mystery of the Incarnation is the most excellent of all mysteries. But the angels knew of it from the beginning; for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19): "This mystery was hidden in God through the ages, yet so that it was known to the princes and powers in heavenly… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 31, AA 5-6 755c-757c 23 HOBBES: leviathan, PART i, 62b-c✓ correct

Whether Bodily and Sensible Pleasures Are Greater Than Spiritual and Intellectual Pleasures? Objection 1: It would seem that bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than spiritual and intelligible pleasures. For all men seek some pleasure, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 2, 4). But more seek sensible pleasures, than intelligible spiritual pleasures. Therefore bodily pleasures are… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 55, A✓ correct

Whether the Angels Know All Things by Their Substance? Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know all things by their substance. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "the angels, according to the proper nature of a mind, know the things which are happening upon earth." But the angel's nature is his essence. Therefore the angel knows things by his essence. Obj. 2: Further, according to… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 12, A 2, ANS 777b-778b

Whether Intention Is Only of the Last End? Objection 1: It would seem that intention is only of the last end. For it is said in the book of Prosper's Sentences (Sent. 100): "The intention of the heart is a cry to God." But God is the last end of the human heart. Therefore intention is always regards the last end. Obj. 2: Further, intention regards the end as the terminus, as stated above (A. 1,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 13, A i, ANS 62c-63c; A 4 65c-66b; Q 14, A i, ANS and REP 3 75d-76c; A 2, ANS and REP 2-3 76d-77d; Q 27, A i, ANS 153b-154b; A 2, ANS and REP 2 154c-155b; A 3, ANS 155c-156a; A 4, ANS and REP 2 156b-d; Q 34, A i 185b-187b; Q 37, A i, ANS 197c-199a; Q 107, A i 549b-550b; PART I-II, Q 22, A 2, ANS 721C-722C✓ correct

Whether Names Applied to God Are Synonymous? Objection 1: It seems that these names applied to God are synonymous names. For synonymous names are those which mean exactly the same. But these names applied to God mean entirely the same thing in God; for the goodness of God is His essence, and likewise it is His wisdom. Therefore these names are entirely synonymous. Obj. 2: Further, if it be said… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 107, A i, REP 1-3 549b-550b✓ correct

Whether One Angel Speaks to Another? Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not speak to another. For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that, in the state of the resurrection "each one's body will not hide his mind from his fellows." Much less, therefore, is one angel's mind hidden from another. But speech manifests to another what lies hidden in the mind. Therefore it is not necessary that… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 29, A i, RI;P ^ 162a-163b; A 2, ANS 163b-164b; Q 30, A 4, ANS 170c-171b; Q 85, A 2, RLP 2 453d- 455b✓ correct

Whether "Person" Is the Same As Hypostasis, Subsistence, and Essence? Objection 1: It would seem that "person" is the same as "hypostasis," "subsistence," and "essence." For Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that "the Greeks called the individual substance of the rational nature by the name hypostasis." But this with us signifies "person." Therefore "person" is altogether the same as… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART ii-n, Q 9, A2,ANs424b-425a✓ correct

Whether the Gift of Knowledge Is About Divine Things? Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of knowledge is about Divine things. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "knowledge begets, nourishes and strengthens faith." Now faith is about Divine things, because its object is the First Truth, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1). Therefore the gift of knowledge also is about Divine things. Obj.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, : Q 96, A 4 1054b-1055c✓ correct

Article 4. Whether three fruits are fittingly assigned to the three parts of continence? Objection 1. It would seem that three fruits are unfittingly assigned to the three parts of continence: because twelve fruits of the Spirit are assigned, "charity, joy, peace," etc. (Galatians 5:22). Therefore seemingly we should reckon only three. Objection 2. Further, fruit denotes a special reward. Now… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 8r, A i, ANS 163a-164d; A 2 164d-165c; A 3, ANS 165d-166b; Q 82, A i, REP 2 168a-d; PART in, Q i, A 4, ANS 706a-707a✓ correct

Whether Original Sin Is a Habit? Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not a habit. For original sin is the absence of original justice, as Anselm states (De Concep. Virg. ii, iii, xxvi), so that original sin is a privation. But privation is opposed to habit. Therefore original sin is not a habit. Obj. 2: Further, actual sin has the nature of fault more than original sin, in so far as… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 89, A 2 199c-200d✓ correct

Whether Venial Sins Are Suitably Designated As "Wood, Hay, and Stubble"? Objection 1: It would seem that venial sins are unsuitably designated as "wood, hay, and stubble." Because wood, hay, and stubble are said (1 Cor. 3:12) to be built on a spiritual foundation. Now venial sins are something outside a spiritual foundation, even as false opinions are outside the pale of science. Therefore,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 81, A 5 167a-d; Q 82, A 2, RLP i 168d-169c; Q 89, A 3 200d-201d✓ correct

Whether If Eve, and Not Adam, Had Sinned, Their Children Would Have Contracted Original Sin? Objection 1: It would seem that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have contracted original sin. Because we contract original sin from our parents, in so far as we were once in them, according to the word of the Apostle (Rom. 5:12): "In whom all have sinned." Now a man pre-exists in… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART r, Q 76, A 5, REP i 394c-396a; QQ 94-102 501c-527a,c

Whether Ignorance Diminishes a Sin? Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance does not diminish a sin. For that which is common to all sins does not diminish sin. Now ignorance is common to all sins, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that "every evil man is ignorant." Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin. Obj. 2: Further, one sin added to another makes a greater sin. But ignorance…

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 114, A 3, ANS 583b-d✓ correct

Whether All Sins Are Due to the Temptation of the Devil? Objection 1: It would seem that all sins are due to the temptation of the devil. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the multitude of demons is the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to others." And Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that "all malice and all uncleanness have been devised by the devil." Obj. 2: Further, of… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 77, A 4 148b-149a; Q 84, A 2 175b-176a; A 4, ANS and REP 4 176d-178a✓ correct

Whether Self-love Is the Source of Every Sin? Objection 1: It would seem that self-love is not the source of every sin. For that which is good and right in itself is not the proper cause of sin. Now love of self is a good and right thing in itself: wherefore man is commanded to love his neighbor as himself (Lev. 19:18). Therefore self-love cannot be the proper cause of sin. Obj. 2: Further, the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 48, A 5, RF,P 3 263a-d; Q 63, A 7, ANS 331c-332b; A 8 332c-333b; Q 92, A i, REP 3 488d-489d; Q 114 581d-585c; PART i-n, Q i, A 7, REP i 614c-615a; Q 42, A 3 802d-803c✓ correct

Whether Evil Is Adequately Divided into Pain* and Fault? [*Pain here means "penalty": such was its original signification, being derived from "poena." In this sense we say "Pain of death, Pain of loss, Pain of sense."—Ed.] Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not adequately divided into pain and fault. For every defect is a kind of evil. But in all creatures there is the defect of not being… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, QQ 85-87 178b-192d; Q 89, A i 199a-c; Q 94, A 6 225d-226b; Q 109 338a-347d passim; PART ii-n, Q 24, A 12 499c-500d✓ correct

Whether Venial Sin Causes a Stain on the Soul? Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin causes a stain in the soul. For Augustine says (De Poenit.) [*Hom. 50, inter. L., 2], that if venial sins be multiplied, they destroy the beauty of our souls so as to deprive us of the embraces of our heavenly spouse. But the stain of sin is nothing else but the loss of the soul's beauty. Therefore venial… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, o 87, A (>, ANS and REP 2 189c-190c; A 7, ANS and RLP 3 190c-191d; A 8, ANS 191d-192d; Q 102, A 3, RI-.P 8-11 272b-276c; PART in, QQ 61-65 855a 884a,c✓ correct

Whether a Suitable Cause Can Be Assigned for the Ceremonies Which Pertained to Sacrifices? Objection 1: It would seem that no suitable cause can be assigned for the ceremonies pertaining to sacrifices. For those things which were offered in sacrifice, are those which are necessary for sustaining human life: such as certain animals and certain loaves. But God needs no such sustenance; according… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, Q 87 997a-1000c; Q 97, A 2 1066d-1067b✓ correct

Article 1. Whether after the resurrection every one will know what sins he has committed? Objection 1. It seems that after the resurrection everyone will not be able to know all the sins he has committed. For whatever we know, either we receive it anew through the senses, or we draw it from the treasure house of the memory. Now after the resurrection men will be unable to perceive their sins by… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 73, A 6 123d-124c; A 10 128a-d; Q 74 128d-137c; Q 75, AA 1-2 137d-139b; Q 76, AA 3-4 142d- 144d; Q 77, AA 6-7 150a-151c; QQ 78-80 152b- 162d; PART ii-ii, Q 186, A 10 662b-663b✓ correct

Whether the Gravity of a Sin Depends on Its Cause? Objection 1: It would seem that the gravity of a sin does not depend on its cause. Because the greater a sin's cause, the more forcibly it moves to sin, and so the more difficult is it to resist. But sin is lessened by the fact that it is difficult to resist; for it denotes weakness in the sinner, if he cannot easily resist sin; and a sin that… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 81, A $, REP 2 430c-431d \✓ correct

Whether Sensuality Is Only Appetitive? Objection 1: It would seem that sensuality is not only appetitive, but also cognitive. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "the sensual movement of the soul which is directed to the bodily senses is common to us and beasts." But the bodily senses belong to the apprehensive powers. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power. Obj. 2: Further, things… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 87, : A 8, ANS 191d-192d; Q 105, A 4, REP 1-4 318b-321a b✓ correct

Whether Anyone Is Punished for Another's Sin? Objection 1: It would seem that one may be punished for another's sin. For it is written (Ex. 20:5): "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate Me"; and (Matt. 23:35): "That upon you may come all the just blood that hath been shed upon the earth." Obj.… Read the rest of this passage →

Stimma Theologica, PART i, Q 51, A i, RLP i 275b-276b; Q 75, A i 378b-379c; AA 4-5 381b 383b; g 76, A i 385d-388c; A 4, REP i 393a-394c✓ correct

Whether the Angels Have Bodies Naturally United to Them? Objection 1: It would seem that angels have bodies naturally united to them. For Origen says (Peri Archon i): "It is God's attribute alone—that is, it belongs to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, as a property of nature, that He is understood to exist without any material substance and without any companionship of corporeal… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, 3 [73 6 i 5-737*12] 277b-d Q 69, A 3 887d 889c✓ correct

Article 3. Whether the souls who are in heaven or hell are able to go from thence? Objection 1. It would seem that the souls in heaven or hell are unable to go from thence. For Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xiii): "If the souls of the dead took any part in the affairs of the living, to say nothing of others, there is myself whom not for a single night would my loving mother fail to visit… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 77, A A 4 -7 403a-406b; PART i-n, Q 9, AA 1-2 657d- 659c; Q 37, A i, ANS 783d-784c✓ correct

Whether Among the Powers of the Soul There Is Order? Objection 1: It would seem that there is no order among the powers of the soul. For in those things which come under one division, there is no before and after, but all are naturally simultaneous. But the powers of the soul are contradistinguished from one another. Therefore there is no order among them. Obj. 2: Further, the powers of the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 76, AA 1-3 385d-393a; o 78, A 4, REP 5 411d-413d; Q 81, A 3, REP 2 430c-431d

Whether in Man There Is Another Form Besides the Intellectual Soul? Objection 1: It would seem that in man there is another form besides the intellectual soul. For the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1), that "the soul is the act of a physical body which has life potentially." Therefore the soul is to the body as a form of matter. But the body has a substantial form by which it is a body.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 77, A i 399c-401b; AA 5-6 403d-405c; Q 79, A i 414a-d 2c. The kinds of soul and the modes of life: vegetative, sensitive, and rational souls and their special powers✓ correct

Whether All the Powers of the Soul Are in the Soul As Their Subject? Objection 1: It would seem that all the powers of the soul are in the soul as their subject. For as the powers of the body are to the body; so are the powers of the soul to the soul. But the body is the subject of the corporeal powers. Therefore the soul is the subject of the powers of the soul. Obj. 2: Further, the operations… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-ii, Q 67 A 13 519d-520d; PART in SUPPL, Q 69, A 3, REP 5 887d 889c; Q 70 893c-900d✓ correct

Whether Charity Remains After This Life, in Glory? Objection 1: It would seem that charity does not remain after this life, in glory. Because according to 1 Cor. 13:10, "when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part," i.e. that which is imperfect, "shall be done away." Now the charity of the wayfarer is imperfect. Therefore it will be done away when the perfection of glory is…

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, Q 75 935a-939c; Q 80, A i, ANS and REP i 956c- 957c; A 3, ANS and RLP 2 958b-959c; Q 81, A 4 966d-967d; Q 9}, A i, ANS 1037d-1039a✓ correct

Article 1. Whether there is to be a resurrection of the body? Objection 1. It would seem that there is not to be a resurrection of the body: for it is written (Job 14:12): "Man, when he is fallen asleep, shall not rise again till the heavens be broken." But the heavens shall never be broken, since the earth, to which seemingly this is still less applicable, "standeth for ever" (Ecclesiastes… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 66, A i, REP i 343d-345c :✓ correct

Objection 1: It would seem that formlessness of matter preceded in time its formation. For it is said (Gen. 1:2): "The earth was void and empty," or "invisible and shapeless," according to another version [*Septuagint]; by which is understood the formlessness of matter, as Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12). Therefore matter was formless until it received its form. Obj. 2: Further, nature in its… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 53 280d-284d✓ correct

Whether an Angel Can Be Moved Locally? Objection 1: It seems that an angel cannot be moved locally. For, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 32, 86) "nothing which is devoid of parts is moved"; because, while it is in the term wherefrom, it is not moved; nor while it is in the term whereto, for it is then already moved; consequently it remains that everything which is moved, while it is… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, Q 83, AA 2-4 976c-981b; A 5, ANS and REP 2 981b-982c; A 6, ANS and REP 2 982c-983b✓ correct

Article 5. Whether by virtue of its subtlety a glorified body will no longer need to be in an equal place? Objection 1. It would seem that by virtue of its subtlety, a glorified body will no longer need to be in an equal place. For the glorified bodies will be made like to the body of Christ according to Philippians 3:21. Now Christ's body is not bound by this necessity of being in an equal… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 72, A 4, REP 2,4 143d-144d; Q 77, A 5 149a-150a; Q 88, A 5 196d-198a; Q 100, A 4, ANS 253d- 255a; PART n-n, Q 46 603c-605a,c✓ correct

Whether Sin Is Fittingly Divided into Sin Against God, Against Oneself, and Against One's Neighbor? Objection 1: It would seem that sin is unfittingly divided into sin against God, against one's neighbor, and against oneself. For that which is common to all sins should not be reckoned as a part in the division of sin. But it is common to all sins to be against God: for it is stated in the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, Q 91, A 2, REP 3 1017c-1020c✓ correct

Article 2. Whether the movement of the heavenly bodies will cease? Objection 1. It seems that when the world is thus renewed the movement of the heavenly bodies will not cease. For it is written (Genesis 8:22): "All the days of the earth . . . cold and heat, summer and winter, night and day shall not cease." Now night and day, summer and winter result from the movement of the sun. Therefore the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 12, A 10 59a-d; Q 46, A 2, REP i 253a-255a✓ correct

Whether Those Who See the Essence of God See All They See in It at the Same Time? Objection 1: It seems that those who see the essence of God do not see all they see in Him at one and the same time. For according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii): "It may happen that many things are known, but only one is understood." But what is seen in God, is understood; for God is seen by the intellect.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 40, A 6 796c-797a✓ correct

Whether Hope Abounds in Young Men and Drunkards? Objection 1: It would seem that youth and drunkenness are not causes of hope. Because hope implies certainty and steadiness; so much so that it is compared to an anchor (Heb. 6:19). But young men and drunkards are wanting in steadiness; since their minds are easily changed. Therefore youth and drunkenness are not causes of hope. Obj. 2: Further,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 16, A i 94b-95c; A 7, REP 4 99a-d; Q 17, A i lOOd- lOld; Q 21, A 2, ANS 125c-d✓ correct

Whether Created Truth Is Eternal? Objection 1: It seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) "Nothing is more eternal than the nature of a circle, and that two added to three make five." But the truth of these is a created truth. Therefore created truth is eternal. Obj. 2: Further, that which is always, is eternal. But universals are always and everywhere;… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 58, A 4, REP 2 302d-303c✓ correct

Whether the Angels Understand by Composing and Dividing? Objection 1: It would seem that the angels understand by composing and dividing. For, where there is multiplicity of things understood, there is composition of the same, as is said in De Anima iii, text. 21. But there is a multitude of things understood in the angelic mind; because angels apprehend different things by various species, and… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 100, A 5, ANS and REP 5 255a-257c; A 6, ANS 257c-258c✓ correct

Whether the Precepts of the Decalogue Are Suitably Set Forth? Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably set forth. Because sin, as stated by Ambrose (De Paradiso viii), is "a transgression of the Divine law and a disobedience to the commandments of heaven." But sins are distinguished according as man sins against God, or his neighbor, or himself. Since, then,… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 82, A 3, REP i 433c-434c; PART i-n, Q 29, A 5 747c-748b✓ correct

Whether the Will Is a Higher Power Than the Intellect? Objection 1: It would seem that the will is a higher power than the intellect. For the object of the will is good and the end. But the end is the first and highest cause. Therefore the will is the first and highest power. Obj. 2: Further, in the order of natural things we observe a progress from imperfect things to perfect. And this also… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 4, A 4, REP i 733a-734a 28 365c-366a pensations of equity

Whether Rectitude of the Will Is Necessary for Happiness? Objection 1: It would seem that rectitude of the will is not necessary for Happiness. For Happiness consists essentially in an operation of the intellect, as stated above (Q. 3, A. 4). But rectitude of the will, by reason of which men are said to be clean of heart, is not necessary for the perfect operation of the intellect: for Augustine… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i -n, Q 73, A 7 124d-125c✓ correct

Whether a Circumstance Aggravates a Sin? Objection 1: It would seem that a circumstance does not aggravate a sin. Because sin takes its gravity from its species. Now a circumstance does not specify a sin, for it is an accident thereof. Therefore the gravity of a sin is not taken from a circumstance. Obj. 2: Further, a circumstance is either evil or not: if it is evil, it causes, of itself, a… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Thcologica, PART i-n, Q 32, A 6 762d-763c; Q 34, A i 768c-769d; A 4 771c- 772b✓ correct

Whether Doing Good to Another Is a Cause of Pleasure? Objection 1: It would seem that doing good to another is not a cause of pleasure. Because pleasure is caused by one's obtaining one's proper good, as stated above (AA. 1, 5; Q. 31, A. 1). But doing good pertains not to the obtaining but to the spending of one's proper good. Therefore it seems to be the cause of sadness rather than of… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART 1-11, Q 60, A 5, ANS 53a-54d; Q 65, A i, REP i 70b-72a; Q 84, A i 174b-175a; PART ii-n, Q 186, A 3,

Whether Poverty Is Required for Religious Perfection? Objection 1: It would seem that poverty is not required for religious perfection. For that which it is unlawful to do does not apparently belong to the state of perfection. But it would seem to be unlawful for a man to give up all he possesses; since the Apostle (2 Cor. 8:12) lays down the way in which the faithful are to give alms saying:… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART II-H, Q 25, Rhetoric, BK 11, CH 4 [i38i*i2- 38] 626d-627d A i, REP 2 501b-502a …✓ correct

Whether the Love of Charity Stops at God, or Extends to Our Neighbor? Objection 1: It would seem that the love of charity stops at God and does not extend to our neighbor. For as we owe God love, so do we owe Him fear, according Deut. 10:12: "And now Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear . . . and love Him?" Now the fear with which we fear man, and which is… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART H-II, Q 29, A 2, REP 2 531a-d; Q 40, A i, ANS 578a- 579b✓ correct

Whether All Things Desire Peace? Objection 1: It would seem that not all things desire peace. For, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. xi), peace "unites consent." But there cannot be unity of consent in things which are devoid of knowledge. Therefore such things cannot desire peace. Obj. 2: Further, the appetite does not tend to opposite things at the same time. Now many desire war and… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART n-n, Q 40, A 2, ANS 579b-580c

Whether Hope Is in the Apprehensive or in the Appetitive Power? Objection 1: It would seem that hope belongs to the cognitive power. Because hope, seemingly, is a kind of awaiting; for the Apostle says (Rom. 8:25): "If we hope for that which we see not; we wait for it with patience." But awaiting seems to belong to the cognitive power, which we exercise by looking out. Therefore hope belongs to… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART ii-ii, Q : 29, A 2, REP 2 531a-d; Q 40, A i, ANS and REP 1,3 578a-579b

Whether It Is Always Sinful to Wage War? Objection 1: It would seem that it is always sinful to wage war. Because punishment is not inflicted except for sin. Now those who wage war are threatened by Our Lord with punishment, according to Matt. 26:52: "All that take the sword shall perish with the sword." Therefore all wars are unlawful. Obj. 2: Further, whatever is contrary to a Divine… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologies PART H-II, Q 40, A 3 580d-581b✓ correct

Whether It Is Lawful for Clerics and Bishops to Fight? Objection 1: It would seem lawful for clerics and bishops to fight. For, as stated above (A. 1), wars are lawful and just in so far as they protect the poor and the entire common weal from suffering at the hands of the foe. Now this seems to be above all the duty of prelates, for Gregory says (Hom. in Ev. xiv): "The wolf comes upon the…

Summa Theologica, PART II-H, Q 32, AA 5-6 544a-546b✓ correct

Whether Almsgiving Is a Matter of Precept? Objection 1: It would seem that almsgiving is not a matter of precept. For the counsels are distinct from the precepts. Now almsgiving is a matter of counsel, according to Dan. 4:24: "Let my counsel be acceptable to the King; [Vulg.: 'to thee, and'] redeem thou thy sins with alms." Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of precept. Obj. 2: Further, it is… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART ii-n, Q 32 540a-550a✓ correct

Whether Almsgiving Is an Act of Charity? Objection 1: It would seem that almsgiving is not an act of charity. For without charity one cannot do acts of charity. Now it is possible to give alms without having charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:3: "If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor . . . and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." Therefore almsgiving is not an act of… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Thcologica, PART i, Q 82, A 4 434c-435c; PART i n, Q 9 657d-662d; Q 17, A 5 689c-690b

Whether the Will Moves the Intellect? Objection 1: It would seem that the will does not move the intellect. For what moves excels and precedes what is moved, because what moves is an agent, and "the agent is nobler than the patient," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16), and the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5). But the intellect excels and precedes the will, as we have said above (A. 3).… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 6, A 4, REP 3 647b-648a; A A 6-7 649a-650d; Q 9, A 2 658d-659c; A 4, CONTRARY 660a-d; A 5, ANS and REP 2-3 660d-662a; Q 10, A 3 664d-665c✓ correct

Whether Violence Can Be Done to the Will? Objection 1: It would seem that violence can be done to the will. For everything can be compelled by that which is more powerful. But there is something, namely, God, that is more powerful than the human will. Therefore it can be compelled, at least by Him. Obj. 2: Further, every passive subject is compelled by its active principle, when it is changed… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, QQ 19- 21 108d-127c; Q 59, A i, ANS 306c-307b; A 2, ANS 307c-308b; Q 60, A i, REP 2 310b-311a; Q 61, A 2, REP i 315c-316a; Q 62, A 6, REP i 322a-d; Q 63, A i, ANS 325c-326c; Q 66, A 2, ANS 345d-347b; PART i-n, Q i, A 2, REP 3 610b-611b; Q 10, A i, REP 2 662d-663d; Q 19, AA 9-10 709d-711d; Q 39, A 2, REP 3 790d- 791b✓ correct

Whether in the Angels the Will Differs from the Intellect? Objection 1: It would seem that in the angel the will does not differ from the intellect and from the nature. For an angel is more simple than a natural body. But a natural body is inclined through its form towards its end, which is its good. Therefore much more so is the angel. Now the angel's form is either the nature in which he… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theokgica, PART i-n, Q 109, A 2, REP i 339c-340b✓ correct

Whether Man Can Wish or Do Any Good Without Grace? Objection 1: It would seem that man can wish and do good without grace. For that is in man's power, whereof he is master. Now man is master of his acts, and especially of his willing, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1; Q. 13, A. 6). Hence man, of himself, can wish and do good without the help of grace. Obj. 2: Further, man has more power over what is… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 74, AA 1-2 129a-130a; Q 109, A 2 339c-340b; AA 7-10 344a-347d 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, [52-105] 77b-d; xvn [82]-xvm [75] 79b-80c; PARADISE, i [94-142] 107b-d; iv [64-114] lllb-d; v [19-30] 112b; vn [25-33] 115c✓ correct

Whether the Will Is a Subject of Sin? Objection 1: It would seem that the will cannot be a subject of sin. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside the will and the intention." But sin has the character of evil. Therefore sin cannot be in the will. Obj. 2: Further, the will is directed either to the good or to what seems good. Now from the fact that will wishes the good, it does… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 82, A i,ANS and REP i 431d-432c; Q 83, A i, REP 1-5 436d-438a; Q 105, A 4, REP i 541c-542a; PART I-H, Q 6, A 4 647b-648a; A 5, REP i 648b- 649a; Q 9, A 4, REP 2 660a-d✓ correct

Whether the Will Desires Something of Necessity? Objection 1: It would seem that the will desires nothing of necessity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that it anything is necessary, it is not voluntary. But whatever the will desires is voluntary. Therefore nothing that the will desires is desired of necessity. Obj. 2: Further, the rational powers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologies PART i-n, Q 19, A 8, ANS 708d-709d✓ correct

Whether the Degree of Goodness or Malice in the Will Depends on the Degree of Good or Evil in the Intention? Objection 1: It would seem that the degree of goodness in the will depends on the degree of good in the intention. Because on Matt. 12:35, "A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is good," a gloss says: "A man does as much good as he intends." But the… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 25, A 3, REP 3 145b-147a; PART i-n, Q 19, AA 3-6 704c-708a; AA 9-10 709d-711d :✓ correct

Whether God Is Omnipotent? Objection 1: It seems that God is not omnipotent. For movement and passiveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with God, for He is immovable, as was said above (Q. 2, A. 3). Therefore He is not omnipotent. Obj. 2: Further, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot sin, nor "deny Himself" as it is said in 2 Tim. 2:13. Therefore He is not omnipotent. Obj.… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART n-ii, QQ 8-9 416d-426c passim; Q 19, A 7 469d-470c; Q 45 598c-603c; PART in SUPPL, Q 92 1025b- 1037c

Whether the Goodness of the Will, As Regards the Means, Depends on the Intention of the End? Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on the intention of the end. For it has been stated above (A. 2) that the goodness of the will depends on the object alone. But as regards the means, the object of the will is one thing, and the end intended is another. Therefore in… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 25, AA 5-6 147d-150a✓ correct

Whether God Can Do What He Does Not? Objection 1: It seems that God cannot do other than what He does. For God cannot do what He has not foreknown and pre-ordained that He would do. But He neither foreknew nor pre-ordained that He would do anything except what He does. Therefore He cannot do except what He does. Obj. 2: Further, God can only do what ought to be done and what is right to be… Read the rest of this passage →

Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 25, ; 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 252b-253a; 443a-b✓ correct

Whether There Is Power in God? Objection 1: It seems that power is not in God. For as primary matter is to power, so God, who is the first agent, is to act. But primary matter, considered in itself, is devoid of all act. Therefore, the first agent—namely, God—is devoid of power. Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi, 19), better than every power is its act. For form is… Read the rest of this passage →

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