Immanuel Kant was a German philosopher. Born in Königsberg in the Kingdom of Prussia, he is considered one of the central thinkers of the Enlightenment.
Practical principles are propositions which contain a general determination of the will, having under it several practical rules. They are subjective, or maxims, when the condition is regarded by the subject as valid only for his own will, but are objective, or practical laws, when the condition is recognized as objective, that is, valid for the will of every rational being.
Remark.
Supposing… Read the rest of this passage →
Practical Reason, 334b-335b A 5, ANS 58b-59d; Q 91, A i 208b-d; PART in,
Practical principles are propositions which contain a general determination of the will, having under it several practical rules. They are subjective, or maxims, when the condition is regarded by the subject as valid only for his own will, but are objective, or practical laws, when the condition is recognized as objective, that is, valid for the will of every rational being.
Remark.
Supposing… Read the rest of this passage →
Science of Right, 450a-d \b to 2b CHAPTER 3: ARISTOCRACY '59✓ correct
I am so connected with it, that if any other person should make use of it without my consent, he would do me a lesion or injury. The subjective condition of the use of anything is possession of it.
An external thing, however as such could only be mine, if I may assume it to be possible that I can be wronged by the use which another might make of it when it is not actually in my possession. Hence…
If we have hitherto drawn our notion of duty from the common use of our practical reason, it is by no means to be inferred that we have treated it as an empirical notion. On the contrary, if we attend to the experience of men's conduct, we meet frequent and, as we ourselves allow, just complaints that one cannot find a single certain example of the disposition to act from pure duty. Although many… Read the rest of this passage →
Fund. Prin. Metophysic of Morals, B[753*7-15] [ii48 46^ 4] 398d; BK nil, CH i [i 155*1 6-21] > 262c-263a✓ correct
Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good, without qualification, except a good will. Intelligence, wit, judgement, and the other talents of the mind, however they may be named, or courage, resolution, perseverance, as qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects; but these gifts of nature may also become extremely… Read the rest of this passage →
In the foregoing chapter we have merely considered the general conditions under which alone the transcendental faculty of judgement is justified in using the pure conceptions of the understanding for synthetical judgements. Our duty at present is to exhibit in systematic connection those judgements which the understanding really produces a priori. For this purpose, our table of the categories… Read the rest of this passage →
But the discovery of what is required for calling an object beautiful must be reserved for the analysis of judgements of taste. In my search for the moments to which attention is paid by this judgement in its reflection, I have followed the guidance of the logical functions of judging (for a judgement of taste always involves a reference to understanding). I have brought the moment of quality…
Fund. Pnn. Metaphvsic of Morals, 256a- b / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 377d 44 Bosw ELL: Johnson, 251a; 539b✓ correct
Table of Contents
Preface
Introduction to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics
Exposition of the Conception of Ethics
Exposition of the Notion of an End which is also a Duty
Of the Reason for conceiving an End which is also a Duty
What are the Ends which are also Duties?
Explanation of these two Notions
Ethics does not supply Laws for Actions (which is done by Jurisprudence), but only for… Read the rest of this passage →